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Risk management in banking operations is a popular topic among researchers in the 
fields of management and banking. Due to developments in technology, research on 
financial technology has also become a hot topic. Banks and financial technology 
companies (fintechs) need to learn what risks impact their operations and how to 
manage these risks effectively. The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship 
between risk management and bank performance, compare it between traditional banks 
and challenger banks/fintechs, and make suggestions on how to improve performance 
by analysing historical data. 
This thesis adopts a mixed-method approach, estimating risk variables and their impacts 
on bank performance through panel data regression models (random-effects and 
generalised method of moments) and conducting case studies to contribute to 
knowledge in theory and practice. This research investigates the relationship between 
five main types of risks (credit risk, market risk, liquidity and capital risk, reputational 
risk, and operational risk) and bank performance measured by three variables (ROA, 
ROE and EPS). This study confirms the importance of risk management in bank 
performance. For example, credit risk variables show negative impacts on all banks, 
which suggests that reducing credit risks could increase bank performance. Market risk 
variables are complex with both positive and negative effects on bank performance. 
Thus, banks should keep market risk at a balanced level to receive better performance. 
Moreover, bank performance could be increased by increasing liquidity, capital and 
reputation as well as reducing debt, operational issues and costs.  
The contributions of this research include the enhancement of literature on the 
relationship between bank performance and risk management. Also, this research 
creates a greater awareness of risk management for challenger banks and fintechs. 
Moreover, it fills gaps in the literature by comparing results for traditional banks with 
those for challenger banks and fintechs. The results of this research offer new insights 
into risk management for both traditional banks and challenger banks and fintechs for 
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academics and have the potential to assist traditional banks and challenger banks and 
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1.1 Introduction  
The financial environment has changed since the last century. Financial technology 
innovations, increased global connections, several financial crises, and customer 
behaviour are all changing the ways banks provide services. With the complexity of the 
banking system growing and developing, these changes are becoming ever more 
demanding. Indeed, these changes have forced banks and financial companies to build 
more operational channels and strengthen their risk management (Cortiñas et al., 2010).  
In more detail, the banking system has also faced different challenges through these 
changes. For example, fintechs are built to compete with traditional banks. The word 
'Fintechs' is short for financial technology companies, and can also be seen as a type of 
challenger banks. In practice, fintechs cover many financial areas (e.g. banking, 
insurance and logistics). In this research, we only focused on those who operate bank 
related business more digitally and which were established recently. They have gained 
ground in the banking sector. Indeed, they provide similar banking services but mainly 
using digital means. In addition, consumer behaviour is shifting from physical 
transactions to digitisation. Traditionally, bank customers bought financial services and 
products through bank branches. With technological improvements, these services can 
be applied for through fintechs, changing the ways customers obtain these products and 
services. 
Another reason for fintech development is the impacts of the last financial crisis, where 
traditional banks did not perform well, some of them even went bankrupt. Fintechs used 
this opportunity to reach more of the marketplace. However, after the crisis, traditional 
banks were required to have better risk management. Fintechs also did not perform as 
well as expected, where the main reason for which could be a high-risk approach in 
their management. 
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In order to have a better understanding of banks' and fintechs' performance through risk 
management, this research focuses on the risk variables and their impacts, based on the 
results available in the banks’ semi-annually documented reports. With the analysis of 
three different countries for both traditional banks and fintechs, this research provides 
comparisons among these countries and bank types. This chapter gives an introductory 
overview of the thesis. It starts with an explanation of the research rationale. Then it 
provides the research aims, questions and objectives. The expected research 
contributions and methodology adopted are listed, followed by an outline of the 
organisation of the thesis. 
1.2 Rationale of the research 
The relationship between risk management and bank performance has been widely 
studied in the literature. Some studies focused on bank risk management, e.g. Bessis & 
O'Kelly (2015), Calomiris & Carlson (2016) and Docherty & Viort (2014). Indeed, 
Calomiris & Carlson (2016) analysed US bank risks from the 1890s by using regression 
models, while Bessis & O'Kelly (2015) focused on general risk management for the 
global banking system. Moreover, Docherty & Viort (2014) explained the consequence 
of risk management failure and regulation related to risk management by applying case 
studies in the UK, US, Canada and Australia, which also provided literature links to 
this thesis. Some other studies centred on the relationship between bank risk 
management and their performance by using panel data analysis, e.g. Anggaredho & 
Rokhim (2017), Fu & Heffernan (2006), Geng et al. (2016) and Hryckiewicz & 
Kozlowski (2017). In more detail, Fu & Heffernan (2009) investigated liquidity risk 
and its effect on Chinese traditional banks. Geng et al. (2016) concentrated on interest 
rate risk and its influence on Chinese traditional banks. Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski 
(2017) focused more on the impacts of the financial crisis on banks from 65 countries, 
while Anggaredho & Rokhim (2017) only investigated Indonesian banks.  
However, due to the fact that fintechs are a relatively new area in the banking industry, 
there are only limited existing studies. Examples include the work of Chishti & Barberis 
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(2016) who studied the general development of the fintech industry as well as the 
studies of Francis et al. (2012) and Barberis & Arner (2016) who examined the value 
of bank innovation in the US and China, respectively. Other relevant studies include 
those of Aldriges & Krawciw (2017), Kotarba (2016) and Yurcan (2018), all of whom 
investigated risk management in fintechs. 
With a holistic view, this research will review the literature on risk management in both 
traditional banks and fintechs. Following similar statistical methods and case studies 
found in the literature, this research will apply an analysis based on panel data 
regression models and case studies. Through comparisons, this thesis will examine the 
differences between fintechs and traditional banks, together with the differences shown 
among three different countries. It is important that banks, managers and investors can 
predict future performance based on their risk management performance using the 
regression models. The results will add new insight into banks' and fintechs' current 
models and enable banks to manage their risks to achieve better operations and 
improved financial performance. 
1.3 Research aims, questions and objectives 
The principal research aims are: 
To investigate the risk management of banks and evaluate bank performance 
through statistical models; To examine how different types of risks affect the 
performance of traditional banks and fintechs; To compare the differences between 
countries and between traditional banks and fintechs and to provide a more 
comprehensive view of banks' risk management. 
Based on the research aims, this study aims to answer the following research questions: 
1. What are the critical characteristics of bank risk management variables, and how 
can we use them to analyse bank performance through bank data?   
2. What differences are shown between traditional banks and challenger banks and 
fintechs in their risk management? 
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3. What differences exist among three different countries in risk management and 
bank performance, and how well did these countries react to the last financial 
crisis? 
4. Through the analysis, what should these banks and fintechs do to improve risk 
management for future challenges?   
According to Jogulu and Pansiri (2011), a step by step approach allows a more 
comprehensive study that answers the research question better. Thus, this study aims to 
address the following research objectives: 
1. To understand key characteristics of risk management (e.g. risk types, variables 
and measurement, and legalisations) in the banking industry through extensive 
literature reviewing. 
2. To investigate traditional banks and challenger banks and fintechs in the banking 
industry (e.g. growth, performance and risk management) by collecting data 
from interim and annual reports.  
3. To use appropriate statistical models to analyse the performance of traditional 
banks and challenger banks and fintechs through the collected risk management 
variables. 
4. To compare the differences between traditional banks and challenger banks and 
fintechs and between countries to highlight the pros and cons of risk 
management and performance. 
5. Based on the results, to apply suggestions and provide recommendations for 
traditional banks and challenger banks and fintechs to improve performance. 
1.4 Expected Contributions to Knowledge 
This research will contribute to the literature in three ways. First, this research is unique 
because it analyses risk variables related not only to traditional banks but also to 
fintechs using panel data regression models. Previous literature, such as Fu & Heffernan 
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(2009) and Geng et al. (2016), only focused on Chinese traditional banks. Their work 
only investigates risk management in Chinese traditional banks from 1985 to 2002 and 
2001 to 2012, respectively. Based on their suggestions, the importance of studying the 
years after 2012, for other countries and for another type of bank is clear. These will all 
be addressed in this thesis. We investigate risk management and its impact on both 
traditional banks and fintechs in 2013-2017 for three countries (China, the UK and 
Australia). 
Moreover, there is limited existing literature related to fintechs. The analysis of this 
literature provided a background explaination for fintechs' risk management and 
performance, such as Hong et al. (2014) and Xu et al. (2014). Because of this, this 
research creates a better risk management awareness for fintechs, thus allowing us to 
solve bank operational problems as well. Thirdly, in an original way, we compare the 
results of traditional banks to those of fintechs, thereby, adding to the existing literature. 
Also, this research applies case studies in both traditional banks and fintechs to support 
the analysis from the panel data regression models. Therefore, this study provides a 
relatively comprehensive analysis of bank performance and risk management.  
Thus, this research is suitable for PhD level because it requires an in-depth 
understanding and knowledge of banking risk management, financial innovations in the 
current financial environment, and the new banking area of challenger banks and 
fintechs. It will also provide comparative case studies of China, the UK and Australia. 
This research attempts to fill the gaps in risk management analysis of fintechs and 
comparisons between traditional banks and fintechs between countries. Also, the 
research results and research-developed models have useful implications in practice. 
1.5 Research methodology overview 
The research follows a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
identify the critical risk factors of traditional banks and challenger banks and fintechs 
and their impacts on bank performance. The quantitative approach involves numerical 
measurement and analysis, and the qualitative approach involves a textual description 
 6 
of the research (Kothari & Garg, 2014). Although it seems like two different approaches, 
in practice, these can be combined in a mixed-methods study (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002).  
Before applying the quantitative and qualitative approaches, we start from a 
philosophical perspective. We contextualise the situation with the investigation of risk 
management and its impacts on both types of banks in the literature review in Chapter 
2. Then, we use financial reports and case studies of Chinese, the UK and Australia 
banks to collect quantitative and qualitative data. Next, we collect and analyse 
information from bank financial reports, looking for evidence of risk management and 
its impact on bank performance. Similar to Docherty & Viort (2014), we use 
representative samples to address case studies which can illustrate the results achieved 
from our panel data regression models.  
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters. A diagrammatic outline is presented in 
Figure 1.1, which shows the links between chapters. From Figure 1.1, we see the 
introductory chapter is followed by the chapter dealing with theoretical and statistical 
models in the literature in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is the research methodology which 
provides links with the previous chapter. Chapter 4 contains our panel data regression 
analysis and our case studies follow in Chapter 5. We then discuss our findings in 
Chapter 6, and finally, our conclusions are presented in Chapter 7. 
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For the last decades, globalisation and high-tech involvements have been the main 
trends of the global economy, while the financial system has played a vital role. At the 
same time, innovative financial products and services have increased competition and 
changed the global banking environment. Consumers now have more choices when 
buying financial services and products. Therefore, banks have to live in a more 
competitive environment (MacDonald & Koch, 2006). Moreover, the 2007-09 financial 
crisis had substantial impacts on every aspect of the global economy, especially in the 
banking industry. After the crisis, the Basel Committee released a tightening of financial 
regulation and risk management procedures for the banking industry. Therefore, bank 
risk management has become more critical than before.  
In banking operations, the responsibility for managers is to maintain financial health by 
producing financial reports, investment activities, development strategies, and 
managing risks (Sokanu, 2015). Before the crisis, authorities paid more attention to the 
capital and market requirements which led to fierce competition between mortgage 
lenders. In order to earn more revenue and market share, mortgage lenders worked on 
subprime lending, which threatened the whole financial system and led to the global 
financial crisis. After the crisis, government authorities paid more attention to bank risk 
management. Understanding bank risk management is one of the best ways to see how 
banks work. For example, Koch and MacDonald (2015) discussed the nature of 
financial management, outlined the changes of economic environment especially in the 
US, indicated the measures for evaluating bank performance and risk management 
(SOAS, 2015). Bank regulation is another subject that needs to be understood. The 
basic idea of regulation is to ensure the safety of financial institutions and customers. 
For instance, Docherty and Viort (2014) described the regulations in the banking 
industry through time, and these regulations provided requirements for banks to follow 
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and improve their performance. 
Risks may occur at any time, but to address and solve every risk is very expensive, both 
in time and resources. So risk management is a continuous process. When managing 
risks, regulators, managers and analysts need to have identify, analyse, distinguish, and 
communicate skills (Greenfield, 2000). Therefore, identifying different types of risks 
could help managers to analyse, monitor, manage and reduce risks. Many risks exist in 
bank operations. Credit risk, market risk, liquidity and capital risk and operational risk 
are four of the main concerns for managers. Thus, in order to evaluate bank 
performance through risk management, the basic idea is to analyse risk variables from 
published or internal reports. For people outside of banks, the annual reports, 
government datasets and newspapers are direct ways to find risk variables.  
Another change in the banking industry was financial innovation. Combined with the 
impact of the 2007-09 financial crisis, fintech became a developing and popular area in 
the bank industry. It brought more choices for consumers to buy financial services and 
products by offering more appropriate advice and lower-cost services. Challenger 
banks/fintechs have earned market share from traditional banks in recent years. For 
example, the bank card penetration rate of Chinese traditional banks dropped 2% when 
WeChat Pay was launched in 2013 (Wang, 2019). For the UK, fintechs for the first time 
outstripped net new lending to the UK SMEs by the traditional banks in 2017 (Arnold, 
2017). For Australia, fintechs also added pressures to traditional banks. KPMG reported 
that P2P lending expanded 20 times from 2013-2015 (KPMG, 2017). Moreover, the 
deputy of governor of the Bank of Italy, Fabio Panetta, said that up to 60% of profits in 
traditional retail banking are threatened by fintechs (Cornell, 2018). All these examples 
prove that fintechs are competing with traditional banks in payments, lending and other 
financial services.  
In addition, challenger banks/fintechs have been supported by government authorities 
in most countries after financial crisis. For example, the Bank of England planned to 
support and generalise fintechs in the banking industry (Binham & Arnold, 2016). 
Moreover, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation 
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Authority (PRA) approved start-ups bank licence applications, such as Atom Bank in 
2016 (Mathuva, 2009). Similar situations happened in Australia as well, Australia 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) supported fintechs to compete with 
traditional banks through approving restricted authorised deposit-taking institution 
(RADI) licence (APRA, 2018). Fintechs in China showed an indisputable growth with 
government support, which was proved by the annual study of KPMG and H2 Ventures 
(Dunkley, 2016).  
Besides the knowledge of risk management, statistical skills are also needed in this 
research area. Much previous research had analysed bank performance through 
different data analysis methods and models. For example, Nakashima (2016) centred 
on the relationship between bank risk management and performance by using panel 
data analysis for two large-scale Japanese banks.  
From this perspective, this chapter, therefore, aims to review literature related to bank 
risk management and fintechs. It helps to provide a guide concept to the research aims, 
objectives, questions and general issues to be discussed in this study. The ideal outcome 
of this literature review should reveal the existing research gaps and provide insights 
for further research in this field (Müller-Bloch & Kranz, 2015). Two of the most 
relevant key themes to review are developed in the following sections. In Section 2.2, 
the fundamental aspects of bank risk management are shown. Section 2.3 investigates 
the development of challenger banks/fintechs and how they performed in risk 
management. Finally, conclusion and research gaps are presented in Section 2.4. 
2.2 Bank risk management and performance 
2.2.1 Bank regulations – The Basel Accords and local financial regulations 
Before considering bank risk management and performance, regulations for local and 
global financial systems need to be understood. The basic idea of the regulations is to 
ensure the safety of financial institutions with developing requirements. For instance, 
Docherty and Viort (2014) described the regulations in the banking industry through 
time, and how regulations helped banks improve their performance (Docherty & Viort, 
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2014). 
The Basel Accords are banking supervision accords including a series of regulations 
which are published through the Basel Committee. The Basel Committee is an 
international organisation which consists of representatives of central banks from G20 
plus major banking countries and locales. The Basel Committee is still continuously 
updating it to fit the global banking system better, and to date, it contains Basel I, II and 
III (BIS, 2017).  
Based on different types of risks, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
published a series of requirements for banks in July 1988 which were called Basel I. 
Capital and risk-weighting asset (RWA) were two critical components in it. To be more 
specific, capital of the bank consisted of core capital (tier one capital) (e.g. common 
stock, retained earnings and non-redeemable preferred stock) and supplementary 
capital (tier two capital) (e.g. undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general loan-
loss reserves, hybrid capital instruments, and subordinated debt), where banks need to 
maintain their core capital at a certain level to continue its operations. Figure 2.1 shows 
the five risk percentage levels in the RWA. In particular, one of the first documented 
requirements was that banks have to hold at least 6% tier one capital in its RWA (BIS, 
1988; Docherty & Viort, 2014). 
 
Figure 2. 1 Summary of RWA. Source: Docherty & Viort (2014), P120. 
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Due to market and property bubbles, banks suffered losses in the 1990s. As a result, the 
BCBS began to improve Basel I from 1997. In 2001, the BCBS published the new bank 
capital measurements and requirements framework and revised it from 2006-09, which 
is called Basel II. In Basel II, a multi-prong approach called the three-pillar framework 
was designed. The pillars included minimum capital requirements, supervisory review 
and market discipline. All these pillars were mutually dependent, which meant one 
pillar could not work without the other two. Pillar 1 was similar and more 
comprehensive than Basel I to assess bank risks. It applied measures including the 
Internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches, the standardised approach (SA) and the basic 
indicator (BI) approach to credit, market and operational risk. Pillar 2 covered risks that 
Pillar 1 does not address. Pillar 3 listed information, requirements, objectives, policies 
and techniques for all interested parties (BIS, 2006) (Docherty & Viort, 2014).  
Because of the 2007-09 financial crisis, the BCBS had to improve Basel II in the aspects 
of bank liquidity and leverage. Basel III added 2% equity of Bank RWA and minimised 
bank leverage ratio to 3%. It also introduced two liquidity ratios which are liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR). Basel III further tightened 
risk management requirements to improve the ability of banks to face economic stress 
(BIS, 2011) (Docherty & Viort, 2014). 
The three countries we are interested in (China, the UK, and Australia) are all important 
members of the G20 who have the right to set the rules during the Basel Accords' 
negotiating process. More specifically, the UK is one of the important leaders of Basel 
Committee since the beginning of the Basel Accords. Australia followed the UK during 
these years for the standard-setting process and became an active country in the Basel 
framework. China, on the other hand, was a latecomer to the liberal economic world. 
China has been engaged more in financial reform since the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
The key piece of the reform included by China is Basel III. Based on Knaack (2017), 
Basel III was the first global financial standard involving China at the negotiation table. 
Thus, with development of the global economy, more developing countries like China 
could play important roles in standard-setting progress. For our countries of interest, 
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based on their different geographical and economic situations, all of them can apply 
different but useful suggestions to BCBS and BIS, which further demonstrates their 
essential roles in the design of the global banking system.  
Furthermore, as most regulatory systems adopted the Basel Accords frameworks, they 
published local regulations to monitor whether the banking system followed Basel 
Accords. As all three countries are members of both the Basel Committee and the G20, 
they follow the Basel Accords when regulating and monitoring their financial systems. 
For the UK and Australia, their governments publish regulations to ensure the safety 
and profitability for financial institutions under the Basel Accords framework according 
to local finance environment (Leonida & Muzzupappa, 2017; RIS, 2012). For China, 
on the other hand, as China's banks lack good governance, China cannot run the same 
process as the UK and Australia. Therefore, China needs to rely more on international 
standards for future global expansion in financial services. Before the 2007-09 financial 
crisis, to avoid local financial institutions violating these rules, China began to modify 
its financial regulations to follow the Basel Accords after joining the WTO in 2001 
(Zhou et al., 2018). After the 2007-09 financial crisis, China published local regulations 
that were even stricter than Basel III (Knaack, 2017). 
2.2.2 Bank performance 
Financial intermediaries, including banks, help funds flow from savers to borrowers. 
Basu (1971) defined banking finance as activities that plan, raise, control and 
administer the funds used in business. McMenamin (1999) provided a similar definition 
that financial management is aiming to achieve some particular goals or objectives by 
determining, acquiring, allocating, and utilising financial resources (McMenamin, 
1999). In order to have a better understanding of the bank, it is essential to analyse and 
evaluate bank performance.  
In practice, analysts usually begin the evaluation of banks with the financial data and 
ratios that can be found in the annual reports. By analysing these data, ratios and 
profitability can be found, and analysts can better predict the future of the bank. Balance 
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sheets and income statements are two primary sources that banks supply in their annual 
or interim reports. The balance sheet provides the financial condition at a point of time, 
such as at the end day of each financial year; quarter or month. The income statement 
provides a summary of profitability during a period, such as one financial year; quarter 
or month (Bodie et al., 2014). Regulators usually require banks to provide reports on a 
quarterly; semi-annually or annually basis.  
From the bank reports, the fundamental of earnings and potential problems can be seen 
and calculated. For example, in financial statements, return on equity (ROE) and return 
on asset (ROA) are shown and can be calculated. Different risk variables can also be 
found and calculated in the risk management section. Earnings per share (EPS) can also 
be found in the listed banks. The authorities also use these variables to monitor bank 
system performance. 
ROE and ROA have been established for a long time. Cole (1972) used this model to 
analyse the performance of banks. By developing over time, ROE and ROA had 
become the most commonly used performance variables in banks. There is a procedure 
using ratio analysis to evaluate bank performance and measure bank profitability. The 
results show the percentage of net income of a bank in a financial year. Thus, banks can 
compare their current and historical performance in investments and earnings 
(MacDonld & Koch, 2006). Although calculating banks' ROE is straightforward, 
breaking down ROE into different components makes it easier to understand. For 
example, the DuPont formula, also known as the strategic profit model, breaks down 
ROE into the net profit margin, asset turnover and financial leverage. The changes in 
each component will influence the ROE, where analysts can find operational problems 
more easily (Bodie et al., 2014). 
Analysts can put ROE and ROA into different regression models to measure the impact 
of different situations. For example, in Pakistan, adopting the e-banking service had a 
significant positive impact on ROE which meant the adoption of e-banking reduced the 
cost of bank operations and increased customer satisfaction and bank profitability (Rauf 
& Ismatullaevich, 2013). Erdogan (2016) presented panel logistic regression models 
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containing different financial ratios (e.g. loan due ratio and cost to income ratio) to 
show that Turkish banks had poor performance (e.g. ROA) during the recent financial 
crisis. He presented the panel with both random logistic and pooled logistic regression 
models to test the results which provided a warning system for Turkish banks to avoid 
further failure.  
As another important performance variable for banks, earnings per share (EPS) is 
calculated to represent their profits in the stock market. The result could be seen as an 
indicator of banks' profitability. All listed banks and fintechs are required to report their 
EPS so that investors and regulators can use it to predict the potential share market 
performance. Banks or fintechs with higher EPS are considered more profitable 
(Nasdaq, 2009). As another widely used variable, many previous studies focused on 
banks' EPS and the variables which could influence it. For example, Bhattacharyya and 
Purnanandam (2011) aimed to test how mortgage and systemic risk impacted US banks' 
EPS by collecting 278 US banks' data from 2000 to 2006. They built a fixed-effects 
regression model which showed that higher mortgage exposure boosted EPS from 2000 
to 2006 and led to the 2007-09 financial crisis. Their results showed that a higher 
systemic risk level positively impacts the EPS and that a higher system risk level can 
help banks receive higher earnings, but also led to the financial crisis with extreme 
losses. 
2.2.3 Bank risk management  
Bank risk management has existed since the beginning of bank operations, and 
definitions vary with different people and time. For managers, the primary objective is 
to maximise the wealth of shareholders. In order to achieve this objective, risk 
management has to be considered through bank operations. It requires managers to 
make trade-off decisions between higher returns and risks taken. Furthermore, because 
of the 2007-09 financial crisis, risk management has become a critical area in banking 
management. Bessis and O'Kelly (2015) addressed and covered almost all aspects of 
risk management in banking. Aebi et al. (2012) analysed how corporate governance 
factors and risk factors influenced bank performance during the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
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In their study, the simple regression model is applied to different governance and risk 
factors that affected the ROE of US banks before and after the financial crisis. Through 
an analysis of each factor impacting ROE and other returns, they highlighted the 
importance of risk governance in banks. Duygun et al. (2013) researched challenges 
and data analysis after the financial crisis, reframing the industry to improve the 
understanding, which helped managers to improve their performance facing the next 
financial crisis.  
As noted above, the reason for using annual reports is that according to the Basel 
Accords and bank risk management frameworks, besides internal reports, the annual 
report is a direct and efficient way for the public to know a bank's risk management 
performance. Besides the performance variables, bank reports also present risk 
variables for people to analyse. For example, Kwan & Eisenbeis (1997) tested the 
relationships between bank risk management (e.g., interest rate, credit risk-taking, and 
capitalisation) and bank operational performance efficiency from 1986 to 1995. 
Through collecting data from 352 US banks, four linear regression models were applied. 
They proved that poor bank risk management could cause inefficiency in bank 
performance, and they also found that credit risk, interest rate risk and capitalisation 
are jointly influenced by each other. Similarly, Calomiris & Carlson (2016) analysed 
US bank risks since the 1890s by using regression models to present risk management 
and performance of banks. Through analysing 206 US banks, they found that improved 
formal corporate governance and reduced risks can improve the asset and equity 
performance of US banks.  
Rad (2016) investigated the risk management and control system, which used two case 
studies in European countries. Based on 31 interviews, he found out that the control 
system (e.g. Basel II risk management methods) maintained and helped to monitor both 
case studies' loan operating procedures. However, he only showed the importance of 
Basel II in the banks' risk management, not risks faced by banks in their operations, 
whereas Kwabena (2014) and Hussain and Shafi (2014) did show this. Kwabena (2014) 
studied the Ghana commercial bank as a case study to show the risks faced by the bank, 
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especially credit risk, and how to manage them. His findings presented evidence of the 
importance of credit risk management under the risk management framework. He 
showed that there is a significant positive relationship between bank performance and 
credit risk management efficiency. Hussain and Shafi (2014) used an Indian bank as a 
case study to show the operational risk faced in bank operations. By interviewing the 
respondents, their analysis showed the benefits of efficient operational risk 
management (e.g. lower cost, higher competitive position, and higher stability of 
earnings) and the limitations in the Indian bank (e.g. lack of senior management 
involvement, a limited budget, and difficulty in cost-benefit analysis). Thus, they built 
an operational management framework to improve operational risk management for 
Indian banks.  
For financial institutions, in order to manage risks more effectively, risks are divided 
into different types. Some of the typical types are discussed below. 
 Credit risk  
Lending is an important bank operational activity. Credit risks exist during the lending 
process because the borrower can fail to meet its obligations to repay banks (BCBS, 
2000). The last financial crisis exposed some problems in bank credit management 
system, such as inefficient monitoring, lack of technological improvement, regulation 
and market changes, and management framework varying across institutions.  
According to the Basel Accords, credit risk is defined as 'the potential that a bank 
borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed 
terms' (BCBS, 2000). Different types of assets and activities have different probabilities 
of failure. For example, loan losses are a typical credit risk for banks. Moreover, many 
banks operate some off-balance-sheet activities, which increases risks and adds 
difficulty in measuring them from the published data (MacDonld & Koch, 2006).  
In order to establish a credit risk management system, bank analysts usually combine 
financial and non-financial variables by using different models and tools. For example, 
managers could use both judgmental methods (with experienced managers) together 
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with statistical models (with quantitative data). In more detail, judgmental methods are 
based on assessors' experience and understanding, whereas statistical models use 
statistical inference or quantitative data, such as credit scoring (Brown & Moles, 2014). 
The basic idea of credit risk management is deciding whether to extend or refuse credit. 
It requires the manager to balance the gain or potential loss from taking credit risk.  
With its importance, there are several variables related to credit risk shown in bank 
reports. The three main relevant variables in this research are non-performing loan ratio 
(NPL), net charge-off rate (NCO) and total loan loss ratio (LoanR). NPL is the ratio to 
show the loan defaults of over 90 days; NCO is the rate of bank write-off over its 
average outstanding loan, and LoanR shows every loss of the lending activities. All of 
these reflect different aspects under credit risks which provide a comprehensive view 
for people to analyse credit risks. For example, Geng et al. (2016) tested bank risks with 
the NPL and interest rate factors for Chinese banks. They used random-effects panel 
data regression models to show their results, where the interest rate factor was 
positively related to bank risk performance; the loan ratios had a negative relationship. 
The results suggested that reducing the bad loan ratio or lowering both interbank or 
central bank interest rates could help Chinese banks improve their performance. Similar 
to Geng et al. (2016), Bailey et al. (2011) studied credit loan and its effect on Chinese 
state-controlled banks. They used loan variables (e.g. repayment time, repayment 
amount and percentage) to test the performance of state-controlled banks (using ROE 
and ROA). The results showed that underperforming banks need to obtain more loans 
in order to maintain their banking operations. Both of the studies suggested that Chinese 
authorities should improve the effectiveness of borrowing and of monitoring of banks' 
risk management. Cortez et al. (2019) used random-effects panel data regression 
models to test the relationship between interest rate, bank performance and bank risks 
using quarterly data from 2008-2018 in Philippine banks. Similar to results of Geng et 
al. (2016) in China, their results suggested that policy rate and overnight lending facility 
rate have a significant negative effect on bank risks, and that bank performance (e.g. 
ROA) is also significantly negatively affected by bank risks in the Philippines. 
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Barth et al. (2018) used an autoregressive and random walk regression model to test if 
regulators could use NCO and bank loss to forecast future bank performance by using 
the data from four banks (two big & two small US banks) from 1991-2016. Their results 
confirmed NCO and historical bank loss could be used to predict future performance, 
which had political implications for bank regulators. For example, through analysing 
NCO and historical bank losses, regulators can obtain a better position when they need 
to decide supervisory actions for a particular bank or a set of banks having serious 
troubles.  
With the influences of the last financial crisis, credit risk management under risk 
management attracted more attention. For instance, PwC (2011) published an article 
listing the problems that the financial crisis brought to financial institutions and 
provided a framework which can improve the credit management for financial 
institutions after the 2007-09 financial crisis (PwC, 2011). Agarwal (2011) investigated 
the trends and opportunities in credit risk management and found that banks need a 
more innovative method for credit risk management (Agarwal, 2011). Both PwC (2011) 
and Agarwal (2011) found these similar points and tried to address these problems. 
They reached the same solution, which was to add more innovative management 
methods into bank credit risk management, such as software services updates. PwC 
(2011) suggested a framework called the credit risk and performance reporting 
dashboard, while Agarwal (2011) conducted a survey to show that innovative 
management in the bank credit management system is a useful tool to improve 
efficiency.  
Nurgaliyeva (2014) and Cana and Cinac (2016) investigated the same area (innovative 
credit risk management methods). Nurgaliveva (2014) analysed a new approach for 
credit risk management in banking with a case study in Kazakhstan (Nurgaliyeya, 2014). 
Cana and Cinca (2016) analysed different financial indicators in the risk appetite 
framework and presented a regression model for Europe (Cana & Cinca, 2016).  
Moreover, some studies also combined credit risk with other risks. For example, Chi & 
Li (2017) built a random-effects panel data regression model to test whether credit risk 
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and economic policy uncertainty had an impact on banking performance. By analysing 
data from four Chinese banks between 2000 and 2014, they showed that both risks had 
negative impacts on the banks’ performance (e.g. ROA). Indeed, they showed that a 
reduction in credit risk or a reduction in the supply of credit could improve bank 
performance in China when economic policy uncertainty increases. 
 Market risk 
For banks, investment is another critical activity which can make a profit. Investment 
operates in an evolving and changing economic environment. Risk of losses could 
happen during an investment project for banks, traders and investors. This type of risk 
is called market risk. It is the risk of losses which are caused by market movement, such 
as interest rate risk, exchange rate risk and share market risk (Bhaduri et al., 2007; 
Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009). Market risk has been studied for a long time, such as, 
Artzner et al. (1999) who studied both market and nonmarket risks and also discussed 
the measurement of these risks.  
There are three main sub-types of market risks: interest rate risk, currency risk, and 
share equity risk. Value at Risk (VaR) is mainly used to represent market risk. It can 
estimate the risks of an investment in a normal market situation. In bank risk 
management, VaR is defined as the probability of loss in a given portfolio and time. For 
example, under Basel II and III, banks are required to use a 99% VaR capital charge 
with their model, which can help them reduce the variability of RWA (Laurent et al., 
2016).  
Kerkhof et al. (2010) chose VaR to represent the market risk variable which addressed 
that VaR and excepted shortfall could be used together to measure the capital reserves 
for the market performance of the companies. Williams (2016) used VaR variables to 
test their impact on the return (ROA) of banks in Australia. The dataset came from 26 
Australian banks from 2002 to 2014, and the random-effects panel data regression 
model was used to present the results. He found that the relationship between bank risk 
and revenue composition was changed before and after the 2007-09 financial crisis. for 
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example, non-interest income was generally believed to increase risk level, but he 
showed some different results after the recent financial crisis as some non-interest 
income reduced risks. 
 Capital and Liquidity risk  
Similar to market risks, as capital traders and investors for investment, banks play an 
essential role in the financial system who provide market liquidity, and their availability 
of funding gives them the ability to make trades. The potential loss of part of the 
investment, which leads not a full return of the original bank capital, is called capital 
risk. Liquidity, as one of the most important capitals for banks, also needs to be 
managed carefully. Liquidity risks happen if banks cannot trade assets or buy or sell an 
investment quickly enough. A typical and undesirable result could be that bank liquidity 
suddenly dries up (BCBS, 2008). The 2007-09 financial crisis also exposed problems 
in bank risk management, such as weak capital and liquidity risk management and 
inefficient regulation monitoring. Thus, many financial institutions went bankrupt; for 
example, the most famous case is the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (Docherty & Viort, 
2014; Ruozi & Ferrari, 2013). After the financial crisis, new capital and liquidity 
requirements were discussed and published by the Basel Accords, which forced banks 
to increase their abilities with respect to capital and liquidity risk management. 
Furthermore, according to the Basel Accords, the definition of capital and liquidity risk 
management in banks is 'the ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet 
obligations as they come due, without incurring unacceptable losses' (BCBS, 2008). In 
addition, the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also issued a guide for 
financial institutions to explain the importance of capital and liquidity risk management, 
and provided strategies for managers to follow during operations (FDIC, 2008). Based 
on Bhaduri et al. (2007), liquidity risk can be categorised into market liquidity and 
funding liquidity. According to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), market liquidity 
and funding liquidity were mutually reinforcing under certain conditions, and they built 
a model linking these liquidities and providing testable predictions. 
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Because of the importance of capital and liquidity risk in the banking system, many 
studies focus on managing them. For example, Greenspan (1999) discussed and 
contributed to the standard of liquidity risk management for a country. Both DeYoung 
and Jang (2016) and Ippolitoa et al. (2016) analysed bank liquidity risk management, 
where DeYoung and Jang (2016) tested whether banks managed liquidity from 1992 to 
2012 and Ippolitoa et al. (2016) provided a method to improve the liquidity risks. They 
both provided similar results, which were that large banks manage liquidity more 
efficiently under the Basel management framework, and liquidity risks influenced small 
banks more in the US and EU. Fu and Heffernan (2009) tested bank liquidity risks for 
Chinese banks' performance (ROA and ROE) from 1985 to 2002. They used random-
effects panel data regression models to test 14 Chinese banks. Their results showed that 
the liquidity holding level was positively related to bank performance. The results 
suggested that increasing the liquidity holding ratio could help Chinese banks improve 
their performance. 
Sharpe (1995) examined Australian trading banks performance in capital risk 
management. He selected variables from thirteen Australian banks' annual reports from 
1967-1988. By applying fixed-effects panel data regression models, he tested how these 
banks performed regarding assets (ROA and profit) with ten capital ratios and fixed-
effects dummies among these banks. It showed that in the 1960s to 1980s, capital risk 
factors were positively related to high expected profit banks and negatively related to 
low expected growth banks. His study provided evidence that Australian banks use an 
asymmetric information approach to optimal capital structure. 
Moreover, there are studies focused on improving bank capital and liquidity risk 
management. For instance, Liang and Yang (2010) built a sub-optimisation model 
under an equilibrium liquidity management strategy. By using an equilibrium liquidity 
management strategy, they proved that Chinese banks could balance profit and liquidity 
during the crisis.  
There are several variables shown in bank reports which can help analysts to analyse 
capital and liquidity risks. To be more precise, seven main relevant variables are 
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provided for this research. With regard to the efficiency of a bank's liquidity risk 
management, quick ratio (QR) and current ratio (CR) can be found. QR shows a bank’s 
short-term liquidity and its ability to repay the current liability and CR shows its ability 
to repay current liabilities with its current assets. The difference between them is that 
QR only tests the most liquid current asset while CR tests all current assets. Zhang 
(2011) used a logistic regression model to test 28 financial indicators, which included 
QR, liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), CR and cost-to-income ratio (C/I), on 64 Chinese 
banks' performance. He showed significant effects of these variables. His results proved 
that Chinese banks need to strengthen risk management with an early-warning system, 
more manager training and suitable bank regulations.  
With regard to the financial strength of the banks, the tier one capital ratio (T1) and 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) can be found. T1 is a measure of bank capitalisation, 
defined as the ratio of tier one capital to RWA, while the CAR shows the ratio of both 
tier one and tier two capital to RWA. Shaban and James (2018) studied the effects of 
ownership change and risk exposure to bank performance in Indonesia from 2005 to 
2012. They selected different variables to represent various risks (e.g. NPL, NCO, T1, 
and C/I) and tested their effect on performance variables (e.g. ROA, ROE and net 
interest margin). Through analysis with fixed-effects panel data regression models, they 
showed that the state-owned banks were less profitable and riskier than a private and 
foreign bank in Indonesia. Epure & Lafuente (2015) studied credit risk, capital and 
liquidity risk (e.g. NPL and CAR), governance and their impacts on the bank 
performance (e.g. ROA and net interest margin) in Costa Rican banks during 1998 to 
2012. Through applying a random-effects panel data regression model, they showed 
that the improvement of risk management efficiency could positively influence bank 
performance. For the corporate governance area, they showed that CEOs from outside 
could improve performance, rather than internal executive turnover. 
With regard to the bank debt level, Debt-to-asset (D/A) and Debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) 
can be found. The difference between them is the denominator, where D/E is total debt 
over the total equity and D/A is over the total asset. Both Pinto and Joseph (2017) and 
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Siddik, Kabiraj and Joghee (2017) tested the impacts of debt level on bank performance 
and proved the significant negative impacts. In more detail, Pinto and Joseph (2017) 
examined 21 Indian banks from 2011 to 2015. They found that both D/A and D/E have 
a significant negative impact on bank return on capital through a simple regression 
model. Siddik, Kabiraj and Joghee (2017) tested 22 Bangladesh banks from 2005 to 
2014. Their results indicated that D/A had a significant negative impact on ROA and 
ROE and a significant positive impact on EPS through applying pooled ordinary least 
squares regression models. Both of them suggested that banks should select an optimal 
debt level to achieve better bank performance. 
The final variable is the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), which shows highly liquid 
assets held by banks to meet short-term obligations, where a high ratio ensures banks 
have the necessary assets to survive any short-term liquidity disruptions. Diallo et al. 
(2015) analysed operational risk, as well as credit and liquidity risk, by testing the 
performance of Indonesian banks using a fixed-effects panel data regression model in 
the panel data analysis. They used NPL to represent credit risk, LCR to represent 
liquidity risk, and C/I to represent the operational risk. Their results showed that 
reducing credit and operational risk and increasing liquidity stabilisation could improve 
the performance of Indonesian banks. 
 Operational risk 
The expansion of the internet and social media, internal operating procedures and 
factors, human factors and external factors are all incentives led risks that occur in 
banks' operations. Any factors may go wrong, which will increase risks in financial 
institutions (Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 2006). According to the Basel 
Accords, operational risk is defined as 'the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems or external events' (BIS, 2006). Moreover, 
EU Solvency II (2007) also gives a definition for operational risk which is the risk of 
change in value because of failure of internal processes, people and system (CEA – 
Groupe Consultatif, 2007).  
 25 
For a long period, operational risks were classified as residual risks in financial 
institutions. However, this situation changed after the 2007-09 financial crisis. For 
example, Chinese banks invested more in software and staff IT training to improve 
operational risk management (Xie et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2011). Banks in Romania, 
the US, Bosnia and Herzegovina all improved their operational risk management by 
adding more big data and IT management skills (Dumescu et al., 2012; Kozarevic & 
Kozarevic, 2016; McLaughlin, 2013). 
However, it is difficult to monitor and analyse all possible operational risks. Studies 
can only focus on one or perhaps a few points of operational risks. For example, Zhang 
et al. (2011) and Xie et al. (2011) both analysed operational risk control of Chinese 
commercial banks based on the Basel Accord II with a questionnaire and Monte Carlo 
Simulation, respectively. Through analysis, Zhang et al. (2011) suggested that Chinese 
commercial banks should build an IT platform which can integrate the management 
system, and train employees to improve operational risk management. Xie et al. (2011) 
identified the capital required to prepare Chinese banks for operational risk in the 
context of Basel II.  
Although the operational risk is hard to monitor, there are still variables in bank reports 
that could be used to analyse operational risk. One is operational risk exposure. Under 
Basel II, the operational risk exposure for the banks is 15% of their gross income 
(BCBS, 2014). Analysts could use operational risks that have occurred as analysing 
variables, such as fluency or losses of occurring operational risk, to compare with the 
operational risk exposure to show the operational risk management performance. For 
example, Chernobai et al. (2011) examined operational risk by using a frequency model 
in US banks from 1980 to 2005. By analysing operational loss data, they linked 
operational risk to internal control environment management (e.g., corporate 
governance, bank size, reported losses and sensitivity to banking risk). These links 
indicated the importance of improving managerial methods for dealing with operational 
risk events. 
Another variable is the C/I ratio, which shows the efficiency of a bank's operation. C/I 
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represents the percentage of total costs to total income. As mentioned above, Diallo 
(2015) and Shaban and James (2018) also selected the C/I ratio to represent the 
operational risk to test its effects on bank performance. Both of them showed the 
importance of operational risk management in bank performance and suggested that the 
central bank should provide better risk models and that banks should follow regulation. 
 Reputational risks 
Reputational risk can be defined as the potential loss in finance, capital, values in 
society and marketing, which will damage a bank's reputation (Heery & Noon, 2017). 
It influences not only banks themselves but also their employees and partners. Xifra 
and Ordeix (2009) investigated reputational risks for Banco Santander in Spain after 
the 2007-09 financial crisis. Through the case study, they argued that Spanish banks are 
in a strong position not only because they did not invest in US subprime mortgage 
products, but also because they have a well-established reputational risk management 
system. Cheung et al. (2011) used the recorded percentage change of the bank's brand 
value as a representative factor to put into the regression and catalogued it as brand 
value change (BVC). Both studies showed the importance of considering reputational 
risk management in bank operations. It suggested that for a better analysis of bank 
performance, reputational risk is worth adding. 
 Interactions between risks 
During the 2007-09 financial crisis, risks showed interactions. The different types of 
risks could have reinforced each other and worsened the loss situation further. For 
example, the shortage of liquidity (high liquidity risk) and subprime loan loss (high 
credit risk) led to a global financial crisis (high market risk). Thus, some of the previous 
literature investigated interactions between risks through correlation analysis. For 
example, Htay & Salman (2013) investigated the relationship between liquidity risk, 
operational risk, credit risk and market risk for ten UK listed banks from 2002-11. 
Through correlation analysis, they found that there existed relationships between risk 
types. Each bank showed its own relationship between risk types, so an increase of 
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liquidity risk might increase operational/credit/market risk for one bank but decrease 
operational/credit/market risk for another. In general, they found that liquidity risk 
influenced credit risk negatively but had a positive impact on market risk. For 
operational risks, liquidity risk showed both positive and negative impacts. Moreover, 
the correlations between these risks were not so high as to influence the selection of 
these risks as variables to analyse bank performance. Based on their findings, managers 
could control the risk level based on types. For example, if a bank has relatively low 
liquidity risk, and a high credit risk. Managers can modify their liquidity risk 
management strategy to take a higher risk, which could help them to reduce the credit 
risk during operations. Thus, they suggested that bankers should use correlations to 
manage risks based on different conditions.  
Besides the interactions between risks with correlations, some previous literature 
investigated the influence of risks and their impact on bank performance. For example, 
Hakimi & Boukaira (2020) investigated the interactional relationship between 
operational risk, credit risk and liquidity risks as well as the impacts of these risks on 
bank performance in Tunisian banks from 2000 to 2017. Through correlation analysis 
- similar to Htay & Salman (2013) - they found out that moderate interactions existed 
between risks. Through random-effects panel data regression analysis, their results 
indicated that all risks influence bank performance (e.g. NIM) while reducing liquidity 
risk and operational capital and loan activity can help Tunisian banks increase their 
performance. Moreover, the interactions between operational risk and credit risk had a 
positive influence where the interaction between operational risk and liquidity risk had 
a negative influence but not a significant one. Thus, they suggested that policymakers 
should enhance banks’ capital and loan activities, help banks to reduce liquidity 
problems, then stabilise the macroeconomic context, which would all help Tunisian 
banks perform better. 
Thus, in a supervisory position, regulators and managers began to consider the 
interactions between risk types and integrated management methods. BIS (2009) 
explained the interactions between credit risk, market risk and liquidity risk in a global 
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supervisory position. The report showed that liquidity risk interacted with market and 
credit risk through the horizon over which assets can be liquidated. The credit risk 
interacted with the market risk increased by overall risk exposure increases over time. 
Moreover, valuation uncertainties or other shocks (e.g. subprime loan crisis) can 
enhance credit risk, which would also have adverse effects on liquidity and market risk. 
It also suggested managers should try to identify conceptual and empirical relationships 
between these risks and then make management strategies. However, it is difficult to 
define joint risks and manage them. In both historical and practical management 
progress, risks have been measured and managed separately by types as well as 
economic capital against each risk type. The approach often encountered in practice in 
the banking industry nowadays, is to estimate each risk type separately and then 
aggregate them (BIS, 2009). 
Therefore, based on previous literature and management suggestions based on Basel 
III, this study could examine the correlation between different types of risks to 
determine their interactions, then analyse them together to test their influence on bank 
performance and provide political suggestions. 
2.3 Financial technology, challenger banks and fintechs 
As a result of innovation in information and communication technologies, the financial 
system has evolved towards the digitisation of transactions. Fintech innovations have 
increased global connections but have also triggered challenges for the financial system. 
With the increasing and growing complexity of the banking system, these changes have 
forced financial institutions to build more operational channels and strengthen their risk 
management to survive under the challenging environment (Cortiñas et al., 2010).  
The fundamental objective of bank risk management is to maximise the wealth of 
shareholders. The management skills addressed in different banks have similarities 
which are to follow the models and rules in the Basel Accords and local government 
strategies. At the same time, different banks keep an internal risk management model 
for managing specific risks faced by the bank. As a new type of bank, many challenger 
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banks and fintechs still follow the same models as traditional banks but with slightly 
different focuses (Bree, 2016). In addition, because of the recent financial crisis, more 
regulations were added to financial institutions. Risk management has already been 
changed in the past decade and needs further changes. 
Before we investigate in depth the fintech area, the definitions of fintech, challenger 
banks and fintech should be further clarified. As mentioned in Chapter one, fintech is a 
short term for 'financial technology' which represents using technology to deal with 
financial activities (Schuffel, 2016). In practice, fintechs operate in many areas, such 
as issuance, logistics and banking services. Moreover, challenger banks, from its literal 
meaning, are the banks built to challenge and compete with traditional banks, especially 
large ones. Some of the challenger banks may became established, earn their market 
share and finally become traditional banks. Then we could distinguish them from 
historic traditional banks by more fintech involvement, such as an online only banking 
system (Flinders, 2015). Based on these definitions, we could find out that modern 
challenger banks and fintech banks all apply similar services and operate in more digital 
ways than traditional banks. Thus, for this research, we treat them as one in the some 
and call them fintechs and challenger banks, which includes fintechs which operate 
bank-related business together with challenger banks which has been established 
recently and operate in more digital ways.  
This section will firstly focus on the history of fintech. Secondly, similar to traditional 
banks, the related regulations will be studied. Then, fintech area performance will be 
presented. Finally, risk management related to fintechs and challenger banks will be 
listed. 
2.3.1 History of fintech 
Fintech is a rapidly growing area, which can be traced back to the 1900s (Hochstein, 
2015). From its literal meaning, it can be explained as the use of technology to drive 
financial solutions. The development of fintech could be divided into three periods from 
the middle of the 19th century. The first period is from 1866 to 1967. Finance and 
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technology were interlinked and mutually reinforcing. These technologies were mainly 
in the financial service industry, such as money and stock transactions for joint-stock, 
insurance and banking institutions. The foundations for fintech during these years 
formed a basis for the modern period (Moore, 2000).  
Since the late 19th century, technologies had been developed rapidly and global 
communications and trade had tightened, which led to the second development period 
of fintech. The second period is from 1967 to 2008. From the late 1960s, the electronic 
payment system became established in the banking system. For example, the Inter-bank 
computer Bureau for the UK and Inter-bank payment system for the US were 
established in 1968 and 1970, respectively. The society of worldwide inter-bank 
financial communications and the BCBS were also established in 1973 and 1975, 
respectively. All of these led to a series of international agreements in fintech and 
continued developing through time (BIS, 2018). In the second stage, many technologies 
were applied to the banking system, such as ATMs applicated globally. However, with 
the development of fintech, there were risks exposed in the banking and finance system, 
such as 'Black Monday' around the world in 1987, and the capital collapse and financial 
crisis around Asia and Russia in 1997-98 (Bookstaber, 2007; Buckley et al., 2016; 
Jorion, 2000). 
The third period of fintech is from 2008 until the present day. During these years, with 
more involvement of technology in life, consumers began to shift their financial 
behaviour to digitalisation. Another trigger of the third stage of fintech was the 2007-
09 financial crisis. As a result, costumers began not to trust banks with their finances 
as they had before. For example, in 2015, there were more people trusting fintechs than 
banks to deal with finance in the US, with only 28% of people having confidence in 
financial services supplied by banks (MEDICI Team, 2015). Further, because of their 
cheaper cost, many people choose fintechs instead of banks.   
Fintech today are developing in different ways in developed countries and developing 
countries. In developed countries (e.g. the UK, the US and European countries), the 
fintech concentrated on and developed four main areas. Firstly, fintechs extended the 
 31 
financing transaction methods (such as algorithmic trading), financing mechanisms 
(such as P2P) and Robo-advisory services. All of these helped to extend finance and 
investment areas beyond that of traditional banks (Chappuis Halder & Co, 2015). 
Secondly, fintech helped managers to build better compliance systems to manage 
internal financial operations and risk management. Thirdly, as digitalisation developed, 
cybercrimes increased a lot. Cybersecurity became a major concern for governments, 
regulators, participants and customers. Thus, many fintechs were keen to create safer 
and better data security systems to protect their business. Finally, fintechs improved 
electronic payment systems for both domestic and cross-border payments. This helped 
with the development of infrastructure in IT and communication (Buckley et al., 2016).  
In general, fintechs could offer new financial products to the existing consumers of 
traditional banks which threaten the operations of traditional banks. This is also shown 
in fintechs in developing countries. Most of the developing countries are in Asia and 
Africa, and government policy encouraged fintech development in these countries. In 
these regions, over 1.2 billion individuals were still unbanked in 2016. Not only 
traditional banks but also challenger banks and fintechs can supply services to these 
individuals (McLean, 1998; Buckley et al., 2016). With regards to Africa, its 
underdeveloped level of banking and financial services, combined with its speedy 
development of mobile phone use, has led to fintech development in Africa from the 
beginning of the 21st century. For example, a successful fintech M-Pesa from Kenya 
launched in 2007. Payments made through M-Pesa account for over 43% of Kenya's 
GDP (Runde, 2015; Safaricom, 2016). For the Asia region, the three main reasons that 
fintechs could develop well are: firstly, IT spending in Asian traditional banks was 
going at a slower speed than fintechs. Secondly, the efficiency of the state-owned 
banking system and branch network was worse than in developed countries and fintechs. 
Thirdly, the high rate of smartphone penetration in this region provided a good 
condition for fintechs' development (Aritomo et al., 2014). Because of the significant 
opportunities existing in the developing countries, many challenges and issues needed 
to be faced during these years (Buckley et al., 2016). 
 32 
Besides the general history of the fintech, there are three countries we are interested in 
investigating. The first country is China. Unsurprisingly, as giant fintech unicorns (e.g. 
Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent) exist in China, Chinese cities obtained top spots in the 
Global Fintech Hub Index (GFHI) 2018. In more detail, Beijing is at in No.1, Shanghai 
No.3, Hangzhou No. 6 and Shenzhen No 7 (Fintech News, 2018). For these giants, their 
business covers almost every aspect of the fintech industry. For example, Alibaba has 
AntFinance in the fintech banking area, AliLogistics for fintech logistics and AliHealth 
for fintech insurance. Moreover, it also cooperates with well-developed traditional 
companies in the area. Besides the giants, there are also successful fintechs and 
challenger banks. For example, Yirendai (YRD), which was the first Chinese fintechs, 
joined the NYSE and was voted as amongst the top 10 safest and best Chinese fintechs 
in 2020 (ShitouFinance, 2020).  
The second country is the UK. As a major financial centre of the world and one of the 
first countries to support and invest in fintech, London, UK obtained No.4 in the GFHI 
2018 (Fintech News, 2018). Similar to China, the UK also has successful fintechs and 
challenger banks. For example, Atom bank became the first fintech bank with licence 
approved by the FCA in 2015 (Gulamhuseinwala, 2015). With its higher savings rates 
and good services, Atom attracted media attention and customers (Atom, 2019). 
Another example could be Starling bank, which was the first UK mobile-only current 
account operator and also got a bank licence in 2016. Together with its easily accessible 
business accounts, Starling showed its advantages and aimed to expand into Europe in 
2020 (Rainmakrr, 2020) (Starling, 2019).  
The last country is Australia. With its unique geographical position and being a hub of 
economic growth in the world (Australia continuously increased its GDP from 1991 
until the influence of Covid-19 in 2020 (Xinhua, 2020)). Australia also plays an 
important role in the fintech industry, Sydney, Australia achieved No.8 in GFHI 2018 
(Fintech News, 2018). Australia also has successful fintechs and challenger banks. Wisr, 
for example, was the first fintech to be publicly listed in Australia. With its faster and 
easier deals for lending, it grew rapidly (Wisr, 2019). Another example could be Tyro, 
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which received its bank licence in 2005 and became the first fintech to do so. With its 
continuous growth over a decade, it became the largest EFTPOS provider in Australia 
(Tyro, 2018).  
Thus, each of these three countries had at least one city in the top 10 fintech hubs around 
the world in 2018. In addition, they all have successful fintechs and challenger banks 
in the industry. So, each of these three countries has shown their high potential in the 
fintech area, which could let them become a strong driving force of the growth for 
global financial markets and economies. 
A the most influential country in the world, the US also plays important role in the 
fintech industry. American cities obtained some high spots in the Global Fintech Hub 
Index (GFHI) 2018. In more detail, San Francisco stayed at No.2 and New York 
achieved No.5 (Fintech News, 2018). From this list, we can see that China’s cities 
surpass American cities as the top fintech hubs. We can see that competition between 
China and the US is intense in fintech industry. The intense competition between China 
and the US is also showed in other economic and technological areas. In addition, based 
on Buckley et al. (2016), as a developed country, the US provided similar process to 
the UK in fintech development and management. Thus, although the US could be 
selected as a comparison country, we excluded it based on its intense relationship with 
China and its similar fintech development process compared to the UK.  
2.3.2 Regulation development for fintechs 
Until now, well-established financial institutions and regulators worked together to 
develop regulations through market consulting and investigations. However, new 
fintechs entered the financial industry without a compliance culture and without 
interacting with regulators. In many countries, laws and regulations are still in an 
uncertain situation. Thus, besides the regulations published for the banking and finance 
systems, regulators also need to understand the new trends of innovations and publish 
regulations to monitor and manage the fintechs.  
As the leading country of fintech, the development of fintech regulations in the UK is 
 34 
worth investigating. Gulamhuseinwala (2015) said that the UK had the world's leading 
fintech policy environment. The FCA in the UK provides a supportive regulatory 
regime to all financial systems, especially to the fintech area after the financial crisis. 
For example, these policies had simplicity, transparency and an industry-led approach, 
including the approach for fintechs. Firstly, the FCA supported project innovation in 
business to develop financial technology. For example, the FCA approved Atom with a 
bank licence as the first fintech challenger bank in the UK, and it also approved three 
hundred innovative firms in 2015. Another approach was the FCA supplying a 
regulatory sandbox for fintech companies which were a 'safe space' for fintechs to test 
their innovative services and products. This 'safe space' helped fintechs test their 
innovations without immediate regulatory consequences (Gulamhuseinwala, 2015). 
Moreover, as fintechs developed during these years, the FCA and the UK government 
finalised a series of regulations to support and monitor the fintech area. For example, 
the FCA published final rules to improve conduction and communication in fintech 
(including e-money) services on 1st February, 2019 and applied the regulations on 1st 
August, 2019. At the end of 2019, the panel of UK government's fintech delivery group 
would like to publish industry standards for fintech partnership, and the EU expert 
group is expected to publish its final report on financial innovation regulations 
(Linklaters, 2019). Figure 2.2 shows the general regulatory development of the EU/UK. 
It shows how the regulatory framework has developed and has become more 
comprehensive until February 2019 (KPMG, 2019). General regulatory development 
of the EU/UK for the rest of 2019 is presented in Figure 2.3. In addition, under the 
Covid-19 situation in 2020, programmes to develop greater fintech adoption, 
convergence and collaboration developed delays in the EU/UK. For example, 
regulators paid more attention to published regulatory plans (e.g. EU digital finance 
proposals, Fintech action plan and road map and European commission papers on 
digital finance), to see the current situation and add more rules. Crowdfunding 
Regulations are aimed to be published in October or November 2020 officially and will 








  Figure 2.3 Fintech UK and EU Regulatory Timeline 2019. Source: (Linklaters, 2019) 
At the beginning stage of the fintech sector in China from 2006 to 2015, China's 
regulators applied a laissez-faire management approach to this newly established 
industry. The regulators were not concerned and refused to acknowledge the 
phenomenon of this industry. As a result, China's regulators did not publish legal rules 
or tools for these new financial and commercial practices, which caused free 
development in this sector (Ranchordas, 2015). At this regulation-free stage, problems 
arose with fintechs, such as liquidity shortage for payback, money and property fraud, 
and sudden run-away or shutdown fintechs. Because of the high volume of investors 
and problems that happened between 2005 and 2015, the protection issues of the 
Chinese fintech sector caused potential issues for the whole financial system in China 
(Shen, 2015). Thus, on 18th July 2015, regulators and the People's Bank of China issued 
the first official regulation on the fintech sector, called 'Guiding Opinions on Promoting 
the Development of Internet Finance' (People's Bank of China & Government of China, 
2015). 
After the first regulation on the fintech sector, regulators published a series of rules and 
additional regulations. The existing Chinese regulatory framework for the fintech sector 
was settled under a 'one plus three' approach. The 'one' is ‘Online Lending Measures 
2016' which can be seen as the charter for online lending in China and outlines the 
requirements and disclosure practices that fintechs should follow. To be more specific, 
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the 'one' firstly defined the legal position of the fintechs, especially fintech banks, and 
also established the central regulation system for the fintech sector. In addition, it 
focused more on risk management in fintechs operations. The 'three' are: 'The Fintech 
Recordation Act 2016', 'The Fund Depository Management 2017' and 'The Information 
Disclosure of Fintech 2017'. These provided detailed rules and requirements that 
fintechs needed to follow and gave investors ways to investigate the background of 
fintechs (Zhang, 2017). 
Following the UK and China, Australia also put a lot into the fintech sector. As Australia 
collaborates with both China and the UK, it is also essential to look at the Australian 
regulations published during these years. Similar to the UK, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC) also supplied a fintech regulatory sandbox which 
provided fintechs either flexibility in the law or fintech licensing exemptions in the 
financial services system (ASIC, 2019). In general, regulators in Australia applied equal 
regulations for fintechs and supported tech-focused business into the fintech market. 
Moreover, regulators helped fintechs broadly by offering informal guidance for 
regulatory understanding by building innovation hubs. ASIC also entered several 
cooperation agreements with other countries' regulators because of the cross-sharing of 
information on the fintech market (Reeves, 2019).  
In general, besides the countries listed above, other countries also published a list of 
regulatory and supervisory documents relating to the fintech area. The regulatory which 
responses to risks related to fintechs had been lengthening, and it seems that the laws 
and regulations will continue developing in the coming years as fintech development 
and the adoption of fintech continues to grow. 
2.3.3 Fintechs' performance and risk management 
Having considered the history of fintech and regulations, this section will show the 
performance of challenger banks and fintechs. Financial innovation aims to produce 
new products, processes, services and organisations to reduce risks and costs and to 
increase benefits through using new financial technologies (Banka, 2013). The 
 38 
representative financial innovations in the banking industry include: online banking, 
online trading platforms, challenger banks and fintechs (Atkins, 2013).  
The fundamental purpose of challenger banks and fintechs is to compete with 
traditional banks and use innovative methods to provide financial services (Lin, 2015). 
Although people are increasingly turning to digital ways to manage their money, 
challenger banks and fintechs still offer ways for their customers to pay in money at 
their branches to attract more customers. For example, Metrobank launched in 2010 
and opened branches in London (Moneyfacts, 2016). Moreover, challenger banks and 
fintechs have focused more on consumers' needs from the outset than traditional banks 
by using data tools. There are some main advantages of fintechs. Firstly, fintechs have 
a direct online system for customers and investors. Secondly, fintechs have no 
boundaries between countries, which means no matter where consumers live, the 
financial services are accessible. In addition, many countries' governments encourage 
and support fintechs (Deloitte, 2019).  
Because of their competitive advantages, the challenger banks and fintechs have 
developed. The continued growth of fintechs is illustrated by the improvement of their 
services and trading methods compared to traditional banks. However, people who 
work in challenger banks and fintechs need a mix of skills in technology, risk 
management, governance, and other bank operation skills. Until now, the performance 
of challenger banks and fintechs had not been as good as expected, and some of them 
operate inefficiently. Therefore, they still need to improve their performance in the 
competitive environment (Bouvier, 2015; Chishti & Barberis, 2016; Carey, 2017; 
Weyer, 2015).  
The 2007-09 financial crisis was another trigger for paying attention to fintechs. It 
forced banks to expose some of their weaknesses and to take a critical look at their risk 
management (Kelly, 2017). It also provided an opportunity for challenger banks and 
fintechs to join the market. Government authorities transformed their attitudes from 
restrictions to support (Kiisel, 2014), for example, the UK challenger banks and 
fintechs took on important roles in financing the liquidity for SMEs based on 
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government support. In 2013-14, they provided liquidity to SMEs to increase 14% of 
their assets (Paul, 2015). 
Thus, based on their competitive advantages and government support, fintechs grew 
and gained market share compared to traditional banks. For example, in China, the 
adoption rate of fintechs was 69% at the end of 2017 and increased to 87% at the end 
of 2019, which was higher than most countries (EY, 2017; EY 2019). At the end of 
2017, there are ten unicorn fintechs, thirty large fintechs and hundreds of small fintechs 
in China. In nearly ten years of development, Chinese fintechs gained 30% market share 
in the Chinese financial industry (Men, 2018). Xiang et al. (2017) also proved the 
development of Chinese fintechs from Chinese government data. They suggested that 
in order to keep developing fintechs in China, regulators and managers needed to 
improve risk management, build a better governance system, and strengthen customer 
protections. In the UK, fintechs and challenger banks also gained market share. The 
adoption rate of fintechs was 42% at the end of 2017 and increased to 71% at the end 
of 2019 (EY, 2017; EY 2019). Moreover, based on Crealoggix (2018), 14% of UK bank 
customers have at least one fintechs or challenger banks account across all ages and the 
number become 25% for millennials and gen-z individuals. However, fintech disruption 
in Australian traditional banking industry is limited. The adoption rate of fintechs was 
only 37% at the end of 2017 and increased to 58% at the end of 2019, which was lower 
than the other two countries (EY, 2017; EY 2019). Based on S&P Global (2020), the 
level of technology disruption in Australia is moderate, which is lower than in the UK 
(high) and China (very high). Fintechs in Australia only held 0.05% of system lending 
and 3% of the credit card market at the end of 2019. But the impact of fintechs on 
traditional banks are increasing with high development of the fintech industry in 
Australia. For example, investment in Australian fintechs increased from $259.5 
million in 2017 to $1913 million in 2020(KPMG, 2020). 
However, because the fintechs sector is relatively new, there few studies focus on 
testing their performance and influencing factors. Thus, any improvement in the area 
could help challenger banks/fintechs perform better in the competitive environment 
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(Carey, 2017). 
Some studies investigated the adoption of fintechs, such as Broby & Karkkainen (2016), 
who investigated the development and adoption of fintechs in Scotland. They showed 
that the key drivers of fintechs were the reaction of government and consumers, and 
risk management performance. They suggested that the Scottish government and the 
traditional banking system should allocate specific resources to react to and assist with 
fintechs' development. Ryu (2018) used multi-variable regression models to test the 
risks and benefits of fintech adoption by analysing 244 fintech users. He showed that 
legal risks had the most significant negative effect, and convenience had the biggest 
positive effect. He showed that risk management influenced the users' selection and 
performance of fintech. 
Some of the studies focused on different types of risks and different countries. 
Claessens et al. (2018) used simple regression analysis to examine credit risk 
management and its influence in fintech market performance in China, the US and the 
UK. Their results showed that credit risk management efficiency, customer and investor 
protection and fintech regulations all influence fintechs' performance. Improving these 
factors could help develop fintechs. Roeder et al. (2018) analysed credit risk, market 
risk and operational risk variables and their impact on fintechs' performance (total 
revenue) through applying multiple regression models to 221 fintechs worldwide. As a 
result, their model could help potential investors to determine the better fintechs to 
invest in in the future.  
Hong et al. (2014) and Xu et al. (2014) studied Chinese fintechs' operations. Hong et 
al. (2014) focused on operational, regulatory and technological risks, while Xu et al. 
(2014) focused on liquidity and operational risks. These two studies suggested that 
managers and regulators need to establish a better framework to reduce these risks. For 
example, they suggested that the government could publish regulations for fintechs, 
which the Chinese government then did from 2015.  
Moreover, the risk-return structure is different for different types of banking. Based on 
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literature for risk management in fintechs and challenger banks (shown above) and in 
traditional banks (shown in Section 2.2.3), we could find that risks had different impacts 
based on type of risks. There is some literature showing risks that had different impacts 
on bank performance based on type. For example, Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007) 
analysed 181 banks from 15 EU countries from 1999 to 2004 through regression models. 
They showed that different types of banks had different performance (private-owned 
banks had better returns than mutual and government-owned banks) and that different 
types of risks had different impacts on different types of banks (e.g. mutual banks had 
better credit risk management efficiency than private and public sector banks). 
Similarly, Chen (2020) also investigated the effects of different types of risk on 
performance. He analysed 43 Chinese banks from 2010 to 2014 and showed that credit 
risks impacted bank performance differently based on their types through the 
decomposition of the profit change model. Both studies suggested that different types 
of banks had different focus points when managing risks and that they should develop 
different operating strategies. 
Finally, a few studies compared impact of risk on fintechs’ performance with that of 
traditional banks. Khanboubi & Boulmakoul (2018) presented the importance of risk 
management in both fintechs and traditional banks and present the differences between 
these two types of banks (e.g. fintechs need to pay more attention to cybercrime and 
data security than traditional banks) . They suggested that both of these need to optimise 
risk management through big data management, and that traditional banks also need to 
set up new sectors, train staff and develop technological services. Through case studies 
in the UK and the US, Mohan (2018) suggested that banks and fintechs should work 
together towards faster innovation in the financial system. Where Jagtiani & Lemieux 
(2017) already proved traditional banks and fintechs were working together to provide 
better lending in the US by using regression models.  
Therefore, based on the previous literature, we note some potential limitations and 
biases when selecting fintechs and challenger banks when analysing them against 
traditional banks. Firstly, most of fintechs and challenger banks are still unlisted (even 
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the giants), which means not all of them publish their business reports for us to analyse. 
So, the bias could be that researchers could only analyse fintechs which publish reports. 
As time develops, the situation could be solved with more fintechs and challenger banks 
providing their reports to the public. Secondly, many fintechs and challenger banks 
have a large chance of failure. When a fintech fails and leaves the market, we have 
limited opportunities to find their data to analyse them and learn lessons. So, the bias 
here could be that researchers can only analyse relatively successful samples. Thirdly, 
the fintech industry is developing rapidly, and research might be outmoded. However, 
even with these limitations and biases, it is still worth investigating the fintech area. 
The research can still be part of the story, understanding the situation of the current 
industry and providing suggestions for managers and regulators who are interested in 
this area. As a new type of bank, the main risks they face during operating are still 
similar to traditional banks, thus, comparisons between them are worth investigating. 
2.4 Conclusion and Research gaps 
With the development of technology and increasing connections in the banking industry, 
fintechs have become established and are now a critical field of interest. Also, because 
of the 2007-09 financial crisis, risk management has become an essential field in 
researching banking industry. However, the performance of fintechs, especially their 
risk management and comparisons between traditional banks and fintechs, has been 
under review. The existing literature shown above demonstrated some pieces of 
evidence.  
This chapter discussed some of the existing risk management performance, regulations 
related to risk management, and impacts of risks on the performance of traditional 
banks and challenger banks and fintechs. Since banks take many risks, they need to 
manage these risks. Through risk management, managers could use historical data, 
regulations and models to identify, analyse, monitor and control all these risks 
(Srivastav, 2013). Many studies (e.g. Valentine, 2012 and Freyer, 2013) presented the 
importance of risk management and showed what managers should do to improve 
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governance in the bank. Some of them tried to provide solutions for risk management, 
mainly focused on traditional banks (e.g. Wu and Olson, 2010). However, in order to 
investigate better risk management in the banking industry, other types of banks (e.g. 
challenger banks and fintechs) are worth studying as well. This literature review 
concluded that, in general, a better reputation, optimum liquidity conditions and lower 
cost percentages in income would produce a better bank performance. Moreover, 
improving risk management efficiency is one of the most important ways to support 
better performance in banks. Moreover, we showed the important roles of China, the 
UK and Australia in the global banking and fintech industry. We also found many 
studies also interested in these three countries, which indicates their importance in 
studies in risk management. Thus, we can see that our countries of interest are indeed 
worth investigating and will provide a contribution to the area. 
This review suggested that previous research on risk management provided some 
explanations about the relationship between risk management and bank performance 
for traditional banks. However, only a few of these studies explained this relationship 
for challenger banks and fintechs and provided only limited explanations. Besides this, 
no comparisons have been carried out regarding the relationship between risk 
management and bank performance for traditional banks and challenger banks and 
fintechs. Thus, this review revealed three research gaps, which are: (i) most of the 
research work on risk management has been done on traditional banks but not on 
challenger banks and fintechs. (ii) many studies mainly focused on one or two particular 
countries or types of risks that impact on bank performance; (iii) previous research also 
failed to provide comparisons between traditional banks and fintechs.  
This research targets all three gaps. We note, however, that the second issue cannot fully 
be covered because it would involve a too large sample size, which is beyond the scope 
of this research. Thus, future research should focus on the remaining gaps. Thus, this 
research will address these limits in the risk management of fintechs and compare the 
results with traditional banks by applying a triangulated analysis between three 
countries (namely China, the UK and Australia). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction  
As an academic activity, research needs to define problems, test hypotheses, consider 
possible solutions, collect and analyse data, test collected data and then deliver research 
findings. Naslund (2002) said that logical research outcomes should be developed based 
on scientific principles through a well-defined research methodology. Kaplan (1983) 
indicated that a well-developed research methodology can provide a good 
understanding of the products and processes of scientific enquiry (Kuhn, 1962). 
Researchers now need to look for suitable or modified methods and techniques for 
observations, inference and analysis. Through the developing of methodology over the 
years, there are plenty of research methods that can be used in research, such as 
descriptive and analytical research, applied and fundamental research, quantitative and 
qualitative research. In all of these types, quantitative and qualitative are the two basic 
approaches. According to Kothari and Garg (2014), quantitative research measures the 
characteristics based on quantitative analysis, including mathematical and statistical 
explanations. On the other hand, qualitative research is concerned more about opinions 
and behaviour based on the research aim. Even though these approaches are not perfect, 
all these methods and techniques can be used to achieve results that successfully 
provide research findings. 
Therefore, identifying an appropriate methodology for research questions is essential. 
While it has seemed that quantitative and qualitative methods are mutually exclusive, 
these two methods can be integrated. It is a methodology increasingly used by 
researchers across different disciplines. This argument is supported by many research 
methodologists (e.g. Cronholm & Hjalmarsson, 2011; Harrison, 2013; Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2008). They suggest that combining these two approaches could better 
answer research questions and provide more complete knowledge about research theory 
and practice.  
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This research adopts a combination of quantitative and qualitative methodology, which 
are the two main theoretical approaches to the research methodology. Based on the 
different research goals, this chapter will explain the reasons for adopting a mix-
methods based approach. The simple explanation is because the purpose here is to use 
all means possible to understand the comparisons between bank types and countries. 
Building statistical models (the quantitive approach), will make use of available data, 
which has been collected and will be analysed through panel data regression models. 
Alongside this, the qualitative approach will consist of case studies in order to 
understand some of the detail behind the overarching differences found in the 
quantitative results. In this way, the aim is to get a clear understanding of traditional 
banks and fintechs. 
The following subsections describe the research design, procedure and a summary of 
the sections. Section 3.2 will present philosophical and epistemological considerations. 
Then, Section 3.3 will show the procedure carried out together with the research process 
and timeline. Section 3.4 will present the research design, which includes countries, 
variables and case selection for both traditional banks and fintechs. Also, it will indicate 
the method and tool selection for statistical analysis. Finally, there will be a conclusion 
in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
The term research philosophy can be seen as the beliefs, assumptions and justification 
for knowledge development. It considers what knowledge has been developed in a 
particular area and is guided by research paradigms. Research paradigms are the 
historical view of knowledge which shows what the knowledge reality is, how 
researchers know about it, and how to find out more. Thus, paradigms provide ontology, 
epistemology, methodology, axiology and the notions of ethics (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Paradigms support the philosophy of the research, such as positivism, interpretivism 
and critical theorism. It also promotes the research approach (Guba, 1990).  
In order to choose a suitable methodology for research, the basic premise needs to find 
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out specific epistemology of research paradigms. Researchers, whether using a 
quantitative or a qualitative approach, display particular epistemological and 
ontological views about research reality and how the research should be conducted 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Prior to applying research results, it is imperative to select an 
epistemological stance that aligns with the beliefs of the researcher about the 
knowledge that will be constructed. If the researcher assumes the knowledge is 
objective and tangible, and that the researcher is just an observer of the knowledge, then 
this kind of researcher is called a positivist. On the other hand, if the research assumes 
the knowledge is subjective and personal, and that the researcher is involved with the 
knowledge, then this kind of researcher is called an interpretivist (Coghlan et al., 2004). 
3.2.1. Critiques of quantitative, qualitative and mixed research methods 
Positivism and interpretivism are based on different philosophical assumptions 
regarding both knowledge consideration and research approaches. Positivist 
epistemology aims to understand a subject by identifying and then explaining the 
phenomenon by components, and it constructs a relationship between components. 
Thus, positivist researchers usually prefer a more quantitative approach (Cavaye, 1996). 
On the other hand, interpretivist researchers who are already involved in the research, 
like the participants, tend to prefer a more qualitative approach. 
Eid and Trueman (2004) said that quantitative research approaches are typically based 
on a logical structure that builds expectations about the links between the concepts in 
the hypotheses. Therefore, the determination of the specific links between concepts by 
the hypotheses would lead to acceptance or rejection of the result of a theoretical 
proposition. Thus, quantitative research approaches emphasise the research 
methodology, procedure and statistical models of validity on the research topic. The 
quantitative approach also relies on statistical measurement and the analysis of datasets 
to determine the relationships between concepts. 
However, Bryman (1993) and Gable (1994) criticised the quantitative research 
approach. They pointed out some existed issues that traditional quantitative approach 
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have, where Bryman (1993) focused more on the orderliness and occupations in using 
a quantitative approach, such as individualism, replication and generalisation, Gable 
(1994) paid more attention to the subjects' relationships and providing descriptive 
statistics and analysis in using a quantitative approach. Also, Gable (1994) considered 
weaknesses of the traditional quantitative survey research, including limited sample 
sizes and misinterpretations by respondents of the survey.  
On the other hand, with regard to the qualitative approach, Marshall and Rossman 
(1989) provided a rationale for qualitative research which was mainly about the 
influence of human behaviour and how to analyse it to understand social behaviour. 
Thus, qualitative researchers consider the meaning of the phenomenon with 
descriptions. The weaknesses of the qualitative approach are also determined by its 
nature. Firstly, data collection is more time-consuming as more types of data need to be 
collected. Secondly, the relationship between research and theory can be weak, as the 
investigated issues may only be linked to broader theoretical issues. Finally, external 
validity is limited, as qualitative research is trying to solve a particular research question, 
rather than a generalised one (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). However, qualitative 
analysis can also be representative for the field of study and then present answers to 
generalised questions in this field (Flick, Kardorff & Steinke, 2004). 
Furthermore, researchers can be both positivist and interpretivist (combining the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches), which is called mixed methodology or 
methods. Gummesson (2000) pointed out that since the late nineteenth century, social 
scientists have begun to merge the positivist and interpretivist paradigms. The trend of 
combining both philosophical stances could build a bridge between the two extreme 
viewpoints. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) called the mixed methodology triangulation, 
and they classified triangulation into four different types. The first one is data 
triangulation which represents data collected from different sources and/or different 
times. The second one is investigator triangulation, which represents the situation 
where different investigators collect data separately and independently. The third one 
is methodological triangulation, which represents the situation where quantitative and 
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qualitative approaches are both employed. The last one is called triangulation of 
theories, which is when the researcher uses theory in one discipline to explain a 
phenomenon in another discipline. 
3.2.2. Justification for the research methodology  
In the aforementioned three types of research methods, the third type (mixed 
methodology) is believed to be suitable for this research. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) 
note that mixed research methods provided more significant empirical results and 
support for the research question. Based on Easterby-Smith et al. (2002), a triangulation 
methodology will be applied in this research to study risk management and its influence 
in banks' and fintechs' performance in China, the UK and Australia. The output of the 
research will be, firstly, from an academic perspective, to apply and improve 
methodology (how to manage risks through panel data regression models) for both 
traditional banks and fintechs in the future. Secondly, from a practice perspective, the 
research will provide insights and benefits in risk management for traditional banks and 
fintechs. Furthermore, from a philosophical perspective, this research will view the 
issues under investigation from both the positivist and interpretivist perspectives, rather 
than either extreme viewpoint.  
Even though this research mainly uses a quantitative approach, a qualitative approach 
(i.e. case studies) will be used to assist in completing the research. This research pulls 
together relevant theories and statistical models with the primary data (both quantitative 
and qualitative) to support the analysis of this research area. 
3.3 Research Procedure 
Based on the aims of this research, reviewing the literature is the first applicable method 
in this research. Literature could offer terminology, articles on risk management, bank 
performance, fintechs developments, and statistical models used in the banking industry. 
The background and theory of the research will be known well, and similar research 
methods and data analysis methods will be adequately understood. Besides this, the 
limitations of previous studies can be detected with these comparisons. These 
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limitations can be considered and avoided through the investigations in this research. 
Besides the literature review, the primary method will be empirical research. The 
simplest explanation of empirical research is using empirical evidence to answer the 
research questions. The ways to gain empirical evidence can be through observation 
and experience, and to analyse the empirical evidence using quantitative or qualitative 
approaches. The aim of using this is to discover and interpret the link between theories 
and facts. This methodology will be helpful to investigate the validity of the hypothesis 
and make the research more valuable in the area (Kauffman & Tallon, 2009). Therefore, 
this research adopts the empirical research and uses a quantitative analysis combined 
with a qualitative analysis. This approach suits the research purpose, which enables us 
to develop panel data regression models to test the relationship between risks and bank 
performance by observing the banks' reports. Also, it will enhance the context of the 
fintechs' development and operation in recent years. Thus, based on previous studies 
and the mixed methodology this research adopts, we can use Figure 3.1 to describe the 
research procedure. 
 
Figure 3.1 The flow of the research procedure 
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3.4 Research Design 
To specify the research aim and objectives, the research design is to set different 
procedures which are like a framework for the whole research study. It defines the 
research type, data collection methods and statistical analysis approaches (Creswell, 
2009). The following subsections present the specific research design. Section 3.4.1 
explains the data gathering strategy. Country and bank selections are presented in 
Section 3.4.2. Section 3.4.3 justifies their choice and lists the specific selections made 
for our case studies. Section 3.4.4 discusses the source of the data and the specific 
variables selected. Section 3.4.5 presents the choice of analytical models that will be 
used to scrutinise the data. Finally, the analysis tools are outlined. 
3.4.1 Data gathering strategy 
Before venturing into data gathering, we conducted a brainstorm to help evaluate and 
prioritise the best solutions for the research implementation. The concept of this 
brainstorm was to consider ideas around the research objectives and look at them 
critically, to ensure that in samples and variables selection are unbiased and useful 
information is gathered. Our ideas about data sources are based on previous studies and 
conventional methods in bank-related research. As annual and interim reports are easy 
to obtain, they are the primary source for regulators and investors to look for 
information on bank performance and bank risk management situations. Therefore, 
these two report types were chosen as the data source to use with official bank 
publications. Thus, data source could be seen reliable, together with proved by previous 
literature with samples and variables selection, with this choice, the quality of data is 
guaranteed (Crooks, 2015).  
Based on Miles et al. (2014), detailed and particular features in the bank financial 
reports can be selected to answer the particular aims specified in this study. This choice 
will, therefore, enable exploration and understanding of the themes in our research 
objectives and help us to achieve them. 
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3.4.2 Country and bank selections 
The research domain can be defined as different types of banks in different countries. 
The representative banks will be selected from traditional banks and fintechs in China, 
the UK and Australia. The main reasons for choosing these countries are: 
⬧ The UK is the global centre of fintechs and the global leader in banks and 
challenger banks.  
⬧ China has had significant developments in challenger banks and fintechs, and it 
has become an essential country in the worldwide banking system.  
⬧ Australia has a unique position in the global financial system with its location. Its 
financial system operates mainly based on the Western model (like the UK), but its 
performance is relatively better than western countries. The typical example is the 
last financial crisis. Australia suffered fewer impacts than other developed 
countries. This is not only because of its different global location but also due to 
its collaborations with China.  
⬧ As measured by GDP per capita, the sample countries include both developed 
countries (the UK and Australia) and developing countries (China). These results 
are relatively comprehensive by investigating all three countries. Comparing the 
differences that exist between these countries could together raise awareness of the 
differences between developed and developing countries' banking risk 
management.  
⬧ All three countries are interconnected through the fintech industry. For example, 
many Chinese investors invest in the fintech industry in the UK and Australia, 
which can help investors to gain experience and management skills in operating 
with fintechs and banks. Moreover, successful Chinese fintech unicorns can also 
provide experiences for other countries as a reference. 
⬧ Through analysing three countries, the results are relatively comprehensive with 
triangulated comparisons rather than paired comparisons. 
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⬧ The research is being undertaken in the UK, and therefore this further justifies the 
UK being an appropriate choice. 
⬧ The research is being undertaken by a Chinese national, and so this both provides 
some specific national background and adds some personal interest to the outcome.  
⬧ There are fewer fintechs founded in developing countries than in developed 
countries, which means that there are fewer options to select for investigations. 
⬧ The study must be limited in size and scope because of the limitations on time and 
resources so that considering more countries is not practical. 
⬧ In addition, as the most influential country in the world economy, the US's fintech 
area is also one of the top countries in the world. It could have been selected for 
comparisons in this research. However, the main reason we did not select the US 
as one of our investigating countries is because of the developing of the Chinese 
economy. As China’s economy develops, the relations between China and the US 
are becoming tense. Although the collaboration continues, in many areas, 
competitive relations are more obvious than cooperation. In the area of fintech, the 
cooperation between China and Australia was closer during our investigated time 
period. Thus, instead of the US, Australia was selected as the third country in this 
research. 
Regarding our bank selections, a few large banks characterise the banking industry with 
a dominant share of business and markets, and various new small banks hold the rest 
of the industry. Although, as discussed in Chapter 2, there are limitations that existed 
in selecting fintechs and challenger banks as a comparative group. They are still worth 
comparing with traditional banks based on the development of fintech and the growing 
interests of the market and government. Given the time constraints and availability of 
the fintechs' data, 11 challenger banks/fintechs were decided to be the sample size for 
each country. The main reason for selecting 11 fintechs is that most of the fintechs had 
not joined the share market or were established recently. Many fintechs, even some 
famous fintechs, do not publicly provide their financial and management reports. 
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Although there are more traditional banks which provide enough data to analyse, in 
order to compare between traditional banks and challenger banks/fintechs, eleven 
traditional banks were also selected to be the sample size for each country. Although 
unequal sample size still could apply comparisons, in order to have an equal comparison 
between these two types of banks together with time-consuming for more sample 
collections, the equal sample size could be a more appropriate choice in this research.  
Table 3.1 shows all the selected traditional banks and fintechs in this study. There are 
eleven traditional banks selected in each country and these have large assets and a 
relatively long history. The criterion for traditional banks' selection is that these banks 
originated in the selected country are, supervised by the local financial regulatory 
authority and are in the list of the top 20 banks in terms of market capitalisation or 
estimated market capitalisation in 2017. For example, Bank of China (BOC), Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), China 
Construction Bank (CCB) and Bank of Communications (BOCOM) were selected as 
Chinese traditional banks. These five traditional banks were the so-called 'big five' of 
Chinese banks and held almost 35% of assets in the Chinese banking industry (Men, 
2018). For the UK, we selected HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Lloyds Group, 
Standard Chartered and Barclays, which are also the five largest UK banks (Misach, 
2018). For Australia, we followed the same selection process. The 'big four' Australian 
banks were selected, which are: Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), Westpac 
Banking Corporation (Westpac), Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) 
and National Australia Bank (NAB) (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA), 2018). 
On the other hand, the critera for selection of the fintechs were that they were originated 
in the selected country, operated bank-related business, publish financial reports, are 
supervised by the local financial regulatory authority and are in the list of top 50 
challenger banks/fintechs in terms of market capitalisation or estimated market 
capitalisation in 2017. For example, YiRenDai was selected as a Chinese fintechs. It 
was a fintech unicorn in China and was the first Chinese fintech IPO that joined the 
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New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 2015 (CreditEase, 2016; Men, 2018). For the 
UK, Atom was selected, which was the first fully mobile challenger bank which had a 
bank licence in the UK (Atom bank, 2014). For Australia, following the same selection 
process, Tyro was selected because it was the first fintech bank which obtained the 
Australia acquirer bank licence in 2005 (Tyro, 2016). 






China Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC) 
1984 YiRenDai (YRD) 2012 
Bank of China (BOC) 1912 Huifutianxia (HF) 2013 
China Construction 
Bank (CCB) 
1954 Qudian (QD) 2014 









1908 Webank (WB) 2014 
China Minsheng 
Banks (CMBC) 
1996 Ideacome (IC) 2012 
China Merchants Bank 
(CMB) 
1987 JD finance (JD) 2013 
China Citic Bank 
(Citic) 




1992 Lufax (LF) 2012 
Industrial Bank (IB) 1988 Tianjin Jincheng 
bank (KCBE) 
2015 
China Everbright Bank 
(CEB) 
1992 PaiPaidai (PPD) 2007 
UK Lloyds Group 1765 Shawbrook Bank 2011 
HSBC 1866 Aldermore Bank 2009 
Barclays 1690 Atom Bank 2014 
Standard Chartered 1969 Monzo Bank 2015 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) 
1727 Metro Bank 2010 




1846 Gatehouse Bank 2008 
Clydesdale 1838 Starling Bank 2014 
Virgin Money 2003 Revolut 2015 
Yorkshire Building 
Society 





1884 Cambridge & 
Counties Bank 
2012 
Australia Commonwealth Bank 
of Australia (CBA) 
1911 Ondeck 2006 
Australia & New 
Zealand Banking 
Group (ANZ) 
1835 Zipmoney 2013 
National Australia 
Bank (NAB) 
1858 Afterpay Touch 2014 
Westpac Banking 
Corporation (Westpac) 
1817 Xero 2006 
Bendigo and Adelaide 
Bank (BA bank) 




1874 Pushpay 2011 
Macquarie Bank 1969 Tyro 2003 
AMP Bank 1988 Change Financial 2011 
Suncorp Bank 1902 ManagedAccounts 2004 
Heritage Bank 1875 Mint Payments 2007 
IMB Bank 1880 Wisr 2015 
Table 3.1 Sample selections (traditional banks and fintechs) 
Now that the banks and fintechs had been selected, it is necessary to consider the 
appropriate time period to study. The period 2013-2017 was chosen because this time 
period shows the performance of all of these banks after the recent financial crisis. In 
addition, many of the fintechs did not exist prior to the recent financial crisis. Some of 
them were founded during or after the financial crisis. They were in their infancy and 
such fintechs were often not willing to present their annual or interim report for the 
public to see. Also, combined with the differences that exist in the start-up and reporting 
periods of fintechs between the chosen countries, the year beginning 2013 provides a 
comparable starting point. Even though reports could be found from 2010 for fintechs 
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in the UK and Australia, for Chinese fintechs, they were not available until 2013. For 
traditional banks, of course, they all have a long history, but as the aim to compare the 
different types of bank, the selection needs to follow the fintechs.  
Moreover, following the regulations, traditional banks and fintechs all publish their 
interim reports and annual report. Thus, the time period is selected from the second half 
from 2013 to the second half of 2017. How these traditional banks and fintechs have 
managed their risks and improved their performance since 2013 can be investigated, 
and the differences between them can be compared. 
3.4.3 Case studies 
Yin (2018) defined the case study as an empirical research method that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in-depth and in a real-life context. Thus, through case 
studies, particular understanding and insights can be gained. Thus, the potential use of 
case studies includes: first, the phenomenon can be learned about. Moreover, from 
actual practice, the relevant theory is verified. Secondly, a relatively full understanding 
of the nature and complexity of the phenomenon can be seen (Farquhar, 2013).   
Case studies investigate the scope of the research area in a small number of units, and 
this small number of cases contrasts with a large number of sample features. It can then 
answer the research questions in a controlled way. Moreover, case studies can also 
concern the phenomenon in context. Thus, we can look into what happens in the actual 
situation. For business researchers, many advantages exist in looking into a particular 
location, company or industry. However, case studies have limitations. One of the main 
limitations is that findings from a small number of cases cannot extend to a more 
general situation where the quantitative survey research applies (Farquhar, 2013).  
Thus, as this research will adopt the mixed methodology, case studies as a qualitative 
approach will be provided to support the findings from the panel data regression models 
in the quantitative approach. Based on Table 3.1, cases are selected from the whole 
sample. The selected examples are listed in Table 3.2. As there are two types of banks 
included in the whole sample, the selection process followed the pair matching method. 
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Firstly, for traditional banks, the cases studied here are the largest bank in each country, 
and they survived through the 2007-09 financial crisis. Secondly, for fintechs, the cases 
studies here are the most famous unicorn fintechs which received licenses earliest and 
their size is well-developed in each country. Thus, one bank in each type from the three 
countries is chosen, resulting in a total of six cases. 
Country Traditional banks Challenger banks/fintechs 
China ICBC YRD 
UK HSBC Atom 
Australia ANZ Tyro 
Table 3. 2 Case studies samples 
In more detail, because of the importance of risk management in the banking industry, 
some banks performed outstandingly, while some banks had difficulties. In order to 
illustrate the risk management and risks' influence and inform this research's objective, 
risk management of the cases is worthwhile to investigate. Therefore, a similar 
approach to case studies is borrowed from Docherty and Viort (2014). We set out six 
case studies in both traditional banks and challenger banks and fintechs. These cases 
will contain lessons learned from risk management, or risk mismanagement, and their 
impact on performance. These cases are not only case studies of the individual banks 
and fintechs, but also provide an insight into the structural issues of the banking 
industry with respect to both traditional banks and fintechs. 
3.4.4 Data collection and extraction 
After deciding on our sample, the next step is to collect related variables for further 
analysis. We hand-picked these variables from bank annual and interim reports. In 
Chapter 2, the literature review, we reviewed some possible variables used in analysing 
bank risk management and their impacts on bank performance. Based on our literature 
review, Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 identify the dependent and independent variables with 
their meanings and expected effects with respects to dependent variables which are 
involved in this research with the panel data regression models. Moreover, in order to 
 58 
compare three countries using one standard, as the most influential international 
settlement currency, except for the percentage, variable (VaR) is collected based on 
millions US$ and variable (EPS) is collected based on US$ per share. 
Dependent variables (Bank performance variables) 
Variable Meaning and measure 
Return on Asset 
(ROA) 
ROA is an indicator used to measure the ratio of the bank's profit to 
the average assets of the bank. It reflects the comprehensive 




 ×  100% 
Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
ROE is an indicator that shows the return on investment of 
shareholders. It reflects the bank's ability to use net asset value to 




 ×  100% 
Earnings per Share 
(EPS) 
EPS is a profit indicator for banks in the share market. EPS and the 
bank's stock price are linked, so it is one of the critical elements that 
the banks' existing shareholders and potential investors use to 
measure the bank. 
𝐸𝑃𝑆 =
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
 
Table 3.3 Dependent variables and their definitions 
Independent variables (Bank risk variables & size)  
Credit risk 
variable 





The lender of the loan believes the borrower will not 
make the payments 90 days after the due date, which 
makes the loan become a non-performing loan. 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛




A net write-off is a debt owed to the bank that is unlikely 
to be recovered. This 'bad debt' is usually written off as 
total write-offs. Non-performing loans may be charged 
off as bad debt on a quarterly or half-yearly basis. 
𝑁𝐶𝑂 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 − 𝑜𝑓𝑓
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
 ×  100% 
Negative 
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Total Loan Loss 
Ratio (LoanR) 
Every loan loss of the bank during the financial period, 
including impairment, loss and write-off loans. The 
LoanR is representative of the status of total credit 
security. 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑅 =  
Total loan loss
Total loan




Meaning and measure Expected 
effect 
Value at Risk 
(VaR) 
The definition of VAR is 'Given some confidence level 
α in (0,1), the VaR of the portfolio at the confidence 
level α is given by the smallest number l such that the 
probability that the loss L exceeds l is not larger than (1 
– α)'. So the equation shows 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼 = 𝑖𝑛𝑓{𝑙 ∈ ℜ: 𝑃(𝐿 >
𝑙) ≤ 1 − 𝛼} = 𝑖𝑛𝑓 {𝑙 ∈ ℜ: 𝐹𝐿(𝑙) ≥ 𝛼  ' (Frey & McNeil, 
2002). The left is the definition of VaR. The equation on 
the right assumes a potential probability distribution, 
which makes it valid only for the parameter VaR 
Following the regulators requirements, banks publish 
their VaR in annual and interim reports at 99% in180-












LCR shows highly liquid assets held by banks to meet 
short-term obligations, and Basel III asks banks to 
obtained at least 100% (since 2015). LCR ensures that 
financial institutions have the necessary assets to 
survive any short-term liquidity disruption. 
𝐿𝐶𝑅 =
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑




CR is a measure of the liquidity and efficiency ratio of 
a bank's ability to repay short-term liabilities with 
current assets.  
𝐶𝑅 =  
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 ×  100% 
Positive 
Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio (T1) 
T1 ratio is the ratio of a bank's core equity capital to its 
total risk-weighted assets. Basel III aims for a  









D/A evaluates a bank's debt levels. D/A indicates the 
financial health of a bank and how over-extended they 
may be.  
𝐷 𝐴⁄ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠




D/E ratio is an indicator to measure the relationship 
between creditors' contributions and the owners' 
contributions. It also shows how far shareholders’ 
equity can meet a company's obligations to creditors in 
a liquidation. 
𝐷 𝐸⁄ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦








The percentage change in the bank's brand value in each 
year and half year basis. 
𝐵𝑉𝐶 =  
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡(𝑛)−𝑡(𝑛−1)
𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡(𝑛−1)








In Basel II, one of the approaches to calculating the 
operational exposure is called the standardised approach 
(operational risk) where the standard indicator is 15% 
of gross income for the commercial banks (Basel 





The operational risk events represent the already 
occurred and reported operational risks with money lost. 
ORP shows the rate of operational risk loss in banks' 
operational risk preparations. If the ratio is less than 
15%, it indicates the preparation is sufficient. If the ratio 
greater than 15%, it suggests the preparation is not 
enough, which may cause an operational risk disaster 
for the bank. 
𝑂𝑅𝑃 =  
𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒




C/I shows how efficiently the bank is being run. The 
lower the ratio, the higher profits the bank earns and this 
indicates that the bank in performing better in its 
operations. 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡/𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒





Meaning and measure Expected 
effect 
Bank Size Log of the bank’s total asset 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) 
Positive or 
Negative 
Table 3.4 Independent variables, their definitions and expected effects 
For the variables mentioned above, some of them were found in the secondary database 
(e.g. Bloomberg) for listed banks, such as ROA, ROE, EPS, NPL, VaR LCR, CR, D/A, 
D/E, T1, Asset and C/I. However, other variables (e.g. NCO, LoanR, ORE, and ORP) 
needed to be collected or calculated from the banks’ annual and interim reports. 
Moreover, for the banks that are not part of the share market, all variables must be 
collected from the annual and interim reports. In addition, as there are more missing 
values for China’s data on Bloomberg, we used another secondary database called the 
China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) which provides data 
particularly for China’s listed companies to collect variables. Similarly, it provides 
ROA, ROE, EPS, NPL, VaR, LCR, CR, D/A, D/E, T1, Asset, and C/I. Furthermore, 
NCO, LoanR, ORE and ORP were obtained from banks’ annual and interim reports. 
Table 3.5 outlines the sources we used for data collection for each country and each 
bank type. 
 Traditional banks Challenger banks/fintechs 
China CSMAR and bank reports CSMAR, Bloomberg and bank reports 
UK Bloomberg and bank reports Bloomberg and bank reports 
Australia Bloomberg and bank reports Bloomberg and bank reports 
Table 3.5 Data source for each country and bank type 
3.4.4.1. Dependent variables 
ROA, ROE and EPS are selected to represent the bank performance as dependent 
variables. Through continuous development, ROE and ROA have become the 
commonly used factors in banks. The use of ratio analysis to evaluate bank performance 
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and measure bank profitability is now well established. Both ROE and ROA have been 
used for a long time to represent bank performance in assets or equity. These show the 
percentage of the income of bank assets or equity in a financial year. Therefore, banks 
can compare their current and historical performance in investments and earnings 
(MacDonld & Koch, 2006). Similar to Bailey et al. (2011), Erdogan (2016) and Rauf 
& Ismatullaevich (2013), this research uses both ROA and ROE as dependent variables. 
Following Abubakar et al. (2016) and Siddik, Kabiraj & Joghee (2017), EPS is also 
used as another dependent variable. EPS is also a common factor in measuring bank 
performance in the stock market. It is seen as the most critical variable in determining 
the stock price, which leads to its impact on the performance and profitability of banks 
in the stock market (Islam et al., 2014). Even though some of the fintechs are not on 
the stock market yet, the differences in the performance of traditional banks and 
fintechs are still worth monitoring and analysing. The main reason for this is that 
fintechs do tend to join the stock market. 
3.4.4.2. Independent variables 
For independent variables, variables are catalogued into six parts based on five bank 
risk types and bank size. The first risk type is credit risk. As stated in the literature 
review, credit risk is an essential type of risk that every financial institution is expected 
to reduce. Three relevant variables (NPL, NCO and LoanR) are collected. Following 
Carbo-Valverde (2016), Geng et al. (2016) and Zhang et al. (2011), we choose NPL and 
LoanR as representative variables in the regression models. The NPL is a favourable 
and widely used ratio used for analysing credit risk and represents the quality of a bank's 
assets. A higher NPL exposes banks to more credit risk. LoanR represents the status of 
a bank's financial security. When it becomes too high, the quality of loans collapses, 
and the value of the bank's assets drop as bad loans increase. Supported by Barth et al. 
(2018), the NCO is selected because it can help managers predict how much money 
will need to be written-off in the future. A higher rate means more loss which has to 
written-off in the credit asset. As said above, based on the literature, we expect that 
there will be a negative relationship between credit risk variables and bank performance.  
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The second type of risk is market risk. Similar to Kerkhof et al. (2010), value at risk 
(VaR) is chosen to represent the market risk variable. It is a widely used measure that 
shows the potential loss for the investments. It provides under normal market volatility 
and probability, the largest potential loss to a bank's portfolio in a future time (Frey & 
McNeil, 2002). Some the researchers argue that VaR has a negative impact on bank 
performance due to the fact that the higher values indicate higher market risk (e.g. 
Kerkhof et al., 2010). However, William (2016) found that higher VaR did not reduce 
bank performance. As both negative and positive influence are shown in previous 
literature, we do not have any prior expectation for the variable with respect to its effect 
on bank performance. 
The next risk type is liquidity and capital risk. Following Jin et al. (2011), Kiema & 
Jokivuolle (2014), Zhang (2011) and combining requirements of financial regulations, 
five relevant variables (e.g. LCR, CR, T1, D/A and D/E) have been selected. We 
removed CAR and QR from the panel data regression models. This is because the CAR 
value contains T1 and T1 is of more concern to banks and investors in practice, and the 
CR value contains QR, where CR could show more of an overall result. As noted in the 
literature review and Table 3.4, LCR ensures that financial institutions have the 
necessary assets to survive any short-term liquidity disruptions. CR shows the bank's 
ability to repay current liabilities with its current assets. T1 shows the bank's financial 
strength in its capital. Thus, we expect that these three variables could have a positive 
influence on bank performance in our models.  
D/A and D/E provide the debt level in the bank's asset and equity respectively, which 
we excepted to reduce bank performance. Thus, based on previous findings (e.g. Pinto 
& Joseph, 2017; Siddik, Kabiraj & Joghee, 2017), a negative relationship between D/A 
and D/E to bank performance are expected and this is that shown in Table 3.4. Moreover, 
the reason for choosing two debt-level variables is D/E demonstrates more directly that 
if the equity is negative, the banks perform poorly. On the other hand, D/A cannot prove 
that because the total assets are always positive. Thus, all variables selected in capital 
and liquidity risk represent a different angle which will provide a comprehensive view 
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of banks' management of this type of risk.  
Regarding reputational risk, similar to Cheung et al. (2011), we also use the percentage 
change in the bank's brand value as a representative factor to put into the models. We 
expect that it will positively influence bank performance. The fifth type of risk is 
operational risk. Since operational risk is difficult to manage and monitor, the Basel 
Accords require banks to prepare 15% of their gross income to react when operational 
risks occur (BCBS, 2015). This research follows the Basel Accords, and it calculates 
the cost of known risk events over the gross income as the ORP in the regression models. 
Compared with the required 15%, the higher the ratio, the worse the operational risk 
has been managed. If the ratio exceeds 15%, it indicates that terrible risks occurred and 
that the bank should pay much more attention to these to prevent this operational risk 
from happening again. Thus, a negative influence could be expected to be shown in 
models on bank performance. Similar to Diallo et al. (2015), the C/I is also selected for 
operational risk to put into the regression models. It shows the efficiency of operations 
management, including operational risk management. Although this ratio does not 
show specific operational risks, it shows the bank's overall operational efficiency. 
Changes in C/I can highlight potential problems. For example, if the ratio increases 
from one period to the next, it means higher operating costs for that bank. Thus, based 
on previous findings (e.g. Diallo et al. 2015; Shaban & James, 2018), we expect that 
C/I will negatively influence bank performance. 
Finally, the bank's total asset is selected. Banks with different sizes may have various 
incentives to participate in investment and corporations. In panel data regression 
models, because the value of total assets is much bigger than other variables, the natural 
logarithm of total assets is used to represent the bank size in almost all literature. Thus, 
this research will follow them and use ln(asset). Some studies (e.g. Elsas et al., 2010; 
Tan, 2016) suggest that larger banks may have lower bank performance. Some the 
studies (e.g. Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Berger & Humphrey, 1994) suggest that larger 
banks can increase their performance to a certain level and after that their larger size 
will decrease their performance. Thus, there is no prior expectation for the effect of this 
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variable on bank performance - both positive and negative could be shown for our 
dataset. 
3.4.4.3 Dummy variables 
Besides bank size, many previous studies added dummy variables to show the impact 
of bank ownership on bank performance for the traditional banks. For example, Fu & 
Heffernan (2009) and Tan (2016) tested if state-owned banks had better performance in 
China. In order to capture the relationship between bank ownership and performance, 
we follow the previous literature's suggestion in using a dummy variable for bank 
ownership (e.g. state-owned banks). However, Tan (2016) showed a positive 
relationship between State-Owned banks (SOB) and bank performance, whereas Fu & 
Heffernan (2009) argued for a negative relationship between them. Thus, we have no 
prior expectation for the effect of this variable on bank performance. 
Based on the government explanations, in our sample, the 'big five' in Chinese banks 
are the state-owned banks. With regards to the UK, there are no state-owned banks. In 
more detail, because of the 2007-09 financial crisis, Lloyds bank group and RBS faced 
colossal losses, and the UK government bailed them out. Although the UK government 
owns a controlling stake of 43% of Lloyds bank group's and 73% of RBS' ordinary 
shares, the banks remained independent of government (BBC News, 2009). With 
regards to Australia, there are also no state-owned banks. In more detail, the CBA used 
to be the only state-owned bank in Australia. However, the CBA went privatisation in 
1991 and became independent of government (CBA, 2019). Therefore, as only China 
has state-owned banks in our sample, the dummy variable will not be included in the 
analysis of Chapter 4. However, in order to have a comprehensive analysis, the Chinese 
traditional banks' results with the dummy variable will be shown in Appendix 1 and 2. 
Dummy 
variable 




Dummy variable equal to one for state-owned banks 
(SOB) and zero for other traditional banks. 
Positive or 
Negative 
Table 3.6 Dummy variable and expected effect 
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3.4.5 Research models selection 
Regression analysis is a widely used statistical process for estimating the relationships 
between variables. There are two main purposes of regression analysis: (i) prediction 
and forecasting; (ii) to test the causal relationships between dependent and independent 
variables. For this research, as a part of the mixed methodology, panel data regression 
models will be built and analysed to achieve the research aims.  
Before the analysis of any relationships, data need to be collected. Cross-sectional data, 
time-series data and panel data are three main types of data in research. The main 
difference between them is the entity and time period. Cross-sectional data contains 
data for multiple entities over a single time period. Time-series data contains data for 
single entities over multiple time periods. Panel data contains data for multiple entities 
with each entity observed over serval time periods (Watson, 2015). For this research, 
the variables listed above were hand-picked from annual and interim reports and were 
catalogued by country and type of bank into different Excel tables. The data are 
presented with the same variables in different years with different banks and countries 
repeatedly. Thus, the dataset in this research can be seen as panel data. As mentioned 
in the literature review, many studies have used panel data regression models to analyse 
bank performance and its influencing factors. This research will follow the previous 
literature, applying panel data regression models to analyse the collected data, test bank 
performance, and examine how different types of risks influence the performance. 
There are several reasons why panel data analysis is of interest. Firstly, panel data 
analysis offers a solution to the problem of omitted variable bias caused by unobserved 
heterogeneity between entities, which is a common problem when fitting a model in 
cross-sectional data sets. Secondly, it can exploit the dynamics that cross-sectional data 
find hard to detect. Cross-sectional data usually consist of no more than a single year, 
but panel data analysis can avoid the problem of a limited time interval. The third 
attraction of the panel data analysis is that it often has a large number of observations. 
For examples, if there are n units of observation and these are undertaken in T time 
periods then there are potentially n*T observations each consisting of a time series of 
 67 
length T on n units.  
The standard form of the panel data regression model is 
  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1
+  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑦 represent the dependent variable; 𝑥 represents the independent variables; 
𝛽0 represents the constant term;  𝛽𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑘) are coefficients to be estimated; 𝑖 
and 𝑡 are indices for the sections and time, respectively; 𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡, where 𝛼𝑖 is 
the individual-specific unobserved effect. For the fixed-effects approach, it includes 𝛿𝑡, 
which is a trend term in 𝑡, which allows intercepts to shift over time. It allows 𝛼𝑖 to 
be correlated with the regressor matrix 𝑥𝑖𝑡 which means the fixed-effects assume that 
induvial-specific effect is correlated with the independent variables. For the random-
effects approach, it shows an unobserved time-invariant and group-specific effect and 
assumes 𝛼𝑖 is independent for all 𝑡 in the random-effects. 𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
There are two main approaches in panel data regression models, namely fixed-effects 
models and random-effects models. In the fixed-effects models, there are three versions 
of estimations under this approach called within-groups fixed-effects, first differences 
fixed-effects, and least squares dummy variable fixed-effects. For within-groups fixed 
effects, the mean value of the variables on a given individual is calculated and 
subtracted from the data for that individual. When put into the general form of the 
regression model, it becomes   ?̅?𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ?̅?𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 +  ?̅?𝑖𝑡  where  ?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑡̅ + 𝛼𝑖 +
?̅?𝑡  , then subtracting the mean variable equation from the general equation, 
gives   𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 ) +  𝛿(𝑡 − 𝑡̅) + 𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡 , and as a result, 𝛼𝑖 
disappears. This version is called the within-group regression model, as it explains the 
variations about the mean of the dependent variable in terms of the variations about the 
means of the explanatory variables related to a given individual. For researchers, the 
major attraction of using this version is the possibility of tackling the unobserved 
heterogeneity bias. As noted above, this eliminates the fixed-effects (unobservable 
across-group differences) by expressing the values of the dependent and explanatory 
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variables for each observation as deviations from respective mean values. Thus, to 
estimate the fixed-effects model with a large number of individuals, within-group fixed 
effects is adopted. For the within-group fixed-effect, SAS can apply a procedure called 
PROC Panel to analyse the dataset, which could do analyse fixed-effects analysis for 
fixed-individual or fixed-time with '/fixedone', or both with '/fixedtwo'. The procedure 
helps us analyse the dataset more clearly, such as, if we only need to fixed the 
individual-effect we can use fixedone.  
In the second version, called first differences fixed-effects, a similar subtraction method 
is applied, but using the current time period minus the one previous time period from 
the observation. As the current model can be written as  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 +
𝛿𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 , the previous time period equation is  𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑗=1 +
𝛿(𝑡 − 1) +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡−1 , so differencing, the result becomes  ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑗∆𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 +
∆𝛿 + 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡−1. Similarly, the equation show 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽0 disappears. In the first two 
versions, the model is manipulated to eliminate the unobserved effect and leave the 
time effects. As moted above, this eliminates the unobservable effect of the parameters 
and causes the loss of the first time period for each cross-section (𝑡 − 1 rather than 𝑡). 
Thus, to address the problem of omitted variables in a panel data analysis, first 
differences fixed-effects is adopted. For the first differences fixed-effect, SAS can 
apply a procedure panel to analyse the dataset with '/fdtwo printfixed BW'. 
In the third version, called least squares dummy variable (LSDV) regression, the 
unobserved effect,  𝛼𝑖 is brought explicitly into the model. For example, a dummy 
variable 𝐴𝑖 can be introduced where it is equal to 1 in the case of an observation related 
to the individual 𝑖  and 0 otherwise. The equation can be rewritten 
as 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝛿𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝐴𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡. Thus, the unobserved effect is treated as 
the coefficient of the individual-specific dummy variable, and 𝛼𝑖𝐴𝑖 represents a fixed-
effect on the dependent variable  𝑦𝑖 for the individual 𝑖 (Dougherty, 2016). As noted 
above, this follows above-mentioned fixed-effects approach with adding dummy 
variables. For the LSDV fixed-effects, SAS can apply a procedure panel to analyse the 
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dataset, which could do analysis with or without a dummy variable with '/w/o a dummy', 
or omits the intercept parameter from the model with '/noint' or place restractictions on 
the parameter estimates with 'restrict'. 
As introduced in the previous paragraph about the fixed-effects approach, fixed-effects 
panel data regression models are not that efficient when the variables are constant for 
each individual. Fixed-effects models are better at showing the relationships between 
variables in a particular group, rather than the whole group representing an industry. 
One possible solution is random-effects models that can show relationships 
representing the whole industry. The random-effects regression model can be applied 
to panel data analysis. For the random-effects approach, the enquired equation is 
  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 , where  𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 , 𝛼𝑖 is the individual-specific 
unobserved effect which gives the unobserved time-invariant and group-specific effect, 
𝑖𝑡  is the error term, and 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡) =  𝐸(𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡) =  𝐸(𝛼𝑖𝑡) + 𝐸( 𝑖𝑡) = 0  by 
assuming individual unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the independent 
variables. (Dougherty, 2016). For random-effects, SAS can apply a procedure panel to 
analyse the dataset with '/ranone' or '/rantwo'. 
Based on Greene (2008), Hsiao et al. (1999) and Torres-Reyna (2007), the fixed-effects 
models explore the relationship between predictors and outcome variables within 
sections and represents the whole group performance. In general, random-effects can 
be seen as efficiently with the assumptions underlying are believed to be satisfied 
(Hofmann & Werkhieser,2012), (Sheytanova,2004). In this research, panel data 
regression models are used to present the general performance of traditional banks' and 
fintechs' performance and how risks influence these performances, and not to present 
these specific banks' performance and their specific risk management. So, the random-
effects models are more preferred to use. However, if there are omitted variables, the 
individual-specific effect 𝛼𝑖 might be correlated with the independent variables in the 
random-effects model, so that the fixed-effects models is more robust.  
Thus, we still need to run a test to determine which approach is preferred. The Durbin-
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Wu-Hausman (DWH) test is a statistical hypothesis test widely used in econometrics. 
It is used to help researchers determine which approach should be used to analyse a 
panel dataset. The null hypothesis is that the random-effects is preferred to use. There 
is no correlation between the error term and the independent variables in the panel data 
regression model. In statistical terms, this implies that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 0 for at least 
one i. The alternative hypothesis is that the fixed-effects model is appropriate. That is, 
a correlation between the error term and the independent variables in the panel data 
regression model exists and is statistically significant. In statistical terms, it states that 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 for all i. Then, a we choose a significance level. In general, this is 
where to be 0.05, which means if the test p-value is smaller than 5%, the researcher 
needs to reject the null hypothesis, and the fixed-effects model will be used in analysing 
data. If the p-value is larger than 5%, the researcher cannot reject the null hypothesis, 
and the random-effects models will be used in the data analysis. Furthermore, the 
Hausman statistic is calculated from the formula: 𝐻 = (?̂?𝑅𝐸 − ?̂?𝐹𝐸)
′
[𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑅𝐸) −
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝐹𝐸)]−1(?̂?𝑅𝐸 − ?̂?𝐹𝐸) , where ?̂?𝑅𝐸   and ?̂?𝐹𝐸  are the vectors of coefficient 
estimates for the random- and fixed-effects respectively. The Hausman statistic (H) is 
𝜒2(𝑘) distributed under the null hypothesis with the degrees of freedom 𝑘 equal the 
number of factors. The observed H, it is compared with the critical values for the 
𝜒2distribution on 𝑘 degrees of freedom, and the null hypothesis is rejected if this is 
bigger than its critical value. If the test rejects the null hypothesis, then there is evidence 
suggest that the random-effects is biased and fixed-effects is the correct estimation 
procedure (Hausman, 1978; Sheytanova, 2004). For the DWH test, SAS can apply a 
procedure called PROC Model to determine model selection with '/hausman'.  
Besides the Hausman test, we also need to test the stationarity of the dataset before 
running regression estimates. Stationarity is a critical concept in time series analysis 
and there are many studies on testing for unit roots in time series data. There are three 
main reasons for testing for stationarity: 1. Stationarity can strongly affect the behaviour 
and properties of the series; 2. The use of nonstationary variables may cause spurious 
regression problems. Spurious regression is a mathematical relationship in which two 
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or more variables are not related to other variables, but, due to coincidence or the 
presence of another unseen factor, it may be incorrectly inferred that they are related.3. 
When the variables in a regression model are nonstationary, the standard assumptions 
of asymptotic analysis will be invalidated. In other words, the usual 't-ratio' does not 
follow the t-distribution and hypothesis testing regarding the regression parameters 
cannot be undertaken validly. 
Moreover, stationarity needs to be considered when analysing panel data. For panel 
data models, the use of panel data unit root tests has become increasingly popular since 
the publication of the paper by Levin and Lin (1993). The main motivation for replacing 
the use of time-series unit root tests such as the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test with panel data unit root 
tests is that as the cross-sectional data increases, the power of the test increases. Another 
advantage of using a panel unit root test is that the test statistic is asymptotically 
normally distributed, whereas the time series unit root test follows an unconventional 
distribution, and the sample is usually approximately normally distributed in 
econometrics (Hadri, 2000).  
The general equation used by the most panel unit root test is ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +
∑ ∅𝑖,𝑙∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑙
𝑝𝑖
𝑙=1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 , where 𝑑𝑖𝑡 are the deterministic components. 𝜌𝑖 = 0 
suggests y has a unit root for individual 𝑖., while 𝜌𝑖 < 0 suggests that the process is 
stationary around the deterministic part.  
There are three main types of panel data unit root tests, namely the Levin-Lin (LL) test, 
the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test and the Fisher's (𝑝𝜆 ) test. Firstly, the LL test was 
developed by Levin and Lin (1992). They incorporated a time trend as well as 
individual and time-specific effects through the test model. In 1993, Levin and Lin 
updated their results of the panel unit root test and solved the problem of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The major limitation of the LL test is that ρ is 
the same for all observations (𝐻0: 𝜌1 =  𝜌2 = ⋯ = 𝜌𝑁 = 𝜌 = 0  and 𝐻1: 𝜌1 =  𝜌2 =
⋯ = 𝜌𝑁 = 𝜌 < 0), which leads to that null hypothesis not being resected under some 
circumstances when it should be, because the alternative is too strong to hold in some 
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empirical cases.  
Next, the IPS test relaxes the assumption that 𝜌 for all 𝑖 . is the same under the 
alternative hypothesis. Although the IPS test was designed as a generalisation of the LL 
tests, the IPS test assumes that 𝑇 is the same for all cross-sectional units and that 
𝐸(𝑡𝑖,𝑇) and 𝑉(𝑡𝑖,𝑇) are the same for all  𝑖 . Thus, the IPS can only be applied to 
balanced panel data. There are many studies that have reviewed tests for significance 
of the results from N independent tests of a hypothesis like the IPS test, especially under 
meta-analysis. These procedures depend on different ways of combining the observed 
significance levels (p-values) from different tests.  
At last, Fisher's ( 𝑝𝜆 ) test shows whether the test statistics are continuous, the 
significance levels are independent uniform (0,1) variables, and 𝜆 has 𝜒2 distribution 
with 2N degrees of freedom. The advantage of Fisher's test is that dataset need not be 
balanced as required in the IPS test and it can be carried out for any unit root test derived 
(Maddala & Wu, 1999).  
Maddala & Wu (1999) compared these three models through Monte Carlo simulations 
and they concluded that Fisher's test (based on the ADF test) is the simplest and most 
straightforward to use and better than the LL and IPS tests. Moreover, their arguments 
also applied to tests using stationarity as the null, and to panel cointegration tests testing 
the null of no cointegration as well as testing the null of cointegration. In addition, for 
stationarity tests, SAS can apply procedure called PROC Panel to analyse the dataset 
with '/stationarity(fisher)'. 
However, Maddala & Wu (1999) pointed out a major problem with panel data unit root 
and cointegration tests, which is an urge to generalise the tests used in univariate data 
to panel data under assumptions. This leads to more focus on technical details and less 
on the questions to be answered, making them less likely to be useful in practice. For 
example, for almost all tests, the hypothesis is either that all series are 
stationary/cointegrated or that all series are nonstationary/not cointegrated. This type 
of hypothesis lessens the value of the test. Moreover, by examining the same panel 
dataset using original regression, fully-modified regression and dynamic regression 
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models, Azizi (2017) demonstrated that regression results were similar even when 
nonstationary variables were used. 
Although there are issues that exist in the panel unit root test, many studies still run unit 
root before regression estimations. For example, Al-Wesabi & Yusof, (2020); 
Athanasoglou et al., (2008); Fainstein & Novikov, (2011); and Tan & Anchor, (2016) 
all run the unit root test before estimating the relationship between bank risks and 
performance. Thus, because this research complements the findings of the above 
mentioned studies and comparisons applied by Maddala & Wu (1999), we will also 
apply the panel unit root test (Fisher's test based on the ADF test) to test for stationarity 
in this research. 
Heteroscedasticity also needs to be tested for when analysing regression models. One 
of the linear regression model assumptions is that the random error terms in the 
regression satisfies homoscedasticity. This means that they need to have the same 
variance. If this assumption is not satisfied, so that the random error terms have 
different variances, then the regression model has heteroscedasticity. Although OLS 
estimates are unbiased and consistent in the heteroscedasticity situation, they are not 
the optimal estimates. Thus, before performing any analysis, the heteroscedasticity of 
the model should be tested, and any heteroscedasticity should be eliminated. White's 
general heteroscedasticity test (WT) is the most widely used method to test for 
heteroscedasticity. In White's test, the null hypothesis is that the random error of the 
regression equation satisfies homoscedasticity. The alternative hypothesis is that the 
random error of the regression equation is heteroscedastic. The test statistics (WT) 
under the null hypothesis follows a χ2 distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k 
is the number of independent variables. If nR2> χ2(k), where n is the number of 
observations, R2 is auxiliary regression determinability coefficient, then the null 
hypothesis is rejected, and there is evidence that the residuals are heteroscedastic (Xu 
et al., 2002). For heteroscedasticity tests, SAS can apply a procedure called PROC 
Model to analyse the dataset with '/white'. In econometrics, heteroscedasticity usually 
appears in the analysis of cross-sectional and panel data. In order to eliminate 
heteroscedasticity after White’s test, using the robust standard error is the most popular 
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and effective method. Robust standard error solves that the standard deviation is not 
sensitive to possible heteroscedasticity problems in the model. The robust T statistic 
calculated based on the robust standard deviation is still asymptotically distributed. T 
test and F test for regression coefficient by robust standard error are both asymptotically 
effective. Thus, it will not influence the estimates for the regression (Mark, 2020). In 
order to calculate the robust standard error, SAS can apply procedure called PROC 
REG to calculate robust standard errors with '/acov'. 
3.4.5.1 Robustness checks and endogeneity 
In economic and financial empirical research, after selecting the research model, a 
robustness check can be applied to test if the original test is valid under other conditions. 
Robustness checks have become widely used in studies to ensure the scientific basis of 
the research (Kuorikoski, Lehtinen & Marchionni, 2007). For example, 23% of the 
papers published in 'The American Economic Review' during 2009 performed a 
robustness check (Lu & White, 2014). 
In literature, robustness has been discussed by many researchers and defined in several 
different ways. For example, robustness can be defined as the same sign and 
significance, or as weighted averaged effect, or as effect stability for original and 
checked results (Neumayer & Plümer, 2017). In order to have higher robustness of the 
evaluation methods and the explanatory ability of indicators, a robustness check or 
robustness test could be applied. Hansen and Sargent (2008) suggested that based on 
the research purpose, the robustness check could be to: 
⬧ Adjust the classifications or standards to the data and test if the results are still 
significant. 
⬧ Replace, increase or reduce the independent variables to test if the results are still 
significant. 
⬧ Use another analysis method (e.g., fixed-effects panel data regression models or 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) models) to test whether the results are 
still robust. 
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Therefore, in order to test the consistency of the results, this research applies a different 
measurement method to test if the results are still similar. 
Besides fixed-effects and random-effects model estimators, GMM model estimators are 
also important in econometrics research. Based on Hansen (1982), GMM is a parameter 
estimation method based on the fact that the actual parameters of the model meet a 
specific moment condition. In another words, suppose we have 𝑛  observations 
{𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛} from a statistical model, and we know that the following q moment 
conditions hold, 𝐸(𝑚1(𝑥1, 𝜃)) = 0, 𝐸(𝑚2(𝑥2, 𝜃)) = 0, … , 𝐸(𝑚𝑞(𝑥𝑞, 𝜃)) = 0 , where 
𝜃 is a p-dimensional unknown parameter for this statistical model. And it is defined as 
a q-dimensional moment function with respect to θ. So, 𝐸(𝑚(𝑥𝑖 , 𝜃) = 0. Then if we 
give a q×q weight matrix W, then we have 𝐸(𝑚(𝑥𝑖 , 𝜃)
′𝑊𝑚(𝑥𝑖 , 𝜃)) = 0. Thus, The 
GMM estimate of ?̂? is ?̂? = arg min
𝜃∈Θ
∑ 𝑚(𝑥𝑖 , 𝜃)
′𝑊𝑚(𝑥𝑖 , 𝜃)
𝑛
𝑖=1 , where Θ is the space 
in which the parameter θ is taken. In econometrics, there are two types of estimation 
methods for GMMs, known as first-difference or one-step GMM and second-order or 
two-step GMM. The one-step GMM has limitations when estimating as it misses recent 
values. If a recent value is missed, then the first-difference transformation could result 
in the loss of too many observations which could lead to an inefficient estimation on 
the dataset, whereas two-step GMM could solve this as it prevents unnecessary data 
loss (Roodman, 2009). For two-step GMM, it also has limitations when estimating 
using small samples. Many studies with Monte Carlo methods found that the estimated 
asymptotic standard errors of the efficient two-step GMM estimators show severely 
downward bias in small samples whereas one-step GMM is virtually unbiased 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). Although both methods show some limitations, the GMM 
estimators are known to be consistent, asymptotically normal, efficient and can produce 
unbiased estimates in all estimators, as GMM does not use any extra information but 
only employs valid internal instruments during estimation.  
Some studies use GMM estimation methods to test the relationship between bank risks 
and bank performance. For example, Athanasoglou et al. (2008) applied a GMM 
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technique to Greek banks which tested the effects of credit risks, operational risks and 
market risks to bank performance during 1985-2001. They found that higher credit risks, 
lower capital holdings and higher operational risks could lower the Greek banks' 
performance. Their study proved the importance of risk management and industry 
monitoring. Following a similar method, Tan (2016) used a one-step GMM to test the 
Chinese banks from 2003 to 2011. He found similar results, namely that higher credit 
risks and lower liquidity holdings could lower the Chinese bank performance. This 
suggested that, in order to have a better performance, both bank managers and 
regulators should improve risk management and monitoring efficiency.  
Moreover, as mentioned above, many studies use a robustness check to test the validity 
of their original models. For example, both DeYoung & Jang (2016) and Fredriksson 
& Moro (2014) use random-effects panel data regression models to test the dataset and 
then use a GMM estimator to demonstrate robustness. In more detail, DeYoung & Jang 
(2016) tested the influence of liquidity risk management for US banks from 1992 to 
2012. They showed that banks should follow and meet the legal liquidity requirement, 
which could help banks to perform better, and the GMM estimator confirm their 
findings received from their original models. Fredriksson & Moro (2014) tested the 
impacts of capital and liquidity risks for Finnish banks from 2001 to 2005. They showed 
that lower liquidity holdings and higher debt could damage bank performance. With the 
support of the GMM estimators, their original models were showed to be reliable. 
Therefore, following previous literature, a one-step GMM system estimator will be 
applied as a robustness check to test the validity of our models for China, the UK and 
Australia. 
The general model to be estimated for our data is   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡, with 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡. where 𝑦 represent the performance variables; 𝑥 represents the risk 
variables and bank size; 𝛽0  represents the constant term;  𝛽𝑗 (𝑗 = 1~𝑘)  are 
coefficients to be estimated; 𝑖 and 𝑡 are indices for the sections and time, respectively; 
k is the number of independent variables; 𝛼𝑖 is the bank-specific unobserved effect 
and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. As our robustness check GMM model is motivated by the 
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literature exploring the determinants of bank performance (e.g., Athanasoglou et al., 
2008; Tan, 2016), we will include one lag of the dependent variable as an additional 
regressor following the literature. Thus employing a dynamic model, the model can be 
expressed as   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 , where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is a one-period 
lagged performance variable and 𝛿 is the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. The 
value of 𝛿 normally stays in the range of 0 to 1, which indicates that the performance 
persists and eventually, the value returns to the average level. A value close to 0 
suggests a high speed of adjustment, while a value close to 1 suggests a slow adjustment 
(Athanasoglou et al., 2008). Moreover, as noted in 3.4.4.3, a dummy variable is added 
for Chinese traditional banks, which is 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝑖𝑡 to show if the ownership influences the 
bank performance. Thus, an additional model for Chinese traditional banks can be 
expressed as   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 + γ𝑆𝑂𝐵𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 , where γ  is the 
coefficient of the dummy variable. The additional estimation results will be shown in 
Appendix 1 and 2. 
In addition, endogeneity can be an issue in regression models. In econometrics, 
endogeneity occurs when the independent variable and the error term are correlated. 
There are three main sources from which endogeneity may occur. Firstly, the difference 
between endogenous and exogenous variables is based on a simultaneous equation 
model, in which the variables whose values are determined by the model are separated 
from the predetermined variables. As a result, ignoring simultaneity in the estimation 
will lead to biased estimates. It will cause a violation of the Gauss-Markov theorem in 
the exogenous hypothesis and lead to endogeneity. Secondly, correlation between the 
independent variable and the error term can also arise when an unobserved variable 
confounds both the independent and dependent variables. The third case is when the 
independent variables are measured with errors (Johnston, 1972; Wooldridge, 2009).  
In general, if the independent and dependent variables of a model are mutually 
dependent, that will lead to endogeneity. 
When analysing a data set through a regression model, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimates of regression coefficients can be biased if the independent variables are 
 78 
related to the error term. As one of the main assumptions of OLS is that there is no 
correlation between the independent variables and the error term, these biases can lead 
to inconsistent estimates and incorrect inferences, which can lead to inappropriate 
conclusions and theoretical interpretations. Sometimes, such biases can even lead to 
coefficients having the wrong sign. Therefore, we need to apply tests to check for 
endogeneity problems. Besides helping to choose a model between fixed-effects or 
random-effects, the DWH test also helps us to detect correlation between variables in 
the regression model. As mentioned in section 3.4.5 above, the DWH test checks for 
correlation between the error term and the independent variables in the model, where 
the null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between the error term and the 
independent variables (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993). Therefore, if the DWH test 
shows that the random-effects model is preferred, there is no endogeneity problem. 
In order to solve endogeneity bias in panel data, GMM is one of the remedies to corrects 
for all three types of endogeneity, as it assumes that the error term is independently and 
identically distributed across the dataset (Zeafarian et al., 2017). GMM for dynamic 
panel data was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
In dynamic panel data, the cause and effect relationship for underlying phenomena is 
generally dynamic over time. For example, in banking risk management, it may not be 
the current year's risk factors that influence performance, but rather the previous year's 
risk factors that play a significant role. In order to address this situation, dynamic panel 
data estimation techniques use the lagged value of the dependent variables as an 
explanatory variable. Lagged values of the dependent variable are determined as 
instruments to control the endogenous relationship. As lagged variables are used in the 
existing model, they are often referred to as 'internal instruments' (Roodman, 2009). In 
more detail, the GMM model eliminates endogeneity by performing an internal 
transformation of the dataset through a statistical process that subtracts the past value 
of the variable from its present value. Because of this process, the number of 
observations is reduced and the efficiency of the GMM is enhanced (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Ullah, Akhtar and Zeafarian (2018) indicated that there are significant differences 
between OLS, fixed-effects and GMM estimations, due to endogeneity bias. By 
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examining datasets from the marketing industry, they found out that GMM had better 
controls for endogeneity. Schultz, Tan and Walsh (2010) also found similar results with 
a governance-performance dataset. Thus, the one-step GMM we used for robustness 
checks can not only test the robustness of the models but also could reduce the possible 
issues caused by endogeneity. 
3.4.6 Data analysis tools 
For analysing data collected from the annual and interim reports, statistical software is 
needed. In this research, Microsoft Excel and SAS are the two main software packages 
used. 
⬧ Microsoft Excel 
Excel has become the most widely used software for analysing data with basic models. 
It provides a straightforward way to record and analyse data. In this research, Microsoft 
Excel will only be used for recording and cataloguing data.  
⬧ SAS  
SAS is widely used in many large companies. It uses a Sample, Explore, Modify, Model 
and Assess process, which offers a simple way to understand and assist in organisations' 
development and projects (Azevedo & Santos, 2008). There are many advantages of 
using SAS. Firstly, it is relatively easy to learn SAS coding. It is user friendly when 
people miscode or mistyping anything in the code program. SAS shows the error line 
for the user to debug. The error and warning messages are distinct and comprehensible 
to look at and re-code to make sure the whole program can run smoothly. Secondly, the 
SAS support website provides a range of useful suggestions which make it easier to 
learn and use SAS. Thirdly, it can protect the dataset security. Finally, it has an excellent 
capacity to handle all data, not only in the analysis procedures but also in the graphical 
procedures. Therefore, SAS will be used as the primary analysis tool in this research. 
The panel data analysis procedure (called PROC Panel) will be used for conducting 
measures of construct validity and reliability for the regression models. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, research design and methodology were presented and employed. It 
detailed data collection methods and explained how these variables were selected and 
will be analysed in the following chapters. The research design highlighted the models 
used to show the effects of bank risks on their performance from different perspectives. 
Moreover, this chapter also provided sample selections for case studies which will 
enhance the understanding of both traditional banks and the fintech industry. It will help 
us to address the research questions and achieve the research aims.  
We will use mixed methods to further the research aims. This followed some previous 
researchers (e.g., Geng et al.,2016; Jumono et al.,2016; Wu & Olson,2010) who used 
similar quantitative methods. This thesis will also provide case studies for particular 
samples to develop the context in the research area. It will also follow some previous 
researchers (e.g. Docherty & Viort, 2014; Howcroft, 2005; Rad, 2016) who use similar 
qualitative methods. We believe that by adopting a mixed methodology, we will achieve 
results relevant to both traditional banks and fintechs and offer value to them, 
particularly because there are rarely results comparing different types of banks. The 















RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
Based on Chapter 2 (our literature review) and Chapter 3 (our research methodology), 
the research guide was designed to allow for analysis using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. In this chapter, we will apply the analysis using descriptive 
statistics and panel data regression models. The results will be presented and compared 
by countries and bank’ types. In more detail, we will investigate banks performance, 
through their financial reports, and consider aspects of risk management factors relating 
to differences between traditional banks and fintechs in China, the UK and Australia.  
Thus, this chapter will present the results and analysis of the data obtained from our 
statistical analysis and will be organised as, Sections 4.2 to 4.4 present the aggregate 
analysis for each country, which including figure comparisons, descriptive statistics, 
stationarity, multicollinearity, homoscedasticity and endogeneity tests before regression 
estimations, random-effects regression models analysis and GMM tests for robustness 
analysis. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Data analysis, results and discussion for China 
In order to examine the relationship between bank risks and performance for Chinese 
traditional banks and fintechs, this section is organised as: 1. The bank performance 
and risk management of Chinese banks are presented in figures with presenting the 
differences between traditional banks and fintechs. 2. Descriptive statistics are listed 
and analysed. 3. The panel-data unit-root tests (Fisher’s type) are applied to determine 
data stationarity. 4. Correlation matrix and variance influence factors (VIF) are 
presented to determine data multicollinearity. 5. White’s test for heteroscedasticity, F 
test, Lagrange Multiplier Test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) tests are applied to 
determine data endogeneity and appropriate regression approach to use. 6. The full 
analysis of random-effects panel data regression models is constructed based on bank 
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type, which includes six models based on three dependent variables and two bank types. 
7. The GMM estimates are applied and compared with results achieved from the panel 
data regression models. 8. Summary is applied for the section. 
4.2.1 Comparisons between Chinese traditional banks and fintechs 
Before presenting the panel data regression analysis, figures about bank performance 
and risk management between Chinese traditional banks and fintechs are presented 
based on semi-annual data. Figure 4.1 showed all three performance variables of 
Chinese traditional banks and fintechs. With regards to ROA, traditional banks showed 
signs of decreasing trends. Moreover, due to the pressure of China's decreasing 
economic trend and the regulations issued by the Chinese government in 2012 (CBRC, 
2013), the trend shows a smooth decrease rather than a sudden drop. On the other hand, 
because of the new establishment of fintechs, it is easy to verify the growth trend for 
ROA. Unlike the smooth trend of traditional banks, extremes exist in the fintechs. Some 
fintechs started with extreme loss positions in their business. By developing in recent 
years, some of them passed the breakeven point, while some will make profits soon. A 
similar trend was presented in ROE. The reason could be that their calculation is similar, 
which is based on pre-tax profits divided by asset or equity, and equity is asset minus 
liability. 
Concerning EPS, we notice a different situation. Firstly, because not all fintechs were 
in the stock market, we only present fintechs who have already joined. The EPS of each 
traditional bank fluctuates a small amount and stays smooth in the long-run. On the 
other hand, fintechs performed differently within companies, but the general trend 
shows increases. Some of them lost money at first and then continuously increased with 
positive EPS at the end of 2017. Some of them performed smoothly with a slight 
increase, which shows their smooth operations during these years. However, because 
of the short time since the fintechs' establishment and joining of the stock market, we 
should wait longer to see a comprehensive view of the performance in the stock market 
of Chinese fintechs. In addition, we could see that there are outliers for fintechs' ROA 
and ROE. Indeed, these points have much lower value than others. This suggests that 
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in the infant stage of fintechs operations, these fintechs could have negative returns at 
different levels, but after this stage, they survived and began to have positive returns. 
Therefore, authorities could give fintechs chances even support them pass this stage. 




Figure 4.1 Performance Comparisons (China) 
Figures 4.2 to 4.7 present the performance of independent variables, where Figure 4.2 
shows credit risk variables; Figure 4.3 presents market risk variable; Figure 4.4 
indicates liquidity and capital risk variables; Figure 4.5 shows reputational risk variable; 
Figure 4.6 indicates the operational risk variables and Figure 4.7 represents the banks' 
asset levels.  
 84 
Because of the global fail in credit management, the risk of default by many banks 
increased. Although China's economy had been less affected than other countries, the 
NPL trend in both types of banks was increasing. However, the rate of traditional banks 
stayed relatively low and smoother. The possible reason might be that the fintechs had 
less choice with customers, and the traditional banks had more experience to deal with 
default loan. With regards to NCO, as mentioned in the methodology, it shows the 
charge-off rate over the three-year average. In order to have a better estimation for the 
future charge-off value, banks need to keep NCO smooth and low. Both types of 
Chinese banks had a relatively low rate. Some of them kept it at a low and smooth level 
for traditional banks, and some of the banks reduced it over time. For fintechs, the rate 
was volatile and a little bit lower than the rate in traditional banks, the reason for which 
could be that they were all established relatively recently, so there was not too much 
credit to write-off in outstanding loans. Concerning LoanR, all loss amounts in the total 
loan counts in this ratio based on its definition. All LoanR stayed under 10% with 
stabilised trends for traditional banks, which meant a smooth situation was achieved. 
However, for the fintechs, lines had positive trends, LoanR increased during these years 
with fintechs development. This indicates that credit risk management efficiency needs 
improvement because the consequences of continued neglect would be severe. 





Figure 4.2 Credit risk variable comparisons (China) 
Next, the market risk variable (VaR) was compared between traditional banks and 
fintechs in Figure 4.3. Most of the samples stayed in a tight range for traditional banks, 
which indicates that the market influence on traditional banks was relatively stable. 
However, there was one exception, BOCOM. Its VaR showed an increasing trend and 
have higher values than others. This indicates that BOCOM was more impacted by 
market risk than other traditional banks. Nevertheless, generally speaking, market risks 
had relatively less impact on traditional banks. For the Chinese fintechs, VaR also 
stayed in a tight range. However, as the scale of fintechs was much less than traditional 
banks, similar VaR values would lead to worse consequences. Thus, market risks 
impacted fintechs more than traditional banks. This result indicates that with more 
global connections, fintechs suffer more in market risk, even though they mainly 
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Figure 4.3 Market risk variable comparisons (China) 
Figure 4.4 showed the five variables in capital and liquidity risks. With regard to LCR, 
the Basel accords required banks to achieve over 100% after 2015. For traditional banks, 
most of the samples achieved regulatory requirements. However, three traditional banks 
face short of liquidity coverage after 2015 with a less than 100% ratio. With warnings, 
these banks worked on solving the problem. As a result, their LCR increased over the 
following years and near the requirement. A similar situation was seen in the Chinese 
fintechs, as some of the fintechs had positions less than 100%. As they were still in the 
starting stage, the regulator was not that strict and allowed them to have more time to 
comply with the regulation. With the increased trends of these fintechs, it could be 
believed they would achieve the regulation requirements. Moreover, there is an outlier 
of LCR in the Chinese fintechs in Figure 4.4. It can be observed that Ideacome has 
much high liquidity compare with its expected cash flow. The reason to explain this is 
that the fintech received many liquidity investment at during that period. Therefore, the 
LCR back to the average level of Chinese fintechs. 
With regard to CR, as it is designed to estimate banks' ability to recover current liability, 
the higher the ratio is the greater the banks' liquidity which indicates banks that have a 
better chance of meeting their current liabilities obligations. However, it should be kept 
at a reasonable level. As showed in the fintechs’ figure, there is an outlier which is much 
higher than others. A too-high ratio may also lead to poor operation, as banks hold too 
many current assets to reduce operational efficiency. As the outlier is at the first year it 
published its data, this situation is accepted with reduce trend with its development. In 
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addition, CR should be higher than one because the value of the ratio equal to one or 
above is an indication that the bank is in a stable position to cover its current liabilities. 
In general, for traditional banks, the ratio was higher than one and had a smoothly 
increasing trend. Some of the fintechs, on the other hand, had ratios less than one, which 
indicated that some fintechs had poor liquidity positions during some period. 
Next, with regards to T1 capital ratio, as noted in our methodology, the minimum 
required ratio is 6% by the Basel Accords. For traditional banks, all of them achieved 
the required level and have signs of an increasing trend. On the other hand, for fintechs, 
most of them achieved the requirement. However, at their starting stage, some of them 
were not achieving 6%. Nevertheless, there is an outlier in the T1 figure. Webank had 
incredibly high T1. Similar to the Ideacome in LCR, the reason should be that Webank 
stayed in absorbing investment stage, with a high volume of investment in T1 capital, 
the ratio becomes very high. T1 of fintechs tended to have the average value in the 
industry. Thus, time should be given to fintechs to achieve better results.  
The Chinese government revised the regulation on banks' debt level and asked them to 
publish their ratios in their annual reports (CBRC, 2015). The trend of D/A in traditional 
banks was then stabilised, which suggested that the debt level of Chinese banks was 
under control. On the other hand, because of the starting stage that fintechs are in, 
fintechs' debt levels were unstable. Moreover, the D/A value of some fintechs was 
higher than one, which suggested that these fintechs held too much debt which may 
influence their operational stability. With the development of business size, the D/A of 
fintechs could go near traditional banks' level in the future. And there is an outlier in 
Chinese fintechs’ figure, Ideacome showed much higher D/A than others which proved 
its high debt level at the end of 2014, with a series of investment, it passed high debt 
stage and back to average level in Chinese fintechs. Similar to D/A, traditional banks 
had a stable trend in D/E. However, a different situation was presented in fintechs. At 
their starting stage of business, some of them even had a negative ratio which indicated 
that these fintechs had a negative net worth and financial instability. The development 
of these fintechs could solve this situation. When they achieve positive net values, the 
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D/E could become positive. Moreover, the figure also proves this result with an 
increasing trend in D/E from negative values. 









Figure 4.4 Capital and liquidity risk variables comparisons (China) 
With regards to BVC in Figure 4.5, the trend for traditional banks moved by around 
5%. This indicates that BVC for traditional banks was at an acceptable level as the 
overall value are increased. For the fintechs, the percentage was more volatile. Some 
of the fintechs had negative BVC, but some of them had large positive BVC. There is 
an outlier in Chinese fintechs’ figure, it showed that from the end of 2016, QuDian 
increased it brand value much higher than other fintechs. In general, most of them had 
increasing brand value, and their future brand value could be expected to increase. 
Traditional Banks Fintechs 
  
Figure 4.5 Reputation risk variable comparisons (China) 
Figure 4.6 shows the operational risk variables. ORP showed a relatively smooth trend 
and remained at a low level for traditional banks. All ORP values were under 15%, 
which was lower than the requirement under the Basel Accords. This suggested that 
traditional banks could handle their operational risks when they occurred. However, 
some of the fintechs had over 15% ORP values. This suggests that these fintechs were 
in trouble with too many costs to solve operational risk issues. One extreme example 
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was Ideacome. The China banking regulatory commission (CBRC) fined Ideacome 
almost $10 million because of illegal operations. However, it still survived through a 
series of big companies' investments (China Business and Finance, 2018). With regard 
to C/I, as mentioned in the literature review, a higher ratio shows a lower efficiency of 
banks' operations. For traditional banks, C/I stayed at a low level and tended to decrease 
too, which suggested that traditional banks were increasing their efficiency in 
operations management. For fintechs, C/I showed high values - some of them were over 
100% - which suggested the cost of operation was higher than the income. For fintechs, 
the highest value showed in Lufax. Under a smoothing operating, the reason for high 
C/I should be an increased cost. As it planned to join the share market from 2015, an 
increasing operational cost was added which lead to a very high C/I. However, as 
fintechs were at the developing stage, a high C/I could be accepted with a decreasing 
trend. Thus, the C/I values of fintechs could decrease to a reasonable level in the future. 





Figure 4.6 Operational risk variables comparisons (China) 
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Figure 4.7 shows the natural logarithm of the banks’ assets. Both types of banks had 
increasing trends for their asset. This indicates that both types of banks developed 
during the investigation time period. The main reason for this is that even though the 
global financial system was still under the influence of the 2007-09 financial crisis, the 
Chinese financial system provided a good place to develop. However, the average asset 
level of fintechs was less than traditional banks which gives a higher potential for 
fintechs to develop. 
Traditional Banks Fintechs 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Bank size variable comparisons (China) 
In general, traditional banks performed better than fintechs in both performance and 
risk management. One manifestation is outliers exist in fintechs’ variables. The main 
reason for this could be that fintechs have just developed in recent years, and both the 
quality and quantity of customers were not at the optimum level. Therefore, analysing 
the differences and problems existing between traditional banks and fintechs, which 
could help managers to build better direction and focus for their risk management and 
future operations may be helpful. 
4.2.2 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide descriptive statistics for performance variables and risk 
variables based on types of bank.  
With regard to ROA, the average was 1.06% for traditional banks, but -12.2% for 
fintechs. The negative average suggests that the performance of Chinese fintechs was 
weak and needs to improve. A similar situation happened for ROE. The average ROE 
 92 
for traditional banks was 16.31% and was -39.1% for the fintechs. This shows that, in 
general, traditional banks performed well with a consensus standard that the average of 
the S&P 500 had 14% ROE as an acceptable ratio. Even some of the fintechs (with a 
maximum of 114% ROE) performed well and developed a lot. The overall fintech 
performance was not as good as excepted.  
On the other hand, with regards to performance in the share market, the average EPS 
of the traditional banks was $0.0496. Although the average was not very high, the 
earnings were more stable with a low standard deviation of 0.0294. For fintechs, 
although they did not perform that well in asset and equity levels, their performance in 
the share market was relatively well with mean $0.155. However, even though the 
average performance was better than traditional banks, the fintechs' EPS was more 
volatile with a 0.502 standard deviation. This means that investors had more chance to 
lose in the share market with the negative earnings (with minimum -$0.76), where the 
traditional banks had a positive minimum ($0.007). 
In credit risk management variables, NPL stayed low. The average value was 1.64% in 
traditional banks, which meant that Chinese traditional banks had a low probability of 
default. The Chinese fintechs had a slightly higher NPL with 2.2%, which was 0.56% 
higher than traditional banks. This shows that the quality of the credit of fintechs was 
not high enough and that the number of customers was not large enough. With the lower 
customers' loyalty, quality and quantity, more movement was showed in fintechs' NPL, 
but given the development of the fintechs, a more stable NPL should be shown in the 
future. The second credit risk variable is NCO. The mean value was 1.69% for 
traditional banks. Similar to NPL, fintechs had a higher average value of NCO, which 
was 2.5%. During the investigated period, the rate peaked at 10.35% for traditional 
banks and 9% for fintechs which was at an acceptable level. During 2013-17, the US 
commercial banks' total loan reached the average value of 51% NCO (Federal Reserve 
System, 2018). Compared with the US, Chinese banks had a more stable and lower 
level of NCO. The last credit risk variable, LoanR, shows the overall credit risk 
performance. Both types of banks had a relatively low average level of the total loan 
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loss ratio, 3.84% for traditional banks and 4.4% for fintechs. Moreover, fintechs had 
0.54% bigger volatility than traditional banks. The peak level was 10.9% for fintechs 
versus 9.83% for traditional banks. This shows that even though the average 
performance looks similar, fintechs' credit risk management was more unstable and 
risky. They should increase credit risk management efficiency to keep operating and 
achieve better results. 
With respect to the market risk, the average VaR was 9.13 for traditional banks and 6.3 
for fintechs. This means, on average, market risks impacted more on traditional banks 
than fintechs in China. However, with a market share lower level, the influence should 
be stronger in fintechs as noted in the figure comparisons. 
Following the Basel Accords, banks were required to apply their LCR to show their 
liquidity ability. Basel III asked banks to have a LCR of at least 100% from 2015 (BCBS, 
2013) to ensure they have the necessary assets to survive any short-term liquidity 
disruption. Similar to the figure comparisons, the average value of LCR was 113.55% 
for traditional banks which met the legal requirement. However, the minimum was 
78.31% which was lower than the requirement. As noted before, banks with this issue 
worked on solving it and tried to meet the legal requirement. For fintechs, the average 
ratio was 177% which was higher than traditional banks. However, the minimum value 
was 18% which was extremely low and showed that some fintechs were lacking in 
liquidity at some points during the investigated time period. 
The average CR value was 107.3% for traditional banks, which shows that traditional 
Chinese banks had significant liquidity to cover their current liabilities. Also, CR had a 
0.0088 standard deviation, which means that traditional Chinese banks always had 
enough liquidity to deal with emergency liquidity problems. For fintechs, the average 
CR was 162% which was high, but it was caused by the extreme value (the maximum 
1876%), without extremes, the average CR drops to 132.99%. Although the liquidity 
situation of Chinese fintechs seems better, with the large standard deviation, a Chinese 
fintech might face the problem that sometimes it has too much liquidity and sometimes 
it is short of liquidity. This confirms the result showed in LCR as low values exist, the 
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liquidity level overall for fintechs was not good enough. Then with regard to T1 capital 
ratio, all traditional banks meet the T1 requirement with the minimum 8.48%, which 
indicates that Chinese traditional banks had enough tier one capital to prevent 
bankruptcy. However, some of the fintechs did not perform that well in tier one capital 
where the minimum value was 2%. The existence of low values exposed the poor 
preparation of fintechs with regard to capital. Therefore, managers should plan to have 
more tier one capital in the future to meet the requirement and prevent bankrupting.  
The last two liquidity and capital risk variables are D/A and D/E. As mentioned before, 
the difference between them is the denominator where D/E is total debt over the total 
equity, and D/A is over the total assets. For both ratios, higher ratios indicate that banks 
may have incurred a higher level of debt and that banks may not be able to repay their 
debt with the sustained cash flow. Traditional banks and fintechs had an average D/A 
at 35.42%, and 59.42%, representatively, which shows that fintechs had a higher level 
of debt and stayed in a more risky situation. With regards to D/E, the average was 
5.3554 for traditional banks and 1.479 for fintechs. Higher values indicate that assets 
are more funded by their debt than equity and the D/E for banks usually higher than 
two, which can be confirmed for the traditional banks. Another reason for fintechs 
having a lower average value of D/E was that negative values exist (the minimum is -
20.789). It indicated a negative net value existed in fintechs which should be 
unacceptable. Thus, regulators need to be more concerned about the fintechs that had 
negative values, monitoring their performance. If they still perform poorly, these 
fintechs face continuous loss and may need to exit the market. Investigations of these 
fintechs should be applied by the regulators to see possible solutions for helping these 
companies. 
With respect to the operational risks, as noted before, if the ORP value is less than 15%, 
then traditional banks and fintechs are fine to deal with their operational risks. However, 
if the value is higher than 15%, they may not be prepared or earn enough money to deal 
with such issues, which may cause serious consequences. The mean value for 
traditional banks was about 2.46%, which was a low and well-performing position. 
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However, for fintechs, because of the existence of extreme values, the mean value of 
fintechs' ORP became 460.9%. However, without extreme values, the mean became 
5.19% which was an acceptable level. The result means that fintechs face more 
operational risks than traditional banks. One possible reason could be that fintechs need 
to face more digital operational issues than traditional banks. Generally speaking, 
without extremes, operational risk management stayed at an acceptable level for both 
types of banks. To achieve a better understanding of operational risk, following Diallo 
et al. (2015), we also collected the C/I ratio to compare. In general, lower C/I ratios 
indicate more profitable bank performance. The average C/I was 27.67% for traditional 
banks and 137.3% for fintechs. This shows that traditional banks were more profitable 
than fintechs and that the costs in operations were more controlled for traditional banks 
than fintechs. Moreover, the maximum ratio was 1788% for fintechs which shows that 
for some fintechs, their costs were for higher than their income. Managers should either 
increase their income or decrease their operational costs (including operational risk 
costs) to solve this issue. 
For the reputational risk variable, both types of banks had a positive percentage on 
average. However, the BVC of traditional banks was more stable with a 0.0559 standard 
deviation while the fintechs' BVC values were varied with a 4.308 standard deviation. 
This means that the brand value of fintechs changed a lot during their development. In 
addition, the mean value of the Chinese traditional banks' size was about US$475 
billion with ln(asset) equal to 13.071. The average value of the Chinese fintechs was 
only about US$0.275 billion, with 5.615 in ln(asset). The relatively large difference in 
scale between them is also reflected in the banking industry's market place. As noted 
before, traditional banks hold more of the marketplace, but as fintechs develop, they 





Variable Mean Std Dev. Maximum Minimum 
Return on asset 0.0106 0.0022 0.0146 0.0048 
Return on equity 0.1631 0.0341 0.2344 0.0822 
Earnings per share 0.0496 0.0294 0.1300 0.007 
Non-performing loan ratio 0.0164 0.0049 0.0266 0.0074 
Net Charge-off rate 0.0169 0.0193 0.1035 0.0001 
Total loan loss ratio 0.0384 0.0176 0.0983 0.0141 
Value at risk 9.1296 12.3828 78.7 0.300 
Liquidity coverage ratio 1.1355 0.1741 1.760 0.7831 
Current ratio 1.0731 0.0089 1.091 1.0515 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.1045 0.0152 0.1371 0.0848 
Debt-to-Asset ratio 0.3532 0.1748 0.7016 0.0800 
Debt-to-Equity ratio 5.3554 2.79 12.63 1.3363 
Brand value change % 0.0559 0.0559 0.253 -0.0615 
Operational risk % 0.0246 0.0253 0.0937 0.0015 
Ln(Asset) 13.071 1.5536 15.131 10.8051 
Cost-to-Income ratio 0.2767 0.0406 0.3858 0.1882 
Observations 99 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics (Chinese traditional banks) 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Maximum Minimum 
Return on asset -0.122 0.500 0.248 -2.798 
Return on equity -0.391 2.242 1.140 -14.461 
Earnings per share 0.155 0.502 1.620 -0.760 
Non-performing loan ratio 0.022 0.016 0.058 0.001 
Net Charge-off rate 0.025 0.016 0.090 0.001 
Total loan loss ratio 0.044 0.023 0.109 0.010 
Value at risk 6.334 6.435 26.000 0.040 
Liquidity coverage ratio 1.771 1.563 8.640 0.180 
Current ratio 1.620 2.499 18.764 0.088 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.42 0.631 4.921 0.020 
Debt-to-Asset ratio 0.5942 0.8037 3.4575 0.0123 
Debt-to-Equity ratio 1.479 5.246 28.490 -20.789 
Brand value change % 1.478 4.308 32.880 -0.108 
Operational risk % 4.609 31.599 240.000 0.000 
Ln(Asset) 5.615 3.087 10.191 0.050 
Cost-to-Income ratio 1.373 2.316 17.884 0.445 
Observations 58 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics (Chinese fintechs) 
Notes: Not all Chinese challenger banks/fintechs are listed, observations are 39 for EPS. 
Without extreme values, Mean of ORP is 5.19%, S.D. is 0.076, Maximum is 0.3133, 
Minimum is 0. 
Through understanding the descriptive statistics, we concluded that Chinese traditional 
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banks’ performance and risk management were moderately concentrated, but that the 
fintechs were unstable and varied between entities. Because of their unstable 
performance, it makes them more valuable to investigate which could help them to 
improve their performance in the future. 
4.2.3 Panel data unit root test 
As described in Chapter 3, before applying the regression model, we need to test the 
stationarity, multicollinearity and endogeneity of the data and select the appropriate 
modelling approach. First, we apply a unit root test for panel data to test the stationarity 
of the data set. To test the stationarity of the data, Fisher-type unit root tests were 
implemented based on ADF tests. The null and alternative hypotheses are H0 is that the 
data are non-stationary or have unit roots, and H1 that the data are stationary or do not 
have unit roots. The results of the unit root based on bank type are shown in Table 4.3. 
The results show that all variables are stationary at the 1% level of significance. The 
null hypothesis for the variables is rejected, indicating that there is no evidence of unit 
roots and the data are stationary. 
 Traditional banks Challenger banks/fintechs 
Variable Statistics P-value Statistics P-value 
ROA 36.30 0.000 35.54 0.000 
ROE 34.22 0.000 26.46 0.000 
EPS 79.56 0.000 13.65 0.000 
NPL 51.37 0.000 14.99 0.000 
NCO 72.41 0.000 18.03 0.000 
LoanR 49.04 0.000 26.00 0.000 
VaR 55.96 0.000 42.04 0.000 
LCR 91.18 0.000 20.72 0.000 
CR 48.34 0.000 27.52 0.000 
T1 40.79 0.000 28.36 0.000 
D/A 51.29 0.000 32.30 0.000 
D/E 146.75 0.000 23.67 0.000 
BVC 59.13 0.000 12.87 0.000 
ORP 44.81 0.000 25.25 0.000 
Ln(Asset) 91.39 0.000 28.11 0.000 
C/I 25.17 0.000 29.25 0.000 
Table 4.3 Fisher-type unit root tests (China) 
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4.2.4 Correlation matrix and variance inflation factors 
When there is a high degree of correlation between two or more independent variables, 
the estimates can be misleading, and even the conclusions of the estimated model may 
be wrong. Therefore, the assumption to follow is that the independent variables are 
independent of each other. To do so, having tested the stationarity of the variables, the 
next step is to test for the presence of multicollinearity between the independent 
variables. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 provide the cross-correlation coefficient matrices for each 
of the independent variables based on bank types. According to Gujarati (2003), if the 
correlation coefficient of each of two regressors exceeds 0.8, there may be a 
multicollinearity problem. As all figures are below 0.8, there is no multicollinearity 
problem in this study. 
 
Table 4. 4 Cross Correlation Matrix (Chinese traditional banks) 
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Table 4.5 Cross Correlation Matrix (Chinese challenger banks/fintechs) 
However, we could see that there are some relatively high correlations (close to and 
over 0.7) that exist between independent variables in matrices showed above. Thus, we 
will apply VIF for our dataset to double-check for multicollinearity problems. The VIF 
ranges from 1 upwards, and the value shows the percentage by which the variance is 
inflated for each coefficient. Generally, a VIF equal to 1 indicates no correlation, a VIF 
between 1 and 5 indicates a moderate correlation, and a VIF above 5 indicates high 
correlation. In addition, a value over 10 VIF indicates a too high correlation and can be 
a cause for multicollinearity concern (Dodge, 2008). Table 4.6 presents the VIFs for all 
variables based on types of banks. From Table 4.6, we found out that NCO and Ln(asset) 
for traditional banks and LoanR for fintechs are relatively larger than others. This shows 
that these variables have a relatively higher correlation with other independent variables. 
Moreover, as credit-related variables show a relatively higher correlation with other 
variables in both types of banks, which indicates higher interactions between credit-
related variables and other risk management variables. This suggests the importance of 
credit risk management for both types of banks. Managers should pay more attention 
to these variables to prevent to much movement to other risk variables. In summary, as 
all VIFs are below 10, the results double-check the correlation matrix results and 
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indicate that there are no issues of multiple correlation in this study.  
Variable Traditional banks Challenger banks/fintechs 
NPL 3.490 2.467 
NCO 4.564 3.646 
LoanR 3.684 4.896 
VaR 1.949 1.530 
LCR 1.441 1.529 
CR 2.282 1.468 
T1 4.345 1.121 
D/A 2.617 1.290 
D/E 2.371 2.180 
BVC 1.283 1.997 
ORP 2.950 2.161 
Ln(Asset) 4.699 1.979 
C/I 3.105 1.615 
Table 4.6 Variance inflation factors (China) 
4.2.5 Tests for heteroscedasticity, endogeneity and model determination 
After stationarity and multicollinearity were tested, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity 
of the dataset need to be tested. As noted in Chapter 3, in data analysis, if the error 
terms do not have constant variance, they are heteroscedastic. If heteroscedasticity is 
present, the standard errors are biased. This can lead to bias in test statistics and 
confidence intervals. In order to test for heteroscedasticity, White’s general 
heteroscedasticity test is employed and the results are shown in Table 4.7. The results 
of White’s test show that heteroscedasticity is present. Since heteroscedasticity causes 
standard errors to be biased, after finding the proper static panel model, we used robust 
standard errors. 




Traditional banks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Fintechs 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 
Table 4.7 Tests for heteroscedasticity 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the DWH test needs to be applied to test the endogeneity 
before analysing the panel regression results. The null hypothesis H0 is 𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 0, 
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which indicates that there is no endogeneity in the dataset. The alternative hypothesis 
H1 is 𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 , which indicates that at least one independent variable is an 
endogenous variable. From Table 4.8, we can see that there is no endogeneity problem 
for this study.  
Besides testing for endogeneity, the DWH test also helps to select the appropriate 
approach to analyse the panel data from fixed-effects or random-effects, where H0 
suggests the random-effects model is more appropriate and H1 suggests the fixed-
effects model is more suitable in this research. In addition, the F test and Lagrange 
Multiplier test were used to determine whether the pooled OLS, fixed-effects or 
random-effects model was the most appropriate for this study. The F test was applied 
to analyse the applicability of the panel with fixed-effects compared to pooled OLS, 
whereas the Lagrange Multiplier test analysed the applicability of a panel with random-
effects compared to pooled OLS. In both tests the null hypothesis suggests the pooled 
OLS is more appropriate, and the alternative hypothesis suggests fixed-effects or 
random-effects is more appropriate. Together with the DWH test, the choice between 
fixed- and random-effects was determined.   
The results for all three tests are shown in Table 4.8. It can be observed that random 
effects proves to be the most appropriate approach for both types of bank. The F test 
and Lagrange Multiplier test show that models with fixed- and random-effects are more 
appropriate than pooled OLS with zero p-values for all dependent variables and bank 
types. Since both models were valid, the Hausman test was performed and results 
showed that a model with random-effects is more suitable than fixed-effects, with p-
values over 5% for three dependent variables and both types of banks. Furthermore, we 
see that the ROA and ROE model for traditional banks has a p-value close to 5%. 
According to Torres-Reyna (2007), even though the p-value is only near to the 
significance level, we still cannot reject H0 and need to use random-effects models for 
the ROA and ROE.  
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Test Bank type ROA model ROE model EPS model 
 𝑝-values 
F  Traditional banks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Fintechs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LM Traditional banks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Fintechs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DWH Traditional banks 0.0812 0.0632 0.1698 
Fintechs 0.1931 0.3153 0.3573 
Table 4.8 Tests for determination the most appropriate approach for data analysis 
(China) 
4.2.6 Panel data regression analysis 
As mentioned above, random-effects models are more suitable here. Based on three 
dependent variables, six models are constructed to examine the relationship between 
bank risks and bank performance for Chinese traditional banks and fintechs. The 
random-effects model estimation results are shown in Tables 4.9 to 4.11. 
Firstly, ROA was selected as the dependent variable to establish two random-effects 
panel data regression models based on bank type. We attempted to evaluate the effect 
of different risk management variables on ROA. The results are presented in Table 4.9 
below. Regarding the types of banks, we can see that while the differences are apparent 
among the estimated coefficients, only some of the variables are significant. The reason 
for selecting more variables was because both differences and similarities existing in 
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Intercept 0.0386 0.0641 -0.3137 0.2229 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.1569* 0.0670 -1.2489* 2.7662 
Net Charge-off rate -0.0172 0.0257 -7.270** 3.8563 
Total loan loss ratio -0.0279* 0.0327 -2.6522 2.6178 
Value at risk -0.0001 0.000023 -0.0043* 0.0077 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0004* 0.0017 0.0001 0.0971 
Current ratio 0.0278 0.0611 0.0115* 0.0191 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.0299** 0.0326 0.0355 0.0624 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.0007 0.0115 -0.6547*** 0.1308 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0002* 0.0007 0.0089 0.0086 
Brand value change % 0.0025*** 0.0035 0.0020 0.0130 
Operational risk % -0.0037* 0.0142 -0.0014 0.0707 
Ln(Asset) -0.0002*** 0.0005 0.1249*** 0.0243 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.0147 0.0069 -0.0155** 0.0211 
R2within 0.3120  0.6997  
R2between 0.3602  0.7707  
R2overall 0.2769  0.4723  
No. of Obs. 99  58  
Table 4.9 Random-effects estimation results (ROA, China) 
Note: *, **, ***represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
For traditional banks, all credit risk variables negatively influence ROA, where NPL 
and LoanR are significant at the 10% level. This suggests that higher credit risks would 
lead to worse ROA, and only NPL and LoanR significantly and negatively influence 
the ROA. In the credit risk variables, the NPL has the largest coefficient and a 1% 
change of the NPL will lead to a 0.1569% change in ROA while a 1% change in NCO 
and LoanR lead to a 0.0172% and 0.0279% change in ROA respectively. This suggests 
that managers should pay more attention to NPL during credit risk management, as NPL 
not only significantly influences the ROA, but also has a higher coefficient. Similar to 
Kerkhof et al. (2010), VaR also has a negative estimate. But as it is not significant, 
combined with a relatively stable financial situation in China, traditional banks can 
worry less about the impact of market risk on ROA.  
Regarding the capital and liquidity risk variables, LCR and T1 have significant positive 
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impacts on ROA with 10% and 5% respectively. This suggests that increased tier one 
capital and liquidity holding percentage in the traditional banks would improve their 
asset performance. T1 had a higher significance level, suggesting that managers should 
pay more attention to ensure T1 meets the requirement. Even though the CR does not 
significantly influence the ROA model, with its positive influence, managers should 
keep the CR at a healthy level to help them achieve a better ROA. Concerning debt 
level, D/E has a negative and significant at the 10% level impact on ROA, which 
suggests that an increased debt level in traditional banks would reduce their ROA 
performance. As with D/E, D/A negatively impacts the ROA for traditional banks with 
a stronger influence based on its higher coefficient value. Even though only D/E shows 
significance, managers should keep the debt level relatively low which to help banks 
attain better performance. 
For selected operational risk variables, both affect ROA negatively with a higher risk 
level, where ORP is significant at the 10% level. Based on the coefficient values, a 1% 
increase of ORP or C/I will lead to 0.0037% or 0.0147% of the decrease in ROA 
respectively. Even though change in C/I will changes ROA more, the higher 
significance level of ORP suggests that Chinese traditional banks should pay more 
attention to particular operational issues than overall operational costs. In light of 
Figure 4.6 and Table 4.1, traditional banks should pay more attention to ORP because 
Chinese traditional banks have a smooth and low C/I during the investigated time 
period. We can expect they will keep their C/I low and stable, so they need to focus 
more on particular operational issues than overall costs. 
For reputational risks, the BVC shows its significant positive impact on ROA at the 1% 
significance level, and a 1% increase in BVC will lead to a 0.0025% increase in ROA. 
This suggests that increasing banks’ reputation could help them increase their ROA 
performance. Thus, Chinese traditional banks should aim to have a good reputation 
during operations. At last, ln(asset) has a negative impact on ROA at the 1% 
significance level, where a 1% increase of ln(asset) will lead to a 0.0002% decrease to 
ROA. This means that a higher asset level will reduce bank performance and has a high 
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level significance. This study confirms previous studies (e.g. Geng, 2016, Tan, 2016 
and Zhang, 2010), which also found a negative relationship between ln(asset) and ROA. 
Thus, the result suggests that maintaining or decreasing the safety amount of assets 
could help traditional banks perform better in ROA. 
For the fintechs, as with traditional banks, all credit risk variables have negative impacts. 
However, the significant variables are different where the NPL and NCO are significant 
at the 10% and 5% level respectively. Because of the higher significance level of NCO, 
managers should be more concerned about it than other credit risk variables. In the 
credit risk variables, the NCO has the largest coefficient and a 1% change of the NCO 
will lead to a 7.27% increase in ROA where NPL and LoanR lead to a 1.25% and 2.65% 
increase per 1% change representatively. This suggests that managers should pay more 
attention to NCO during credit risk management, as NCO not only significantly 
influences the ROA, but also has a high coefficient value. Moreover, the values of the 
estimates are much larger than they showed in traditional banks. This confirms that 
credit risk hurts ROA performance like traditional banks, but fintechs should be more 
concerned about these credit risk variables. One possible reason for this may be that 
traditional banks' credit risk management methods operate smoothly with their long 
history, whereas fintechs are still searching for suitable credit risk management methods.  
With regards to market risk, VaR for fintechs shows the same impact as traditional 
banks, where a 1% increase in VaR will lead to 0.0043% decrease of ROA. Because 
VaR has higher impact rate and significance at the 10% level, the market risk seems 
more important to fintechs than traditional banks. In addition, based on the operational 
mechanisms, fintechs are more related to other markets than traditional banks in China. 
Thus, fintechs should take more care about market risk with their relatively weak 
market position in the financial system. Concerning the capital and liquidity risk 
variables, different results are shown. Only CR has a 10% significantly positive impact, 
but not like traditional banks where LCR and T1 are significant. In more detail, a 1% 
change in CR will lead to 0.0115% positive change of ROA, where LCR shows 
0.0001%, and T1 shows 0.0355% positive changes to ROA. This means that fintechs 
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need to pay more attention to keep their liquidity level healthy like traditional banks. 
Concerning debt level, D/A has 1% significantly negative impact, where a 1% change 
in D/A will lead to 0.65% negative change in ROA. Thus, this suggests that fintechs 
need to control their debt level. Moreover, as there existed negative equity in fintechs, 
the D/E estimation may not show the expected impact on ROA. Thus, the importance 
of D/A is seen, which is proved by the 1% significant level. This suggests that managers 
should consider more on D/A when managing risks.  
For operational risk impacts, both variables also negatively impact ROA, where a 1% 
change in ORP will lead to 0.0014% negative change, and C/I shows 0.0155% negative 
impact. Unlike traditional banks, the cost of occurred risks (ORP) does not significantly 
influence ROA performance, but overall operational cost influences their performance 
at the 5% significance level. This suggests that fintechs need to control their overall 
costs and increase their operational efficiency to achieve better ROA performance. For 
reputational risks, the BVC shows its positive impact on ROA, a 1% increase in BVC 
will lead to a 0.002% increase in their ROA. This suggests that increase fintechs' 
reputation could help them increase their ROA performance. Although BVC does not 
significantly impact the ROA, increasing reputation during operations is still good for 
Chinese fintechs' ROA. Moreover, as fintechs are in their developing stage, unlike 
traditional banks, there is evidence of a positive relationship between bank size and 
ROA, which suggests that increasing size tends to result in higher returns on assets. 
Based on coefficient value, a 1% increase in ln(asset) will lead to 0.1249 % increase in 
ROA. This result is the opposite for traditional banks. Thus, in order to have a higher 
ROA, managers should control or increase the bank size in different types of banks. 
Besides interpreting variables, we looked the R2 (e.g., within, between and overall) for 
our ROA models. R2(within) refers to the variation within one individual over time, 
which can be given by 𝑅𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛
2 (?̂?) = 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟2[?̂?𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖]. R
2(between) measures 
the variation between the individuals, which is given by 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛
2 (?̂?) = 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟2[?̂?𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖]. 
R2(overall) is a weighted average of these two, which is given by 𝑅𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙
2 (?̂?) =
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𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟2[?̂?𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦𝑖𝑡] , where  ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ ?̂? ,  ?̂?𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
′?̂?  and ?̂?𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)
′ ?̂? 
(Hauser,2019). With regards to ROA, R2(within) shows a 31% variation within one 
traditional banks over time and a 70% variation within one fintech over time. 
R2(between) shows 36% variation between traditional banks and 77% variation 
between fintechs. R2(overall) shows 27% for traditional banks and 47% for fintechs. 
We could find out that fintechs have higher R2s, which indicate higher variation was 
presented in fintechs. 
 Traditional 
banks 
 Fintechs  




Intercept 0.183 0.5762 -1.0428 0.6931 
Non-performing loan ratio -2.5889** 1.1084 -3.4581* 2.6408 
Net Charge-off rate -0.0908* 0.4194 -15.7116 7.7032 
Total loan loss ratio -0.0362 0.5319 -5.7916** 1.9401 
Value at risk -0.0005* 0.00037 0.0225* 0.0342 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0016* 0.0282 0.0008 0.4380 
Current ratio 0.6613 0.5327 0.1244** 0.0850 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.1716*** 0.5339 0.2293* 0.2826 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.514** 0.1869 -3.6079*** 0.5685 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0097** 0.0116 0.0449* 0.0386 
Brand value change % 0.0336 0.0547 0.0628 0.0582 
Operational risk % -0.0465* 0.2307 -0.0036 0.4345 
Ln(Asset) -0.0014*** 0.0079 0.4367*** 0.1036 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.2286** 0.1162 -0.0328** 0.0943 
R2within 0.3547  0.7032  
R2between 0.4218  0.7809  
R2overall 0.2941  0.4017  
No. of Obs. 99  58  
Table 4.10 Random-effects estimation results (ROE, China) 
Note: *, **, ***represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Besides ROA, ROE also shows consistent results through random-effects panel data 
regression estimations in Table 4.9. For traditional banks, this study exhibits some 
similar results to previous studies. For example, we see the significant and negative 
effects of NPL on ROE which is the same as Zhang et al. (2015). We also see a 
significant positive effect of LCR on ROE which is consistent with Zhang (2011). As 
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with Pinto & Joseph (2017) and Siddik, Kabiraj, & Joghee (2017), we see a significant 
negative effect of D/E on ROE. Besides confirming the previous studies' results, 
estimations also showed NCO, ORP, C/I and ln(asset) have a significant negative effect 
on ROE which suggests that traditional banks need to reduce these risks as observed 
before in Table 4.9. 
In more detail, all credit risk variables negatively impact the ROE, where they have 
higher coefficient values for the fintechs. This confirms that credit risk hurts ROE 
performance as shown for ROA. Fintechs should be more concerned about these credit 
risk variables, as they show a larger impact value. With regards to significance level, 
NPL and NCO are significant at the 5% and 10% level for traditional banks, while NPL 
and LoanR are significant at the 10% and 5% level for fintechs. With regards to 
coefficient values, NPL has the largest coefficient value for traditional banks, a 1% 
increase in NPL will lead to a 2.589% decrease in Chinese traditional banks’ ROE. This 
suggests that managers should pay more attention to NPL during credit risk 
management, as NPL not only significantly influences both ROA and ROE, but also 
has a higher coefficient value. For fintechs, NCO has the largest coefficient number, a 
1% change of the NCO will lead to a 15.71% decrease in Chinese fintechs ROE, even 
though it is not significant, managers still need to keep it low. However, managers 
should be concerned more with LoanR, as it shows the highest significance level with 
a relatively high coefficient value.  
Next, with regards to market risk, unlike VaR in ROA, it shows different results based 
on types of bank. VaR has a significantly negative impact on traditional banks’ ROE at 
the 10% significance level. A 1% increase in VaR will lead to a 0.0005 decrease in 
traditional banks’ ROE. Thus, to increase the bank's ROE, managers should keep the 
VaR relatively low. However, at the 10% significance level, a 1% increase in VaR will 
lead to a 0.0225% increase in fintechs’ ROE. As VaR show a different impact on bank 
performance, managers should take more care about market risk with its complexity. 
Thirdly, with regards to liquidity and capital risk variables, similar to ROA, all three 
variables positively impact the ROE. For traditional banks, LCR and T1 are significant 
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at the 10% and 1% level. This suggests that increased tier one capital and liquidity 
holding percentages in the traditional banks would improve their equity performance. 
A higher significance level for T1 suggests that managers should pay more attention to 
ensure T1 meets the requirement. For fintechs, CR and T1 are significant at the 5% and 
10% level. This suggests that increased current ratio and tier one capital holding 
percentage cwould improve fintechs’ ROE. With regards to coefficient values, CR 
shows the highest value for traditional banks. Even though the CR is not significant in 
the ROE model, with a higher coefficient value, managers should keep the CR of a 
healthy level, which could help them achieve a better ROE. For fintechs, T1 shows the 
highest coefficient value, a 1% increase in T1 will lead to a 0.02293% increase in ROE. 
Based on its significance level and coefficient value, managers should focus more on 
fintechs' T1. Moreover, even though the LCR does not have significant impact on the 
ROE, it is not said that LCR is not essential; fintechs still need to follow the legal 
requirements. Regarding the debt level, both D/A and D/E negatively and significantly 
impact ROE at the 5% significance level for traditional banks, which suggests that a 
decreased debt level in traditional banks would increase their ROE performance. For 
fintechs, when concerning debt level variables, D/E is important. It is not significant in 
ROA with a negative impact, but is significant in ROE with a positive impact. The 
reason could be that during the investigating time, negative D/E existed in Chinese 
fintechs. Even with the positive sign, this will hurt performance. Moreover, as D/A still 
negatively impacts ROE at the 1% significance level, managers should be more 
concerned with D/A than D/E when managing debt level risk variables and keep the 
debt at an acceptable level. In the future, data should be recollected for fintechs. With 
a more extended time period than in this research, we could see if the results will change 
or not with the development of these fintechs. 
With regards to reputational risks, similar to the results obtained from ROA, BVC 
positively impacts on ROE for both types of bank. This means that increase brand value 
and bank size could help Australian banks to improve their performance. With larger 
coefficient values, fintechs could receive higher impact with increase in ROE. 
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Moreover, ln(asset) shows similar results with ROA. It negatively impact traditional 
banks’ ROE but positively impact fintechs’ ROE. The result suggests that maintaining 
or decreasing the safety amount of assets could help traditional banks perform better in 
ROE. But for fintechs, increasing size tends to have a higher ROE.  
Finally, concerning operational risk variables, both variables have negative impacts on 
ROE for both types of banks. This suggests that Chinese banks should keep operational 
risk variables low, which could help banks achieve a better ROE. Based on significance 
levels and coefficient values, managers should consider more on particular operational 
risks for traditional banks. Fintechs need to control their overall costs and increase their 
operational efficiency. Overall, the coefficient values in ROE are around ten times 
larger than coefficient values in ROA. The possible reason could be that the ROE values 
are around ten time larger than ROA. Unlike traditional banks, fintechs’ ROE 
coefficient values do not show ten times larger than fintechs’ ROA coefficient values. 
The possible reason could be that their ROA and ROE are not stable as they still in 
developing stage. When they run long enough, the results may tend similar to traditional 
banks.  
Similar to ROA, we looked the R2 for our ROE models. R2(within) shows a 35% 
variation within one traditional banks over time and a 70% variation within one fintech 
over time. R2(between) shows 42% variation between traditional banks and 78% 
variation between fintechs. R2(overall) shows 29% for traditional banks and 40% for 
fintechs. We could find out that fintechs have higher R2s, which indicate higher 









 Fintechs  




Intercept 0.0594 0.5577 -0.6954 0.5371 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.7150* 0.5802 -8.2467** 6.7153 
Net Charge-off rate -0.1468* 0.2201 -10.9282** 9.1406 
Total loan loss ratio -0.0558 0.2852 -4.1195* 6.5968 
Value at risk -0.0006*** 0.0002 -0.0305*** 0.0224 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0104* 0.0147 0.0013** 0.0194 
Current ratio 0.5348* 0.5309 0.0294 0.1017 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.3032 0.2864 1.9447** 2.0570 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.0439* 0.1032 -0.1459 0.5201 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0004 0.0062 0.0001** 0.0217 
Brand value change % 0.0105** 0.0296 0.0255 0.1160 
Operational risk % -0.0909* 0.1329 -2.1017** 2.2866 
Ln(Asset) -0.0047*** 0.0051 0.0970** 0.1265 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.027*** 0.0596 -0.2015* 0.1997 
R2within 0.3230  0.6012  
R2between 0.3681  0.6292  
R2overall 0.2062  0.5228  
No. of Obs. 99  30  
Table 4.11 Random-effects estimation results (EPS, China) 
Note: *, **, ***represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Finally, we are interested in observing whether the stock market's bank performance 
depends on managing different types of risks. The random-effects panel regression 
models are also applied to estimate coefficients and provide these results with EPS in 
Table 4.11.  
For traditional banks, the findings suggest that the impacts of credit risk are important 
to the stock market's performance, where NPL and NCO are both significant at the 10% 
level. This suggests that traditional banks with high credit risk have a higher chance of 
losing profit on the share market. In the credit risk variables, the NPL has the largest 
coefficient number, 1% increase of the NPL will lead to 0.715% decrease of the EPS 
where NCO and LoanR could lead to 0.1468% and 0.0558% representatively. As NPL 
shows its importance in all three dependent variables, this suggests that managers 
should concern more on NPL during traditional banks’ operations. With regards to 
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market risk, with significant negative influence, the higher market risk of traditional 
banks is shown by the worse EPS of traditional banks. Based on VaR's negative 
influence on all three dependent variables, traditional banks should keep their VaR 
relatively low and stable, which could help them perform better. 
With regards to liquidity and capital risk variables, similar to ROA and ROE, LCR has 
significant and positive effects on EPS. It is significant for all three dependent variables, 
which suggests that managers should pay more attention to LCR to meet the legal 
requirement. CR and T1 also provide a positive relationship with EPS, where CR is 
significant at the 10% level. In more detail, a 1% change in LCR will lead to 0.0104% 
positive change of EPS, where CR shows 0.5348%, and T1 shows 0.3032% positive 
changes to EPS. Even though they are not significant for all three dependent variables, 
the result indicates enough liquidity and capital holding percentage will help banks 
receive better performance with their relatively high coefficient values. Similar to 
Siddik, Kabiraj, & Joghee, (2017), D/A has significant and negative effects on EPS 
which is the same as for ROE. The results suggest that traditional banks should keep a 
healthy liquidity level and reduce their debt level, which will improve their overall 
performance.  
For reputational risks, the BVC has a significant and positive effect on EPS at 5% 
significance level, indicating that traditional banks with a better reputation could 
perform better on the share market where 1% increase in BVC will lead to 0.0105% 
increase in their EPS. Thus, as BVC shows its positive influence on all three dependent 
variables and significance to ROA and EPS, Chinese traditional banks should aim to 
increase their reputation during operations. 
With respects to the operational risk variables, both of them show significant and 
negative impacts on the EPS with a 10% level (ORP) and 1% level (C/I). Thus, by 
lowering the overall cost and operational penalties in bank income, traditional banks 
could profit in the share market. C/I shows more influence on EPS with a higher 
significance level, which suggests that managers should consider more on reducing 
operational cost. As both variables show significant influence on EPS, decreasing the 
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operational risks could help banks develop their performance, where 1% decrease in 
ORP and C/I will increase 0.0909% and 0.027% of EPS, respectively. Some previous 
studies confirm this result. For example, Mathuva (2009) also showed that increased 
C/I would hurt Kenyan's bank performance.  
Moreover, due to the large scale of sample traditional banks' assets, similar to ROA and 
ROE, ln(asset) of traditional banks shows a significant negative impact on EPS. Thus, 
for Chinese traditional banks, maintaining a smooth or reducing safe amount of assets 
could increase their overall performance. However, the negative relationship found in 
this research is opposite to some previous studies (e.g., Bhattacharyya & Purnanandam, 
2011), who suggested that increased bank size could increase the EPS for banks. 
Because fintechs are still in developing stage, most of them are not in the stock market. 
A similar situation happened in our dataset that not all Chinese fintechs are in the share 
market. We only selected fintechs that had joined the stock market for analysing EPS. 
The panel data regression model shows that the credit risk influence level is high. For 
example, all credit risk variables significantly negative effect the EPS with much high 
estimate value. This shows that credit risk has a more significant impact on fintechs 
than traditional banks, especially on EPS. In more detail, NPL and NCO present a 5% 
significance level, and LoanR shows a 10% significance level. Based on coefficient 
values, 1% increase in NPL, NCO or LoanR will lead to 8.2467%, 10.9282% and 
4.1195%, respectively. For market risk variables, VaR also has a negative impact in a 
1% significance level, which proves the higher market risks are, the worse fintechs 
perform. A 1% increase of VaR will lead to 0.0006% decrease in EPS.  
With regard to liquidity and capital risks, with higher liquidity and capital hold, there 
is more chance for fintechs to receive higher EPS. With a 5% significance level showed 
in LCR and T1, managers in fintechs should keep monitoring these variables and 
following the legal requirements, which could help fintechs increase their EPS. In more 
detail, a 1% change in LCR will lead to 0.0013% positive change of EPS, where CR 
shows 0.0294%, and T1 shows 1.9447% positive changes to EPS. Concerning debt 
level, similar to ROE, D/E has 5% significantly positive impact, where a 1% change in 
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D/E will lead to 0.0001% negative change in EPS. This shows that with negative equity, 
reduced debt will help increase EPS. D/A, on the other hand, like ROA and ROE, shows 
a negative impact on EPS. Thus, Chinese fintechs need to reduce the debt level, and 
similar to ROE, with the equity situation of fintechs becoming better in the future, the 
estimations should be rerun for a better fit.  
Similar to results shown in ROA and ROE, consistent results were found with respect 
to operational risk variables in EPS. Both of them significantly and negatively affect 
the EPS, where a 1% change in ORP will lead to 2.1017% negative change and C/I 
shows 0.2015% negative impacts. This suggests that reducing operational risks with 
more focus on ORP could help fintechs increase in the EPS performance. For 
reputational risks, consistent results are presented. BVC shows its positive impact on 
fintechs' EPS, where a 1% increase in BVC will lead to 0.0255% increase in their EPS. 
So, similar to ROA and ROE, managers should increase fintechs’ BVC during 
operations which could help them increase their performance. 
At last, fintechs size (ln(asset)) has a positive and significant relationship with EPS at 
5% significance level, where 1% increase in ln(asset) will lead to 0.097% of the 
increase in EPS. Because ln(asset) has a significant positive influence on bank 
performance for fintechs and significant negative influence on bank performance for 
traditional banks, these results indicate that larger size could increase bank performance 
to a certain level. After that, it would decrease bank performance. This confirms the 
findings of some previous studies (e.g. Athanasoglou et al., 2008 and Berger & 
Humphrey, 1994). 
Similar to ROA and ROE, we looked the R2 for our EPS model. R2(within) shows a 32% 
variation within one traditional banks over time and a 60% variation within one fintech 
over time. R2(between) shows 36% variation between traditional banks and 63% 
variation between fintechs. R2(overall) shows 21% for traditional banks and 52% for 
fintechs. We could find out that fintechs have higher R2s, which indicate higher 
variation was presented in fintechs. 
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In summary, the results show consistent results between types of bank. Firstly, all credit 
risk variables showed a negative influence on bank performance. This suggests that 
reducing credit risks could help both types of banks increase their performance. 
Secondly, LCR, CR and T1 showed a positive influence on bank performance. Thus, 
both types of banks should follow legal requirements to increase their liquidity and 
capital holding level, which could help them perform better. Thirdly, operational risk 
variables showed a negative influence on bank performance. It suggests that for both 
types of banks, controlling operational issues and costs could increase their 
performance. Finally, developing the bank's reputation could help both types of banks 
increase their performance. Therefore, for both traditional banks and fintechs, a better 
reputation, healthy liquidity conditions, efficient credit risk management, lower debt 
and cost levels and alertness to market movement could provide better performance in 
both returns and on the stock market. 
Besides similarities, four differences exist between traditional banks and fintechs that 
can be seen through the regression estimations. The first difference is shown in credit 
risk. It shows a higher level of impact on fintechs than traditional banks with higher 
coefficient value of estimates. One possible reason could be that consumers quantity, 
loyalty, and quality are lower than for traditional banks. As fintechs' develop, the results 
should improve. The second difference is market risk. For fintechs, it shows a higher 
level of impact and is significant in the regressions for all three dependent variables. It 
suggests that fintechs should be ready to react to market risk. For traditional banks, the 
market risk might be less worrisome because there are fewer impacts of the recent 
financial crisis, and the Chinese government is more involved in stabilising the market 
than in other countries.  
The third difference is the size of the ln(asset). It has a positive influence on fintechs 
but a slightly negative impact on traditional banks. As traditional banks have been 
established for a long time and have reached a substantial level of assets, maintaining 
the safe level or reducing useless assets could help them perform better. However, the 
higher level of assets owned by fintechs, the better performance will be. The last 
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difference concerns operational risk. For traditional banks, ORP shows significance 
across the three dependent variables which means traditional banks need to avoid 
particular operational issues occurring. However, for fintechs, C/I is significant for all 
three dependent variables, which means that fintechs should monitor the overall cost of 
their operations at the developing stage. With increasing the operational efficiency, the 
performance of operational risk will also improve.  
In addition, in order to have a more comprehensive view, as noted in Chapter 3, a 
dummy variable (SOB) could be added in the panel data regression models. The 
detailed analysis can be found in Appendix 1. In summary, the results are consistent 
compared with the results obtained above. With regards to the dummy variable (SOB), 
it shows a positive impact on all three bank performance variables. It suggests that state-
owned banks enjoyed more scale efficiency than other banks. However, SOB is only 
significant for ROA and ROE, which indicates that being a state-owned bank has more 
impacts on performance for assets and equity but not on stock market performance. 
Moreover, with the highest estimate value, the SOB influences ROE more than the other 
two dependent variables.  
4.2.7 GMM estimates for China 
In addition to the random-effect model, we can use GMM to check if our results from 
the random-effects model are robust. According to Anderson and Hsiao (1981), 
Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond (1998), the GMM is a powerful tool 
in econometrics. GMM could solve unobservable heterogeneity caused by endogeneity 
and simultaneity of the variables (Wintoki et al., 2012). Thus, even though we called 
GMM a robustness check for our random-effects models, the results from the GMM 
are as important as we got from the random-effects models. We will use and compare 
both approaches’ results (Random-effects and GMM) to build our discussion and 
conclusions. 
Similar to Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Tan (2016), the model of GMM can be 
expressed as   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 , where 𝑦  represent the 
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performance variables; 𝑥 represents the risk variables and bank size; 𝛽0 represents 
the constant term; 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is one period lagged performance variables; 𝛿 is the speed 
of adjustment to equilibrium;  𝛽𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑘) are coefficients to be estimated; 𝑖 and 
𝑡 are indices for the sections and time, respectively; 𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡, where 𝛼𝑖 is the 
bank-specific unobserved effect and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Tables 4.12 to 4.14 report 
the GMM estimates for the impacts of risks on the bank performance (ROA, ROE and 





Intercept 0.1095 -0.5654 
One period lag of ROA 0.3299* 0.0236 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.0591* -2.6789* 
Net Charge-off rate -0.0091 -4.2111** 
Total loan loss ratio -0.0028* -3.1013** 
Value at risk -0.0001 -0.0008* 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0009* 0.0056 
Current ratio 0.0603 0.0001 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.0062** 0.0432* 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.0201 -1.2192 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0013* 0.0001 
Brand value change % 0.0009*** 0.1869*** 
Operational risk % -0.0054* -0.0020*** 
Ln(Asset) -0.0076* 0.0743*** 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.0108 -0.0312 
F-test 180.9*** 2973.4*** 
Sargan Test (p-value > 𝜒2) 32.9(0.472) 60.74(0.343) 
AR(1) z = -3.94 
p-value = 0.00 
z = -34.15 
p-value = 0.00 
AR(2) z = -0.24  
p-value = 0.82 
z = -1.25 
p-value = 0.22 
No. of Obs. 99 58 
Table 4.12 GMM estimation results (ROA, China) 
Notes: *, **, ***represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model 
estimation. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 1 and 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
Firstly, ROA was selected as the dependent variable to establish two GMM estimates 
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based on bank type. The F-statistics show the significance of the variables, and the 
Sargan test shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. As we used the 
lag order of the dependent variable to be the explanatory variable, it is necessary to test 
over-identifying problems caused by selecting the lag order dependent variable. Sargan 
test could do this test, where the null hypothesis is that the restriction of the model on 
over-identifying is sufficient; and the alternative hypothesis is that the model has over-
identifying problems. Thus, a reasonable test should not reject the null hypothesis. As 
the Sargan test follows a 𝜒2 distribution, we checked and found out the Sargan test 
value cannot be rejected in our model. Furthermore, based on Arellano and Bond (1991), 
the inconsistency would be applied when second-order autocorrelation is presented. In 
this study, the second-order autocorrelation is rejected by AR(2) errors and even though 
a negative first-order autocorrelation is presented, the estimates of independent 
variables are still consistent.  
For Chinese traditional banks, the significant coefficient of the lagged ROA confirms 
the dynamic character of the model specification. Based on Athanasoglou et al. (2008), 
a value of 𝛿 close to 0 represents a competitive structure, and a value close to 1 
represents a less competitive structure. 𝛿 takes a value of 0.33 when ROA measures 
the bank performance. This result suggests that traditional Chinese banks' performance 
seems to persist and implies that traditional Chinese banks may not be too far from a 
perfectly competitive market structure. 
Turning to the other independent variables, the results here for the dependent variables 
are consistent with our random-effect panel data regression models. Firstly, credit risk 
variables have negative impacts. This suggests that higher credit risks lead to poor 
performance for Chinese traditional banks. In details, NPL and LoanR also significantly 
negative impact the ROA at the 10% level. In these credit risk variables, the NPL has 
the largest coefficient number, 1% change of the NPL will lead to 0.0591% of the ROA 
where NCO and LoanR could lead to 0.0091% and 0.0028% representatively. Similar 
to random-effects models, NPL shows its importance in credit risk management in both 
significance level and coefficient value. Thus, this suggests that managers should pay 
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more attention to NPL during credit risk management. With regards to market risk 
variables, VaR has a negative impact on ROA, which is also similar to the results from 
random-effects estimates. With a relatively low and not significant coefficient value, 
Chinese traditional banks can worry less about the impact of market risk on ROA. 
Regarding the capital and liquidity risk variables, consistent results also show in GMM 
compared with random-effects. LCR and T1 have significant positive impacts on ROA 
with 10% and 5% respectively. Even though the CR is not significant in the ROA model, 
with a positive and relatively large coefficient value, managers should keep the CR at 
a healthy level which could help them achieve a better ROA. The results indicate that 
following the regulation requirements (e.g. Basel Accords) and increasing the capital 
holding level could increase their performance. We further notice that the debt level 
variables are negatively related to bank performance, where D/E is significant for ROA 
at the 10% level. Same to D/E, D/A negatively impacts the ROA for traditional banks 
with stronger influence with a higher coefficient value. Similar to the results from 
random-effects, the GMM results suggest that a lower debt level could help banks to 
receive better performance.  
With regards to operational risk variables, GMM also provides results consistent with 
our random-effects panel data regression models. Both variables affect ROA negatively 
with a higher risk level, where ORP is significant at the 10% level. Based on the 
coefficient values, a 1% increase of ORP or C/I will lead to 0.0054% or 0.0108% of 
changes in ROA. Even though changes in C/I will change ROA more, the higher 
significance level of ORP suggests that with a relatively developed operational risk 
management system, managers in Chinese traditional banks should be concerned more 
with particular operational risks instead of general operational costs. 
For reputational risk variables, BVC shows a significant positive impact to ROA at 1% 
significance level, where a 1% increase in BVC will lead to 0.0009% increase in their 
ROA. This suggests increasing in reputation could help the banks increase ROA 
performance. Finally, the bank size coefficient is significant and negatively impacts 
bank performance at the 10% significant level for ROA. This result is consistent with 
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Tan (2016), who also found a negative relationship between the size of Chinese 
traditional banks and performance.  
For Chinese fintechs, The F-statistics show the significance of the variables. The Sargan 
test shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. The AR tests show that 
the estimates of independent variables are consistent. With regard to lagged dependent 
variables, although it is not significant, the coefficient of the lagged ROA shows the 
dynamic character of the model specification. 𝛿 takes a value of approximately 0.024, 
which suggests that the performance of the Chinese fintechs seems to persist to a 
perfectly competitive market structure in ROA.  
Estimates for the independent variables show results for ROA consistent with our 
random-effects panel data regression models. Firstly, all credit risk variables have 
negative impacts and the coefficient values of these variables are larger than were 
obtained for traditional banks. Moreover, all three variables significantly negatively 
impact the ROA, where NPL has a 10% significance level, NCO and LoanR have 5% 
significance level. In more detail, a 1% increase in NPL will lead to 2.68% decrease in 
ROA, NCO shows 4.21% and LoanR shows 3.1%. This confirms that credit risk hurts 
bank performance as in traditional banks, but that fintechs should be even more 
concerned with these credit risk variables. With regards to market risks, VaR shows a 
negative relationship with bank performance and is significant at the 10% level for 
ROA. In addition, as fintechs are more related to other markets and have a smaller 
market scale than Chinese traditional banks. Thus, they should take more care about 
market risks with their relatively weak market position in the financial system.  
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, similar results are presented 
compared with results from random-effects models. Fintechs with a higher level of 
capital and liquidity holdings level and meet legal requirements for these variables 
could obtain better performance. In more detail, slightly different results are shown in 
these variables. All of them positively impact the ROA, but only T1 has a 10% 
significantly positive impact, but not like shown in random-effects estimates where CR 
is significant. Based on coefficient values, a 1% increase in CR will lead to 0.0001% 
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positive change of ROA, where LCR shows 0.0056% and T1 shows 0.0432% positive 
changes to ROA. With regards to debt variables, the results show that D/A has a 
negative impact where D/E has a positive impact on ROA. This result is consistent with 
our random-effects panel data regression models, which also presents the same results 
that D/E has the opposite effect on ROA compared with traditional banks’ results. 
Compared with the Chinese traditional banks, the possible reason for this result could 
be because negative values of D/E exist in Chinese fintechs. Even with the positive sign, 
D/E ratio will hurt performance. Thus, data should be recollected in the future for 
fintechs to have a more extended time period than in this research, and the results may 
change with the development of these fintechs. Thus, the importance of D/A is seen, 
which is proved by the higher coefficient value. This suggests that managers should 
consider more on D/A when managing risks.  
With regards to operational risk variables, both variables also show negative impact on 
ROA, where 1% change in ORP will lead to 0.002% negative impact and C/I shows 
0.0312% negative impact. With the significance level, the ORP shows a 1% 
significance level. Unlike GMM estimates shown in traditional banks, together with 
control over particular operational risks, Chinese fintechs also need to control their 
overall costs and increase their operational efficiency to obtain better performance. 
With regards to reputational risk variables, consistent results are shown compared with 
random-effects estimates for Chinese fintechs and GMM estimates for Chinese 
traditional banks. BVC also shows a significant positive impact on ROA at the 1% 
significance level which suggests that increased reputation could help fintechs achieve 
better performance. Finally, similar to the random-effects estimates for ROA, there is 
evidence of a positive relationship between size and ROA performance. At 1% of 
significance level, a 1% increase of fintechs' ln(asset) will lead to a 0.0743% increase 






 Traditional banks Fintechs 
Intercept 0.2911 -0.2039 
One period lag of ROE 0.5231*** 0.2428 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.1863*** -1.3283* 
Net Charge-off rate -0.2352* -1.2324 
Total loan loss ratio -0.2005 -1.1668* 
Value at risk -0.0004** -0.0041 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0172* 0.1870*** 
Current ratio 0.2266 0.0019* 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.5801* 0.2545 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.4235** -0.6280* 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0283 0.0008 
Brand value change % 0.0121 0.1028*** 
Operational risk % -0.0393** -0.0095*** 
Ln(Asset) -0.0363* 0.3035*** 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.1359 -0.0116* 
F-test 280.1*** 929.3*** 
Sargan Test (p-value > 𝜒2) 24.71(0.851) 41.24(0.942) 
AR(1) z = - 3.88 
p-value = 0.00 
z = - 36.95 
p-value = 0.00 
AR(2) z = -0.82 
p-value = 0.42 
z = -1.11 
p-value = 0.26 
No. of Obs. 99 58 
Table 4.13 GMM estimation results (ROE, China) 
Notes: *, **, ***represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model 
estimation. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 1 and 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
Besides ROA, GMM estimates for ROE also show consistent results compared with 
random-effects panel data regression estimations in Table 4.12. For traditional banks, 
similar to GMM for traditional banks in ROA, the F-statistics show the significance of 
the variables. The Sargan test shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. 
The AR tests show that the estimates of independent variables are consistent. For the 
lagged dependent variable, the significant coefficient of the lagged ROE confirms the 
dynamic character of the model specification. 𝛿  takes a value of 0.52 when 
performance is measured by ROE. This result also suggests that the performance of 
Chinese traditional banks seems to persist to a moderate extent. 
 123 
Turning to the other independent variables, the results here for the dependent variables 
are consistent with our random-effect panel data regression models. Firstly, credit risk 
variables have negative impacts. This suggests that higher credit risks lead to poor ROE 
for Chinese traditional banks. In details, NPL and NCO also significantly negatively 
impact the ROE at the 1% and 10% level. In these credit risk variables, the NCO has 
the largest coefficient number, 1% change of the NCO will lead to 0.2352% of the ROE 
where NPL and LoanR could lead to 0.1863% and 0.2005% representatively. Similar 
to random-effects models, NPL shows its importance in credit risk management based 
on the highest significance level. With regards to market risk variables, VaR has a 
significant negative impact on ROE at the 5% significance level, which shows a more 
significance estimate compared to the results from random-effects estimates. Thus, in 
order to increase the bank's ROE, managers should control the VaR at a relatively low 
level. 
Regarding the capital and liquidity risk variables, consistent results also show in GMM 
compared with random-effects. LCR and T1 have significant positive impacts on ROE 
with a 10% significance level. Even though the CR does not appear significant in the 
ROE model, with its positive influence, managers should keep the CR in a health level 
which could help them to achieve a better ROE. The results indicate that following the 
regulation requirements (e.g. Basel Accords) and increasing the capital holding level 
could help banks increase their performance. We further notice that the debt level 
variables are negatively related to bank performance, where D/A shows its significance 
for ROE at the 5% level. In more detail, a 1% decrease in D/A will lead to 0.4235% 
increase in ROE where D/E shows 0.0283% influence in ROE. Similar to the results 
from random-effects, the GMM results suggest that a lower debt level could help banks 
to receive better performance.  
With regards to operational risk variables, GMM also provides results consistent with 
our random-effects panel data regression models. Both variables affect ROE negatively, 
where ORP is significant at the 5% level. Based on the coefficient values, a 1% increase 
of ORP or C/I will lead to 0.0393% or 0.1359% of changes in ROE. Similar to the 
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GMM for ROA in traditional banks, even though changes in C/I will changes ROE 
more, the higher significance level of ORP suggests that with a relatively developed 
operational risk management system, managers in Chinese traditional banks should be 
concerned more with particular operational risks instead of general costs of operations.  
For reputational risk variables, BVC shows a positive impact on ROE, where a 1% 
increase in BVC will lead to 0.0121% increase in their ROE. This suggests that 
increasing in reputation could help banks increase ROE performance. Finally, the 
coefficient for bank size is significant and negatively impacts on bank performance at 
the 10% significant level for ROE. This result is consistent with Tan (2016), who also 
found a negative relationship between the size of Chinese traditional banks and 
performance. Overall, similar to random-effects estimates, the coefficient values of 
ROE are around ten times larger than coefficient values in ROA. The possible reason 
could be that the ROE values are around ten times larger than ROA. The GMM further 
confirmed this result.  
For Chinese fintechs, The F-statistics show the significance of the variables. The Sargan 
test shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. The AR tests show that 
the estimates of independent variables are consistent. With regard to lagged dependent 
variables, although it is not significant, the coefficient of the lagged ROE shows the 
dynamic character of the model specification. 𝛿 takes a value of approximately 0.2428, 
which suggests that the performance of the Chinese fintechs seems to near to a perfectly 
competitive market structure in ROE.  
Estimates for the independent variables show results for ROE consistent with our 
random-effects panel data regression models. Firstly, all credit risk variables have 
negative impacts and the coefficient values of these variables are larger than were 
obtained for traditional banks. Moreover, NPL and LoanR have a significantly negative 
impact the ROE at the 10% significance level. For coefficient values, a 1% increase in 
NPL will lead to 1.3283% decrease in ROE, NCO shows 1.2324% and LoanR shows 
1.1668%. We could see that the coefficient values are larger than they showed in 
traditional banks like random-effects models. This confirms that credit risk hurts bank 
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performance as in traditional banks, but that fintechs should be more concerned with 
these credit risk variables. With regards to market risks, VaR shows a negative 
relationship with bank performance for ROE, where a 1% decrease in VaR will lead to 
0.0041% increase in ROE. In addition, as fintechs are more related to other markets 
and have a smaller market scale than Chinese traditional banks. Thus, they should take 
more care about market risks with their relatively weak market position in the financial 
system.  
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, similar results are presented 
compared with results from random-effects models. Fintechs which have a higher level 
of capital and liquidity holdings level and meet legal requirements for these variables 
could obtain better performance. In more detail, slightly different results are shown in 
these variables. All of them are positive impact on ROE, LCR and CR show their 
positive impact at 1% and 10% significance level. It is not same to show in random-
effects estimates where CR and T1 are significant at 5% and 10% significance level. 
Based on coefficient values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to 0.187% positive impact 
on ROE, where CR shows 0.0019% and T1 shows 0.2545% positive impact on ROE. 
With regards to debt variables, the results show that D/A has a negative impact at a 10% 
significance level, where D/E has a positive impact on ROE. This result is consistent 
with our random-effects panel data regression models, which also presents the same 
results that D/E has the opposite effect on ROE compared with traditional banks’ results. 
The possible reason for this result could be because negative values of D/E exist in 
Chinese fintechs. Even with the positive sign, D/E ratio will hurt performance. Thus, 
data should be recollected in the future for fintechs to have a more extended time period 
than in this research, and the results may change with the development of these fintechs. 
With the coefficient values, a 1% increase in D/A will lead to 0.628% decrease in ROE, 
and a 1% increase of D/E will lead to 0.0008% increase in ROE. Thus, the importance 
of D/A is seen, which is proved by the higher coefficient value. This suggests that 
managers should consider more on D/A when managing risks.  
With regards to operational risk variables, both variables also show significantly 
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negative impacts on ROE, where a 1% increase in ORP will lead to 0.0095% negative 
change and C/I shows 0.0116% negative impact. With the significance level, the ORP 
shows a 1% significance level and C/I shows a 10% significance level. Similar to GMM 
estimates shown in fintechs’ ROA, together with control over particular operational 
risks, Chinese fintechs also need to control their overall costs and increase their 
operational efficiency to obtain better performance. With regards to reputational risk 
variables, consistent results are shown compared with random-effects estimates for 
Chinese fintechs and GMM estimates for Chinese traditional banks. BVC also shows a 
significant positive impact on ROE at the 1% significance level which suggests that 
increased reputation could help fintechs achieve better performance. Finally, similar to 
the random-effects estimates for ROE, there is evidence of a positive relationship 
between size and ROE performance. At 1% of significance level, a 1% increase of 
fintechs' ln(asset) will lead to 0.3035% increase of fintechs' ROE, which suggests that 
increasing size tends to result in better performance.   
In addition, similar to the results shown in random-effects estimates and unlike 
traditional banks, fintechs’ ROE coefficient values do not show ten times larger than 
fintechs’ ROA coefficient values. The possible reason could be that their ROA and ROE 
are not stable as they still in developing stage. When they run long enough, the results 














Intercept 0.2497 -1.1039 
One period lag of EPS 0.0429 0.4680*** 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.6868* -0.3573* 
Net Charge-off rate -0.2724* -2.2579*** 
Total loan loss ratio -0.3424** -0.9379** 
Value at risk -0.0009*** -0.0105* 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0034 0.2195* 
Current ratio 0.4973* 0.2661** 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.0552** 0.4510 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.0949* -0.2528* 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0038 0.0245* 
Brand value change % 0.0171** 0.0083 
Operational risk % -0.0899* -0.1432* 
Ln(Asset) -0.0038** 0.1766** 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.1439* -0.2569* 
F-test 224.7*** 1437.2*** 
Sargan Test (p-value > 𝜒2) 29.14 (0.66) 53.7 (0.60) 
AR(1) z = -2.03 
p-value = 0.00 
z = -30.13 
p-value = 0.00 
AR(2) z = -1.01 
p-value = 0.31 
z = -1.23 
p-value = 0.22 
No. of Obs. 99 30 
Table 4.14 GMM estimation results (EPS, China) 
Notes: *, **, ***represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model 
estimation. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 1 and 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
Finally, we are interested in observing whether the stock market's bank performance 
depends on managing different types of risks. The GMM estimates are applied to show 
coefficients and provide these results with EPS in Table 4.14.  
For traditional banks, similar to GMM for traditional banks in ROA and ROE, the F-
statistics show the significance of the variables, the Sargan test shows there is no 
evidence of over-identifying restrictions, and the AR tests show the estimates of 
independent variables are consistent. With regard to lagged dependent variables, 
although it is not significant, the coefficient of the lagged EPS shows the dynamic 
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character of the model specification. 𝛿 takes a value of 0.0429 when performance is 
measured by EPS. This result also suggests that Chinese traditional banks' performance 
seems to persist in a perfectly competitive market structure in EPS. 
Turning to the other independent variables, the results here for the dependent variables 
are consistent with our random-effect panel data regression models. Firstly, credit risk 
variables have significant negative impacts. This suggests that higher credit risks lead 
to poor EPS for Chinese traditional banks. In details, NPL and NCO significantly 
negatively impact the EPS at the 10% level, and LoanR has the 5% significance level. 
In these credit risk variables, the NPL has the largest coefficient number, a 1% increase 
of the NPL will lead to 0.6868% decrease of the EPS where NCO and LoanR could 
lead to 0.2724% and 0.3424% representatively. Similar to random-effects models, NPL 
shows its importance in credit risk management based on the highest significance level. 
With regards to market risk variables, VaR has a significant negative impact on ROE at 
the 1% significance level which is similar to the results from random-effects estimates. 
Thus, in oreder to increase the bank's EPS, managers should control the VaR relatively 
low. 
Regarding the capital and liquidity risk variables, consistent results also show in GMM 
compared with random-effects, that all three variables are positive influence the bank 
performance. In more detail, slightly different results are shown in these variables. LCR 
and T1 show their positive impact at 10% and 5% significance level. It is not same to 
show in random-effects estimates where LCR and CR are significant at the 10% 
significance level. Based on coefficient values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to 
0.0034% increase of EPS, where CR shows 0.4973% and T1 shows 0.0552% increase 
of EPS. Even though the LCR does not significant in EPS model, with its positive 
influence, managers should keep the LCR in a health level and pass the legal 
requirements, which could help them to achieve a better EPS. The results indicate that 
following the regulation requirements (e.g. Basel Accords) and increasing the capital 
holding level could help banks increase their performance. We further notice that the 
debt level variables are negatively related to bank performance, where D/A is 
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significant for EPS at the 10% level. In more detail, a 1% decrease in D/A will lead to 
0.0949% increase in EPS where D/E shows 0.0038% influence in EPS. Similar to the 
results from random-effects, the GMM results suggest that a lower debt level could help 
banks to receive better performance.  
With regards to operational risk variables, GMM also provides results consistent with 
our random-effects panel data regression models. Both variables affect EPS 
significantly and negatively at the 10% level. Based on the coefficient values, a 1% 
decrease of ORP or C/I will lead to a 0.0899% or 0.1439% increase in EPS. This 
suggests that Chinese traditional banks should control their operational risks during the 
business, especially in the stock market. For reputational risk variables, BVC shows a 
significant positive impact on EPS at the 5% significance level, where a 1% increase in 
BVC will lead to 0.0171% increase in their EPS. This suggests increasing in reputation 
could help bank increase EPS performance. Finally, the coefficient for bank size 
significantly impacts bank performance at the 5% significant level for EPS. With 1% 
increase in ln(asset), the EPS will decrease 0.0038%. 
For Chinese fintechs, The F-statistics show the significance of the variables. The Sargan 
test shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. The AR tests show that 
the estimates of independent variables are consistent. For the lagged dependent variable, 
the significant coefficient of the lagged EPS confirms the dynamic character of the 
model specification. 𝛿 takes a value of approximately 0.468, which suggests that the 
performance of the Chinese fintechs seems to persist to a moderate extent in EPS.  
Estimates for the independent variables show results for EPS consistent with our 
random-effects panel data regression models. Firstly, all credit risk variables have 
negative impacts and the coefficient values of these variables are larger than were 
obtained for traditional banks. Moreover, all of them are significant where NPL 
significantly negatively impacts the EPS at the 10% significance level, NCO has a 1% 
significance level and LoanR has a 5% significance level. For coefficient values, a 1% 
increase in NPL will lead to 0.3573% decrease in EPS, NCO shows 2.2579% and 
LoanR shows 0.9379%. We could see that the coefficient values are larger than they 
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showed in traditional banks like random-effects models. This confirms that credit risk 
hurts bank performance as in traditional banks, but that fintechs should be more 
concerned with these credit risk variables. With regards to market risks, VaR shows a 
significantly negative relationship with EPS at 10% level, where a 1% decrease in VaR 
will lead to a 0.0105% increase in EPS. In addition, as fintechs are more related to other 
markets and have a smaller market scale than Chinese traditional banks. Thus, they 
should take more care about market risks with their relatively weak market position in 
the financial system, especially in the stock market.  
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, similar results are presented 
compared with results from random-effects models. Fintechs which have a higher level 
of capital and liquidity holdings level and meet legal requirements for these variables 
could obtain better performance. In more detail, slightly different results are shown in 
these variables. All of them positively impact the EPS, LCR and CR show their positive 
impact at 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. It is not same to show in random-
effects estimates where LCR and T1 are significant at the 5% level. Based on coefficient 
values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to 0.2195% positive change of EPS, where CR 
shows 0.2661% and T1 shows 0.451% positive changes to EPS. With regards to debt 
variables, the results show that D/A has a negative impact on EPS at 10% significance 
level, where D/E has a significant positive impact on EPS at the 10% significance level. 
This result is consistent with our random-effects panel data regression models, which 
also presents the same results that D/E has the opposite effect on EPS compared with 
traditional banks’ results. The possible reason for this result could be because negative 
values of D/E exist in Chinese fintechs. Even with the positive sign, D/E ratio will hurt 
performance. Thus, data should be recollected in the future for fintechs to have a more 
extended time period than in this research, and the results may change with the 
development of these fintechs. With the coefficient values, a 1% increase in D/A will 
lead to 0.2528% decrease in EPS, and a 1% increase of D/E will lead to 0.0245% 
increase in EPS. Thus, the importance of D/A is seen, which is proved by its higher 
coefficient value. This suggests that managers should consider more on D/A when 
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managing debt level risks.  
With regards to operational risk variables, both variables also show significantly 
negative impacts on EPS at the 10% level, where a 1% increase in ORP will lead to a 
0.1432% decrease and C/I shows 0.2569% negative impact. Similar to GMM estimates 
shown in fintechs’ ROA and ROE, together with control over particular operational 
risks, managers also need to control their overall costs and increase their operational 
efficiency to obtain better performance. With regards to reputational risk variables, 
consistent results are shown compared with random-effects estimates and GMM 
estimates for both types of banks, BVC also shows a positive impact on EPS which 
suggests that increased reputation could help fintechs achieve better performance. 
Finally, similar to the random-effects estimates for EPS, there is evidence of a positive 
relationship between size and EPS performance. At 5% of significance level, a 1% 
increase of fintechs' ln(asset) will lead to a 0.1766% increase of fintechs' EPS, which 
suggests that increasing size tends to result in better performance.  
In summary, the F-statistics confirms the significance of the variables, the Sargan test 
shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions and the AR tests show the 
estimates of independent variables are consistent in all our GMM. For Chinese 
traditional banks, the significant coefficient of the lagged performance variables (ROA 
and ROE) confirm the dynamic character of the model specification. For Chinese 
fintechs, the significant coefficient of the lagged performance variable (EPS) confirms 
the dynamic character of the model specification. These results suggests that the 
performance of Chinese banks seems to persist to a moderate extent and implies that 
the Chinese banks may not be too far from a perfectly competitive market structure.  
Turning to the other independent variables, the GMM estimations showed consistent 
results with our random-effects panel data regression models. Firstly, credit risk 
variables have negative impacts. And with the higher coefficient values for fintechs, the 
results confirm that credit risk hurts bank performance in both types of banks, but 
fintechs need to be more concerned with these credit risk variables. Of the three selected 
credit risk variables, at least two of variables significantly influence the performance, 
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which reflects the importance of credit risk management in banking operations. 
Moreover, depending on the different performance variables, managers could prioritise 
credit risk variables and find a balance point to achieve better overall performance. 
With regards to market risks, VaR shows a negative relationship with bank performance 
in both types of banks. For traditional banks, the result shows that the influence of VaR 
related more to the market performance variable and based on its high significance level, 
managers should consider it more when banks would like a better performance on the 
stock market. For fintechs, as they are more related to other markets and have a smaller 
market scale than Chinese traditional banks. Thus, they should take more care about 
market risks with their relatively weak market position in the financial system. 
Next, we find that there is a positive relationship between liquidity and capital holding 
level and bank performance for both types of bank. The results indicate that following 
the regulation requirements (e.g. Basel Accords) and increasing the capital holding 
level could help banks increase their performance. For debt level variables, different 
results are shown between types. For traditional banks, a lower debt level could help 
banks to receive better performance. For fintechs, as positive D/E impacts exist for bank 
performance and negative D/E exists in dataset, fintechs need to balance the debt level 
and rerun the model with longer investigated time period of investigation.  
With regards to operational risk variables, GMM also provides results consistent with 
our random-effects panel data regression models. The results indicate that with a 
relatively developed operational risk management system, managers should be 
concerned more with particular operational risks instead of general costs of operations. 
For the relatively new established operational risk management system, managers 
should not only concern with particular operational risk issues like traditional banks but 
also need to be concerned with overall operational costs. For reputational risk variables, 
BVC shows a positive impact on all bank performance variables for both types of banks, 
which means increasing reputation could help bank increase bank performance. With 
regards to bank size, our results are consistent with our panel data regression models, 
similar to Athanasoglou et al. (2008), we also showed that bank size shows a positive 
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impact on performance up to a certain level and that size then reduces the performance. 
In addition, as mentioned in last section, the same similarities and differences hold in 
GMM estimates as shown in random-effects panel data regression models. Thus, the 
GMM reinforced our findings of the impact of risks on Chinese bank performance. 
Moreover, similar to Appendix 1, a dummy variable (𝑆𝑂𝐵𝑖 ) is added for Chinese 
traditional banks, to show whether ownership influences bank performance. The model 
becomes   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 + γ𝑆𝑂𝐵𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 , and γ is the coefficient 
of the dummy variable. The estimation results will be shown in Appendix 2.  
4.2.8 Summary 
This section analysed 22 Chinese banks and listed them as two types (11 traditional 
banks and 11 fintechs). Firstly, we applied figure comparisons between traditional 
banks and fintechs. Then, descriptive statistics, stationarity, multicollinearity 
heteroscedasticity and endogeneity tests were presented and analysed. At last, by using 
ROA, ROE, and EPS as dependent variables, we employed panel data regression 
models and GMM to study the impact of different types of risks on different kinds of 
banks' performances. Moreover, as we used random-effects estimates to build a 
generalised model for the dataset. We did not need to add time- or individual- influence 
factors in the analysis, as they already be analysed through R2.  
The overall conclusion for Chinese banks is that improving different bank risk 
management aspects could help Chinese banks perform better. The reasons for this 
seem obvious. Due to the recent financial crisis, the BSBC and governments worldwide 
discovered the importance of risk management. The question is what type of risk needs 
to be focused on more. Similar to the results shown in Aebi et al. (2012) for the US 
banking system, this research also proved the importance of risk management for 
Chinese banking. Consistent with the studies of Geng et al. (2016), Zhang (2011), and 
Diallo et al. (2015), we also showed the negative influence of credit risk and operational 
risk, some positive and some negative impact of liquidity and capital risks, and the 
positive impact of bank brand value on bank performance. We further found that bank 
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size has a slightly negative impact on traditional banks, but a positive impact for 
fintechs.  
According to the empirical findings, for both types of Chinese banks, at least one 
variable of each type of risk significantly impacted the bank performance in all three 
different dependent variables. Thus, banks in China should catalogue and prioritise 
risks through types, then based on our regression analysis, better performance in the 
future could be achieved. For example, for banks with a long history, sound 
development and stable performance, more attention should be paid to capital and 
liquidity risk, than to credit risk, operational risk and market risk. Furthermore, keeping 
bank size stable and developing bank reputation is important. On the other hand, 
fintechs established recently and were in the development stage, need to be more 
concerned about their credit risk, and stay alert to market movements. Also, pay 
attention to liquidity and capital risk and operational risk at the same time; and then 
improve their asset level and reputation. Moreover, as differences existing in the 
significance level and significance between two types of banks, based on the findings 
in this section, managers of traditional banks and fintechs could use these results to 
manage different types of risks and use historical data to estimate the future 
performance. Therefore, managers should be aware of influence level of different types 
of risks and variables when prioritising these risks. They could further provide a more 
efficient strategy when managing risks. In addition, managers could estimate their 
future performance through our models and set risk management targets. For example, 
based on the historical data, managers can estimate the future values of risk variables 
for their bank/fintech and receive the performance results based on the bank type. Thus, 
if the Chinese bank/fintech wants to improve its performance, it can reduce or increase 
risk variables to achieve the goal. Also, they can set the target value of risk management 
variables and check in the future if they meet the goal. Moreover, through our models, 
managers could better understand their competitors, which could help them avoid some 
mistakes or improve some advantages through management. For example, a 
bank/fintech can estimate the future risk values for its competitors and get their 
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estimated performance. Then, the manager can compare the results with their 
performance, finding advantages and disadvantages in risk management. As a result, 
managers can develop risk management strategies with a more focused risk 
management target to receive better performance. 
At the same time, investors and shareholders in China could also benefit from our 
models. By finding the relevant variables from banks/fintechs official website or any 
legal ways, investors and shareholders can receive different results based on the bank 
type. This could help them know if a bank/fintech develops or which bank/fintech is 
better to invest in these days. Similarly, policymakers and governments in China could 
also benefit from our models. Instead of investing in banks/fintechs, they can find 
banks/fintechs perform better or worse than others which can help them keep their eyes 
on these banks/fintechs and support or shut down these banks/fintechs. Moreover, 
through our models, policymakers and governments can understand the general 
situation for different bank types, which can help them make more targeted regulatory 
requirements based on bank type. More discussion could be found in Chapter 6. 
Based on the processes in this chapter, the following sections consider the UK, Australia 
and overall datasets. This will allow us to see the differences between countries and 
types of banks. 
4.3 Data analysis, results and discussion for the UK 
In the previous section, the risks influencing Chinese banks' performance were 
identified for traditional banks and challenger banks/fintechs. In order to have a 
comprehensive result, we will also present results for the UK and Australia following 
China's same pattern. Similarly to Section 4.2, this section is also organised as follows: 
1. Figure comparisons; 2 Descriptive statistics; 3. Panel-data unit-root tests (Fisher's 
type); 4. Correlation matrix and variance influence factors (VIF); 5. White’s test, F-test, 
Lagrange Multiplier Test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test; 6. Panel data 
regression models (random-effects type); 7. GMM estimates; 8. Summary. 
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4.3.1 Comparisons between the UK's traditional banks and fintechs 
Figures about bank performance and risk management between the UK's traditional 
banks and fintechs are presented before presenting the analysis of panel data regression 
models. Figure 4.8 shows all three performance variables for the UK's traditional banks 
and fintechs. With regards to ROA, unlike the profitable situation of Chinese traditional 
banks, the UK's traditional banks mostly stayed in low profits, and some had a loss 
position during the investigation period. The ROA for the UK traditional banks showed 
signs of a stable trend but stayed at a low level, except for Barclays. Barclays' 
performance changed during the investigated time period. Its ROA reached near 6% at 
2015H1 and dropped to near -1% at 2017H1. For fintechs, on the other hand, similar to 
Chinese fintechs, it is easy to verify the growth trend for the UK fintechs. Due to 
developing in recent years, similar to the UK's traditional banks, the UK's fintechs also 
had a low-level profit ROA. 
A similar trend is seen in ROE for the fintechs. Most of the fintechs started with loss 
position, then nearly reached to the low-profit position. However, for traditional banks, 
ROE showed a different situation compared with ROA and Chinese traditional banks' 
ROE situation. They showed that the 2007-09 financial crisis heavily influenced them. 
Some of the traditional banks even had negative ROE. Thus, this situation showed that 
the UK traditional bank performed worse than Chinese traditional banks. However, the 
ROE showed signs of an increasing trend, which demonstrates good potential for future 
performance.  
For EPS, our figures for both types of banks only show traditional banks/fintechs which 
already joined the share market. The UK traditional banks had a volatile trend around 
zero for EPS. The same reasons for this can be applied as for ROA and ROE, which 
was that the UK was heavily influenced by the financial crisis and a higher level of 
connections in the share market than China. For fintechs, as only a small amount of 
them joined the share market, we could not show the whole trend of fintechs. For the 
sample we have, the develop performance of these samples is shown. Some of them 
had an extreme loss at the beginning, then the loss reduced. Some of them performed 
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smoothly, which demonstrated their smooth operations during these years. However, 
because of the lower number of fintechs that joined the stock market, we should wait 
longer for more fintechs to join the share market, to receive a better view in the future. 
In addition, we could see that there are outliers existed for fintechs' performance. Indeed, 
these points have much lower value than others. This suggests that in the infant stage 
of fintechs operations, these fintechs could have negative returns or earnings at different 
levels. If they survived this stage, they could begin to have positive returns and earnings. 
Therefore, authorities could give fintechs chances even support them pass this stage. 





Figure 4.8 Performance comparisons (UK) 
Figures 4.9 to 4.14 present the independent variables, similar to Section 4.2, figures are 
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organised by type of risk. Figure 4.9 presents the credit risk variables. For the UK 
traditional banks, a decreasing trend was presented during the investigated time period. 
With a series of regulations and policies that the UK's FCA published after the financial 
crisis, credit risk management is seen to increase the efficiency of the UK traditional 
banks. The NPL dropped to near 2%, which neared the NPL of Chinese traditional 
banks. Similar trends were also seen in NCO and LoanR. 
On the other hand, most UK fintechs stayed in a stable range, which was higher than 
Chinese fintechs but not high enough to endanger the credit business. Moreover, the 
overall credit risk level of fintechs was shown to be higher than that in traditional banks. 
In addition, an extreme existed in the UK fintechs, Revolut, which had a higher credit 
risk level than others. The possible reason should be that it is established very recently 
where its credit risk management system had not been tested and needed to be improved. 
The quality of the customers also needs to be improved, which can also help this fintech 
reduce its credit risks. Moreover, we also need to give this fintech more time to show 
its management ability and analysable trends of these credit risk variables. Thus, credit 
risk management of the UK banks was performed worse than Chinese banks. This 
confirms that the 2007-09 financial crisis had a higher impact on the UK economy. 
However, traditional banks recovered quickly since then, which suggests a better 
potential performance of the UK traditional banks, especially in credit risk management. 







Figure 4.9 Credit risk variables comparisons (UK) 
Similar to the credit risk variables, the VaR values of the UK banks were more 
substantial than the VaR shown in China. The main reasons could be that (1) the global 
market had a higher impact on and involvement with the UK banks than Chinese banks. 
(2) GBP had a higher exchange rate against the USD than RMB in the currency value, 
and so the high value presented was acceptable. In more detail, some of the banks had 
a stable trend of VaR for both types of banks. Others showed an increasing trend. Thus, 
for the UK, both traditional banks and fintechs need to be ready to react to the market 
movement during operations. 
Traditional Banks Fintechs 
  
Figure 4.10 Market risk variable comparisons (UK) 
With regards to capital and liquidity risk, in Figure 4.11, we see that both LCR and CR 
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had a similar increasing trend, which showed that the liquidity conditions of the UK 
traditional banks were well developed. However, some of the UK traditional banks did 
not meet the 100% LCR requirement after 2015. Similar to China, with warnings, these 
banks tried to solve this problem. As a result, their LCR increased and met the 
requirement at the end of 2017. For fintechs, these ratios in most of them did not show 
a generally increasing trend, while they performed stably at the requirement level. 
Moreover, some showed a high increasing trend in LCR, which indicates that these 
fintechs had a better liquidity situation. However, some of them dropped their LCR 
under 100% after 2015, which suggest a poor liquidity situation for these fintechs to 
respond to liquidity coverage issues. Thus, these fintechs need to be more concerned 
about their liquidity situation to prevent serious issues occurring. Moreover, similar to 
Chinese fintechs, there is an outlier of LCR in the UK fintechs figure (Figure 4.11). 
With higher values than other fintechs, it can be observed that the outlier shows a high 
ratio of liquidity to expected cash flow. The possible reason could be that the fintech 
received many liquidity investments during that period. As the values decrease to the 
average, it should not be a problem. 
With regard to CR, traditional banks show that their CR values were higher than one 
and had a smoothly increasing trend. However, there are outliers which had higher 
values for fintechs. For fintechs, most of them had a stable trend and some of them are 
relatively higher than others. Similar to Chinese fintechs, as the outliers are at the initial 
years that fintechs published their data, the situation is accepted with a reduced trend 
with its development.  
Then, with regards to T1 capital ratio, traditional banks had a healthy capital holding 
condition (over 10%) which was also higher than the requirement (6%) and higher than 
Chinese traditional banks (over 8%). The trend of T1 also increased during the 
investigated time period, which suggests the UK traditional banks had enough tier one 
capital to prevent bankruptcy. On the other hand, fintechs had a similar trend to 
traditional banks. This indicates that fintechs had a relatively healthy capital ratio 
condition during the investigated time period. Moreover, there are outliers in the T1 
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figure. Similar to Chinese fintechs, the possible reason should be that these fintechs are 
in their absorbing investment stage. With a high volume of investment in T1 capital, 
the ratio becomes relatively high. Thus, this situation should be temporary, with their 
development, T1 would be reduced to the requirement of the banking industry and near 
the ratio of traditional banks. We should wait and monitor a more extended period for 
a better view.  
With regard to debt level variables, the D/A of the UK traditional banks performed 
differently between banks, where some of them had a relatively lower level than the 
others. Thus, for banks with higher D/A values, they should pay more attention to 
reduce their debt level than the others. The D/E of the UK traditional banks also had a 
stable trend. Thus, similar to China, the UK traditional banks had a stable trend with 
respect to the debt level. Fintechs, on the other hand, showed a different situation. 
Compared with Chinese fintechs, most of the UK fintechs also showed a stable trend 
in D/A. Similar to China, there is an outlier in D/A figure. As it is in the first year of the 
fintech published its data, this situation is accepted as the D/A reduced to average with 
its development. Moreover, there was only one negative value of D/E in the UK fintechs 
as proposed to several negative values shown in China. This suggests that the UK 
fintechs control their debt levels better and thus perform better than Chinese fintechs. 
Even though the high D/E ratio shows the high debt level of fintechs, it is still better 
than a negative D/E. 








Figure 4.11 Capital and Liquidity risk variables comparisons (UK) 
Figure 4.12 presents the reputational risk variable (BVC). For traditional banks, with 
the influence of the 2007-09 financial crisis, the changes moved around 0%. Thus, the 
reputation of the UK traditional banks stayed similar during these years. For fintechs, 
reputation developed during these years. Moreover, it showed a better trend of 
reputation than it showed Chinese fintechs. However, the trend might not keep 
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developing that well when fintechs step into a mature period. We should give them 
more time to prove their ability in the financial market. 
Traditional Banks Fintechs 
  
Figure 4.12 Reputational risk variable comparisons (UK) 
With regards to the operational risk variables in Figure 4.13, ORP shows a smooth trend 
for both types of banks, which is similar to the Chinese banks. However, one exception 
exists for both types of banks, where they provided a much higher ORP than the others 
and did not meet the Basel III requirement (15%). This suggests that some of the UK 
traditional banks did not perform as well as Chinese traditional banks. Fintechs, on the 
other hand, performed similar to Chinese fintechs, as extremes over the limit exist, but 
others showed an acceptable level. 
With regards to C/I, most UK traditional banks kept all their costs less than their income. 
However, values over than 100% did exist during the investigated time period. 
Moreover, the maximum C/I for Chinese traditional banks was 38.58% which was 
much lower than the maximum C/I value in the UK. This result shows that the 
operational efficiency for the UK traditional banks was much lower than shown in 
China. Thus, they need to improve their management methods to control costs, 
including operational risk costs, to better efficiency. For fintechs, some of had costs 
were higher than incomes, which was a similar situation as shown in Chinese fintechs. 
This suggests that their operational efficiency was low and needs to improve 
immediately like Chinese fintechs.  
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Figure 4.13 Operational risk variables comparisons (UK) 
With regards to bank asset levels (ln(asset)) in Figure 4.14, the UK traditional banks 
had a stable level which showed that they retained their assets during operations. For 
fintechs, their asset levels showed signs of a slightly increasing trend which was similar 
to the Chinese fintechs and better than the UK traditional banks. 
Traditional Banks Fintechs 
  
Figure 4.14 Bank size comparison (UK) 
In general, the UK traditional banks and fintechs performed at an acceptable level 
during these years, and they showed their advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, 
analysing the differences and problems that exist between traditional banks and fintechs 
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could help managers to build better direction and focus for their risk management and 
future operations. 
4.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 provide descriptive statistics for performance variables and risk 
variables based on types of bank. With regards to performance, the average ROA value 
was 0.35% for traditional banks, but -19.23% for fintechs. A similar result was shown 
for ROE, where the mean value was 3.37% for traditional banks, and -15.37% for 
fintechs. This confirms the results in Figure 4.8. Both the ROA and ROE of the UK 
traditional banks had a worse average value than Chinese traditional banks, and the UK 
fintechs performed worse than the UK traditional banks. 
Moreover, even though the UK fintechs did not perform well, they still had a better 
average value than Chinese fintechs (-39.1%). Concerning EPS, the UK banks 
performed better on average ($0.3119 for traditional banks and $0.0726 for fintechs) 
than the Chinese banks, which suggested better market earnings for the UK banks. In 
summary, the UK traditional banks performed worse than Chinese traditional banks in 
ROA and ROE but better in EPS. The reasons could be, firstly, the influence of the 
financial crisis was more substantial in the UK than in China. Secondly, with fewer 
years' development of China in the stock market, all the Chinese listed companies 
performed not as well as other countries. The UK fintechs, similar to Chinese fintechs, 
still need to improve their performance, because they had a negative rate of returns. 
In terms of credit risk management variables, the average value of NPL was 2.61% in 
traditional banks, which also stayed at a low level but higher than the average value of 
Chinese traditional banks. However, the UK traditional banks performed better for the 
other two credit risk variables than traditional Chinese banks with a relatively lower 
average value of NCO and LoanR. Fintechs, on the other hand, had a higher rate than 
did Chinese fintechs. For example, the average value of NPL was 5.91% which was 
more than twice the average value of NPL for Chinese fintechs (2.2%). However, the 
level of credit risk was acceptable with a decreasing trend. Moreover, as a series of 
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support legalisations and tight regulatory requirements about banks were published, the 
UK fintechs should achieve better in the future.  
With regards to VaR, this showed a more substantial risk level for the UK traditional 
banks than Chinese traditional banks. As the market fluctuated a great deal during the 
investigating time period, the average value of VaR was 24.87 for the UK traditional 
banks. Moreover, the standard deviation of VaR was high, which indicates that the 
market movement had different influence levels for different banks. For the UK fintechs, 
VaR showed a similar situation to the Chinese fintechs. The average value was 6.2, 
which was much smaller than that shown in traditional banks. However, with their 
smaller marketplace and proportions, an even lower VaR might have a significant 
impact.  
Under the liquidity and capital risk variables, the UK traditional banks had a similar 
situation to the Chinese traditional banks. On average, they showed enough liquidity 
and capital holding percentages with a reasonable debt level. However, some of the 
traditional banks performed less well with a lower the LCR (the minimum value is 
82.34%). The UK fintechs also showed similar results to Chinese fintechs except for 
D/E. As noted in the previous section, the UK fintechs had a relatively better situation 
with respect to D/E level with less negative values. This suggests that the UK fintechs 
should control their debt level to achieve a better rate.  
With regards to BVC, Tables 4.15 and 4.16 confirm the results show in Figure 4.12. 
Traditional banks increased the limited values of their brand value as their poor 
performance during the financial crisis, with a 0.7% average value. Fintechs, on the 
other hand, showed their development in the market with a 23.37% average value. In 
addition, based on the average value, the bank size of the UK traditional banks was 
smaller than Chinese traditional banks and the UK fintechs were larger than Chinese 
fintechs.  
With regards to operational risk variables, ORP for the UK banks (traditional banks 
12.61% and fintechs 11.38%) showed a higher average value than shown in Chinese 
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banks (traditional banks 2.4% and fintechs 461%, (5.19% without extreme values). This 
suggests that the UK traditional banks had higher expenses for operational risks than 
Chinese traditional banks. As the UK traditional banks had a relatively comprehensive 
operational risk management system to prevent operational risks, the results should be 
better. The banks with high ORP values should pay more attention during operations to 
prevent loss caused by occurring operational risks. The UK fintechs performed better 
than Chinese fintechs, as no extreme issues occurred during the investigated time period. 
However, as the average value was close to the requirement (15%), the UK fintechs 
still need to reduce operational risk issues to prevent future disasters. Moreover, C/I 
showed a lower efficiency of the UK traditional banks where they had a higher average 
value (66.2%) than Chinese banks (28%). For fintechs, the average value of C/I 
(4852.4%) had a higher value than was seen showed in Chinese fintechs (137.3%). This 
shows that the fintechs face a dangerous operational situation and need to cut their 
operational costs immediately to prevent bankruptcy. 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Maximum Minimum 
Return on asset 0.0035 0.0086 0.0598 -0.0154 
Return on equity 0.0337 0.0719 0.1476 -0.344 
Earnings per share 0.3119 0.4469 1.7909 -0.4300 
Non-performing loan ratio 0.0261 0.0202 0.0947 0.0130 
Net Charge-off rate 0.0101 0.0160 0.0950 0.0001 
Total loan loss ratio 0.0381 0.0228 0.1060 0.0230 
Value at risk 24.8742 25.7627 125.5 0.4000 
Liquidity coverage ratio 1.2787 0.2718 2.4670 0.8234 
Current ratio 1.0611 0.0141 1.0979 1.0290 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.1695 0.0542 0.349 0.1050 
Debt-to-Asset ratio 0.4346 0.2952 0.8744 0.1014 
Debt-to-Equity ratio 8.5368 6.7258 23.812 1.9228 
Brand value change % 0.0070 0.0695 0.2063 -0.172 
Operational risk % 0.1261 0.2763 1.9400 0.0041 
Ln(Asset) 12.6159 1.1438 14.8300 10.4283 
Cost-to-Income ratio 0.6620 0.1955 1.8098 0.3868 
Observations 97 





Variable Mean Std Dev. Maximum Minimum 
Return on asset -0.1923 0.4936 0.0278 -2.0588 
Return on equity -0.1573 0.5747 0.3201 -2.5458 
Earnings per share 0.0726 0.2869 0.25 -1.03 
Non-performing loan ratio 0.0591 0.1536 0.7830 0.0002 
Net Charge-off rate 0.0220 0.0427 0.257 0 
Total loan loss ratio 0.0548 0.1025 0.5600 0.0031 
Value at risk 6.5260 7.2428 34.2300 0.0600 
Liquidity coverage ratio 1.8075 1.6067 7.6786 0.6000 
Current ratio 1.8320 1.4186 7.8128 0.9095 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.2327 0.2187 1.2930 0.0810 
Debt-to-Asset ratio 0.5916 0.4149 2.622 0.0554 
Debt-to-Equity ratio 4.3293 4.3341 13.6731 -2.85 
Brand value change % 0.2337 0.2734 0.9620 -0.2833 
Operational risk % 0.1138 0.3767 2.562 0.0003 
Ln(Asset) 6.4496 2.6032 9.7010 -0.3010 
Cost-to-Income ratio 48.5240 137.0581 600.0000 0.2886 
Observations 52 
Table 4.16 Descriptive statistics (UK fintechs) 
Notes: Not all UK traditional banks are listed, observations are 70 for EPS. 
Not all UK challenger banks/fintechs are listed, observations are 30 for EPS. 
Through understanding the descriptive statistics, we conclude that the UK traditional 
banks' performance and risk management were relatively better than the UK fintechs. 
However, the BVC of fintechs demonstrated the development of the UK fintechs. Thus, 
as both of them had advantages and disadvantages, the values of the investigation has 
been demonstrated. 
4.3.3 Panel data unit root test 
Similar to China, before applying the regression model, we apply a unit root test for 
panel data to test the stationarity of the data set at first. In more detail, Fisher-type unit 
root tests were implemented based on ADF tests to test the stationarity of the data. The 
null and alternative hypotheses are that H0 is that the data are non-stationary or have 
unit roots, and H1 that the data are stationary or do not have unit roots. The results of 
the unit root based on bank type are shown in Table 4.17. The results show that all 
variables are stationary at the 1% level of significance. The null hypothesis for the 
variables is rejected, indicating that there is no evidence of unit roots and the data are 
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stationary. 
 Traditional banks Challenger banks/fintechs 
Variable Statistics P-value Statistics P-value 
ROA 49.57 0.000 28.06 0.000 
ROE 34.89 0.000 26.11 0.000 
EPS 54.10 0.000 16.91 0.000 
NPL 20.88 0.000 44.25 0.000 
NCO 42.60 0.000 24.68 0.000 
LoanR 64.47 0.000 46.86 0.000 
VaR 53.08 0.000 25.58 0.000 
LCR 91.50 0.000 29.56 0.000 
CR 63.67 0.000 54.11 0.000 
T1 49.99 0.000 49.73 0.000 
D/A 35.02 0.000 27.02 0.000 
D/E 46.38 0.000 26.24 0.000 
BVC 32.33 0.000 30.13 0.000 
ORP 50.38 0.000 40.49 0.000 
Ln(Asset) 44.83 0.000 24.89 0.000 
C/I 43.68 0.000 28.52 0.000 
Table 4.17 Fisher’s type unit root tests (UK) 
4.3.4 Correlation matrix and variance inflation factors 
Tables 4.18 and 4.19 show the correlations of the explanatory variables for the UK 
banks based on bank types. Similar to Chinese banks, no two variables had a correlation 
coefficient of over 0.8. Thus, no multicollinearity problem existed. However, we could 
also see that there is some relatively high correlations (close to and over 0.7) that exist 
between independent variables in matrices showed above. Thus, we apply VIF for our 
dataset to double-check for multicollinearity problems. Table 4.20 presents the VIFs for 
all variables based on types of banks. Similar to China, some variables show a relatively 
larger VIF than others, such as NPL for traditional and NCO for fintechs. Moreover, as 
they are credit-related variables, it shows higher interactions between credit-related 
variables and other risk management variables, which suggests the importance of credit 
risk management for both types of banks. As all VIFs are below 10, the results double-
check the correlation matrix results and indicate that there are no issues of multiple 
correlation in this study. 
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Table 4.18 Cross Correlation Matrix (UK traditional banks) 
 






Variable Traditional banks Challenger banks/fintechs 
NPL 4.640 4.209 
NCO 3.114 4.671 
LoanR 4.330 3.396 
VaR 2.433 2.204 
LCR 1.456 1.189 
CR 2.914 3.943 
T1 1.800 2.656 
D/A 4.021 4.895 
D/E 4.468 1.454 
BVC 1.354 2.182 
ORP 1.136 2.190 
Ln(Asset) 2.685 4.339 
C/I 1.894 2.508 
Table 4.20 Variance inflation factors (UK) 
4.3.5 Tests for heteroscedasticity, endogeneity and model determination 
Similar to China, we tested heteroscedasticity for the UK, White’s general 
heteroscedasticity test is employed and the results are shown in Table 4.21. The results 
of White’s test show that heteroscedasticity is present. Since heteroscedasticity causes 
standard errors to be biased, after finding the proper static panel model, we used robust 
standard errors. 




Traditional banks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Fintechs 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 4.21 Tests for heteroscedasticity 
Moreover, we tested the endogeneity of the UK dataset through the DWH test. Table 
4.22 show that we could not reject the null hypothesis (H0: there is no endogeneity exist, 
and random-effects is more appropriate), we could see that there is no endogeneity 
problem for this study. Moreover, as mentioned in Section 4.2.5, we need to apply three 
tests to find the most appropriate approach to obtain our panel regression results. Table 
4.22 shows the p-values of this test for the UK dataset. The results show that we need 
to reject the null hypothesis of the F test and Lagrange Multiplier test (H0: the pooled 
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OLS is more appropriate). This suggests that models with fixed- and random-effects 
are more appropriate than pooled OLS with zero p-values for all dependent variables 
and bank types. All p-values are greater than 5% for all three dependent variables in 
the DWH test, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis. This suggests that random-
effects models are suitable.  
Test Bank type ROA model ROE model EPS model 
 𝑝-values 
F  Traditional banks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Fintechs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LM Traditional banks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Fintechs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DWH Traditional banks 0.0950 0.2248 0.1367 
Fintechs 0.2021 0.1990 0.0700 
Table 4.22 Tests for determination the most appropriate approach for data analysis 
(UK) 
4.3.6 Panel data regression analysis 
Based on the three dependent variables, we constructed six random-effects panel data 
regression models to test the influences of risk variables on the bank performance 
variables based on different bank types. The random-effects model estimation results 










 Traditional banks Fintechs 




Intercept -0.1387 0.0985 0.1899 0.1092 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.0306* 0.1173 -4.3907*** 1.1149 
Net Charge-off rate -0.0473 0.0864 -7.4907*** 3.0570 
Total loan loss ratio -0.1579*** 0.1114 -0.6979 0.1262 
Value at risk -0.0001* 0.00005 0.0236*** 0.0130 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0006 0.0035 0.0330** 0.0718 
Current ratio 0.1889*** 0.0942 0.0943** 0.1006 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.0357** 0.0129 0.1497 0.0761 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.0175*** 0.0119 -2.0421*** 1.1462 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0007 0.0006 -0.0038** 0.0061 
Brand value change % -0.0108* 0.0130 0.1043 0.1050 
Operational risk % -0.0008* 0.0030 -0.5897*** 0.2346 
Ln(Asset) 0.0032** 0.0013 0.0380 0.0237 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.0082** 0.0051 -0.0006 0.0115 
R2within 0.5587  0.6088  
R2between 0.5674  0.6522  
R2overall 0.3211  0.4697  
No. of Obs. 97  52  
Table 4.23 Random-effects estimation results (ROA, UK) 
Note: *, **, ***represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
With regards to ROA, the results are consistent for the credit risk variables with Chinese 
banks. All variables have negative influences on the UK traditional banks and fintechs. 
In more detail, NPL and LoanR have a significant negative impact on ROA for 
traditional banks, while NPL and NCO show significant negative influences on fintechs. 
For traditional banks, the LoanR has the largest coefficient number, a 1% increase of 
the LoanR will lead to a 0.1579% decrease of the ROA where NPL and NCO could 
lead to 0.0306% and 0.0473% representatively. When managing credit risks, managers 
should consider more on the LoanR with its higher significance level and coefficient 
value. Moreover, as shown in Figure 4.9, the credit risk level is more under control with 
increased efficiency. It indicates that UK traditional banks performed well in credit risk 
management. For fintechs, consistent results were also seen. NPL and NCO show 
significant negative impacts on ROA as they showed in China. With regards to 
coefficient values, the NCO has the largest coefficient number, a 1% increase of the 
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NCO will lead to a 7.4907% decrease of the ROA where NPL and LoanR could lead to 
4.3907% and 0.6979% decrease, representatively. Thus, with a higher significance level 
and coefficient values, managers in fintechs should focus more on NCO in credit risk 
management. In addition, in both China and the UK, fintechs provide higher coefficient 
values than in traditional banks which suggests that credit risk has a higher impact on 
fintechs, and that managers should pay more attention to reducing credit risks. 
VaR shows a significant influence on ROA for both UK traditional banks and UK 
fintechs, where it is only significant for Chinese fintechs. This suggests that the market 
movement has a higher impact on UK banks than Chinese banks. It shows a negative 
impact on traditional banks which means that high market risk leads to poor ROA 
performance. 1% increase in VaR will lead to a 0.0001% decrease in traditional banks' 
ROA. However, it shows a positive impact on fintechs which suggests that higher 
market risks lead to a better ROA performance. 1% increase in VaR will lead to a 0.0236% 
increase in fintechs ROA. This result proves the complexity of the market risks, which 
suggests that the UK banks should take extra care about market risks. 
With regards to our estimates of liquidity and capital risk variables, similar to China, 
all three variables are positively impact on ROA for both types of banks, which suggests 
that increasing the liquidity and capital holding level would help UK banks increase 
ROA performance. In more detail, CR and T1 have a significant positive impact ROA 
for traditional banks at 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. In comparison, both 
LCR and CR show significant positive influences on fintechs at the 5% significance 
level. For coefficient values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to a 0.0006% increase in 
ROA, where CR and T1 could lead to 4.3907% and 0.6979%, representatively, for the 
UK traditional banks. For fintechs, LCR will lead to a 0.0330% increase in ROA, where 
CR and T1 could lead to 0.0943% and 0.1497%, representatively. For both types of UK 
banks, as CR has the highest significance level combined with a relatively high 
coefficient value, managers should take extra care about CR. With regards to debt level, 
D/A shows a significant negative impact on ROA for both types of banks at the 1% 
significance level in the UK. A 1% increase in D/A will lead to a 0.0175% decrease in 
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ROA for traditional banks, In contrast, a 2.0421% decrease in ROA for fintechs. 
Moreover, D/E has a significant negative relationship with ROA for the UK fintechs, 
whereas it shows a positive impact on Chinese fintechs. This suggests that the higher 
debt level will reduce ROA performance for UK fintechs. Considering the significance 
level and coefficient value, both types of UK banks should consider more on the D/A 
than D/E. 
In addition, there is evidence of a positive relationship between bank size and ROA in 
the UK traditional banks and fintechs, which suggests that larger banks tend to have 
higher returns on assets. Moreover, as ln(asset) only significantly positively influences 
the traditional banks' ROA, where a 1% increase in ln(asset) will lead to a 0.0032% 
increase in ROA. This suggests the higher importance of size in traditional banks 
performance. Together with Chinese traditional banks' results for ln(asset), this shows 
that bank size increases performance to a certain level and then decreases performance 
after that point, this result is consistent with previous studies(e.g. Athanasoglou et al., 
2008; Berger & Humphrey, 1994). For reputational risks, the BVC shows a positive 
impact on both types of banks. For UK traditional banks, it shows a significantly 
positive impact on ROA at the 10% significance level, a 1% increase in BVC will lead 
to a 0.0108% increase in their ROA. This suggests that increase banks' reputation could 
help them increase their ROA performance. Thus, UK traditional banks should aim to 
have aa increasing reputation during operations. For the UK fintechs, a 1% increase in 
BVC will lead to a 0.1043% increase in UK fintechs' ROA. Although it is not significant, 
increasing reputation during operations is still good for the UK fintechs. 
Finally, with regards to operational risk variables, ORP has a significant negative 
influence on the ROA of both types of banks (10% significance level for traditional 
banks and 1% significance level for the fintechs). A 1% increase in ORP will lead to a 
0.0008% decrease in ROA for traditional banks and a 0.5897% decrease for fintechs. 
This proves that when operational risks occur, bank performance decreases because of 
higher costs occurred. C/I confirms similar results, but it was only significant in 
traditional bank estimation at the 5% significance level. With regards to coefficient 
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value, a 1% increase in C/I will lead 0.0082% decrease in ROA for UK traditional banks 
and a 0.0006% decrease for the UK fintechs. This result shows that the UK traditional 
banks should consider operational risks carefully as both variables are significant. For 
fintechs, managers should pay more attention to ORP with its higher significance and 
coefficient value. 
Similar to China, besides interpreting variables, we looked at the R2 for our ROA 
models. R2(within) shows a 56% variation within one traditional banks over time and a 
61% variation within one fintech over time. R2(between) shows 57% variation between 
traditional banks and 65% variation between fintechs. R2(overall) shows 32% for 
traditional banks and 47% for fintechs. We could find out that fintechs have higher R2s, 
which indicate higher variation was presented in fintechs. 
 Traditional banks Fintechs 




Intercept 0.3443 0.5182 -0.2011 0.5044 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.7435*** 0.6133 -3.1545*** 0.5346 
Net Charge-off rate -1.1569*** 0.4547 -5.4655** 0.2673 
Total loan loss ratio -0.0001 0.5589 -0.5009 0.0610 
Value at risk 0.0003* 0.0003 0.0378** 0.5916 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0115* 0.0188 0.0230 0.0336 
Current ratio 0.3661 0.4935 0.1122* 0.4658 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.1022*** 0.1027 0.1339 0.3624 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.712*** 0.0623 -1.883*** 0.6763 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0008* 0.0008 -0.0037* 0.2920 
Brand value change % 0.0080* 0.0719 0.0903 0.0732 
Operational risk % -0.0096** 0.0157 -0.5681*** 0.1066 
Ln(Asset) -0.0038 0.0066 0.0247 0.0108 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.2220*** 0.0271 -0.0006* 0.0526 
R2within 0.6322  0.5034  
R2between 0.6802  0.5546  
R2overall 0.4701  0.3983  
No. of Obs. 97  52  
Table 4.24 Random-effects estimation results (ROE, UK) 
Note: *, **, ***represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
Besides ROA, ROE also shows consistent results through the random-effects panel data 
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regression estimates in Table 4.22. Firstly, all credit risk variables negatively impact 
ROE, while fintechs have a higher impact with larger estimates than the UK traditional 
banks. For both types, NPL and NCO have a significant negative impact on ROE. In 
more detail, NPL and NCO show their significance at the 1% significance level for UK 
traditional banks. In contrast, for UK fintechs, NPL and NCO show their significance 
at the 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. With regards to coefficient values, 
for traditional banks, the NCO has the largest coefficient number, a 1% increase of the 
NCO will lead to a 1.1569% decrease of the ROE where NPL and LoanR could lead to 
0.7435% and 0.0001% representatively. For fintechs, the NCO also has the largest 
coefficient number, a 1% increase of the NCO will lead to a 5.4655% decrease of the 
ROE where NPL and LoanR could lead to 3.1545% and 0.5009% decrease, 
representatively. This result indicates that reducing credit risks would help the UK 
banks to achieve a better ROE. Managers should consider more on the NCO with its 
stronger significance level and coefficient values. Fintechs should consider more on 
credit risk management with higher coefficient values for credit risk variables.  
Then, with regards to the market risk variable, VaR shows a significant positive impact 
on ROE for both types of banks. This suggests that if the UK banks catch the 
opportunities of the market movement, they can achieve a better ROE when facing 
market risks. A 1% increase in VaR will lead to a 0.0003% increase in traditional banks' 
ROE and a 0.0378% increase in fintech' ROE. Thus, our findings supported previous 
who found market risk may cause loss to banks (e.g., Frey and McNeil, 2002; and 
Kerkhof et al., 2010) as well as bring opportunities for banks (e.g. Willam, 2016).  
Thirdly, with regard to the liquidity and capital risk variables, for the UK traditional 
banks, LCR and T1 show a significant positive influence on ROE at the 10% and 1% 
significant level, respectively. For coefficient values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to 
a 0.0115% increase in ROE, where CR and T1 could lead to 0.3661% and 0.1022%, 
representatively. T1 shows its importance in liquidity and capital risk management with 
a higher significant level and a relatively coefficient value. Thus, the UK traditional 
banks need to meet T1 legal requirements during operation. D/A and D/E show a 
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significant negative impact on ROE at the 1% and 10% significant level. A 1% increase 
in the D/A or D/E will lead to a 0.712% or 0.0008% decrease in ROE. With the higher 
significance level and coefficient values, managers should focus more on D/A during 
risk management. Thus, in order to have a higher ROE, the UK traditional banks should 
increase their liquidity and capital holding level and reduce their debt level. For fintechs, 
CR shows a significant positive impact at the 10% significant level, and D/A and D/E 
show a significant negative impact on ROE with the 1% and 10% significant level, 
respectively. With regards to coefficient values, a 1% increase in LCR, CR or T1 will 
lead to a 0.023% or 0.1122% or 0.1339% increase in ROE, while a 1% increase in D/A 
or D/E will lead to a 1.883% or 0.0037% decrease in ROE. Thus, in order to have a 
higher ROE, UK fintechs should increase the liquidity and current asset holding levels 
and reduce debt levels. Managers should focus more on CR based on its higher 
significance level for liquidity risk management and D/A based on its higher 
significance level and coefficient value for debt level management.  
Next, concerning the reputational risk variable, BVC has a significantly positive impact 
on ROE at the 10% significance level for traditional banks. A 1% increase in BVC will 
lead to a 0.008% increase in the bank's ROE, which shows the importance of keeping 
developing the bank brand value. However, BVC is not significant for fintechs. This 
does not show that BVC is not important in fintechs' operations but instead suggests 
that the BVC is not a highly significant influence on the fintechs' ROE during the 
developing stage of such fintechs. Managers still need to keep fintechs’ BVC healthy 
and increased, as a 1% increase in BVC will lead to a 0.0903% increase in fintechs' 
ROE. Similar to China, ln(asset) also shows a positive influence on ROE for fintechs 
but a slightly negative influence for traditional banks. A 1% increase in ln(asset) will 
lead to a 0.0038% decrease in traditional banks' ROE, but 0.0247% increase for fintechs. 
Although the ln(asset) are not significant for both types of banks, managers still need 
to keep their asset at a healthy level, which could help them to have a good performance.  
Finally, with regards to operational risk variables, both ORP and C/I have significant 
negative impacts on ROE for both types of banks. In more detail, ORP shows its 
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significant at the 5% level for traditional banks and 1% level for fintechs, where C/I 
shows it significant at the 1% level for traditional banks and 10% level for fintechs. 
This confirms that keeping bank operations smooth and decreasing the cost of 
operations could help the UK banks improve their ROE. With regards to coefficient 
values, a 1% increase in ORP will lead to a 0.0096% decrease in ROE for traditional 
banks and a 0.5681% decrease for fintechs. A 1% increase in C/I will lead 0.2220% 
decrease in ROE for UK traditional banks and a 0.0006% decrease for the UK fintechs. 
This result shows that both types of the UK banks should consider operational risks 
carefully as both variables are significant. In addition, as ORP has a higher coefficient 
value than C/I, managers in fintechs should pay more attention to their ORP.  
Besides interpreting variables, we looked at the R2 for our ROE model. R2(within) 
shows a 63% variation within one traditional banks over time and a 50% variation 
within one fintech over time. R2(between) shows 58% variation between traditional 
banks and 55% variation between fintechs. R2(overall) shows 47% for traditional banks 
and 39% for fintechs. We could find out that traditional banks have higher R2s, which 












 Traditional banks Fintechs 




Intercept -4.2179 6.8939 -0.1300 0.4348 
Non-performing loan ratio -6.4574** 4.7601 -10.5275** 4.6189 
Net Charge-off rate -0.8104 5.5770 -4.4348 2.3172 
Total loan loss ratio -0.0077* 0.6055 -5.3857* 5.0986 
Value at risk -0.0016* 0.0032 -0.0172* 0.0052 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0712 0.1617 0.0581 0.2897 
Current ratio 0.8481** 0.4436 1.6099*** 1.4791 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.7480*** 1.4931 1.3621 1.3152 
Debt-to Asset ratio -1.2392 1.3362 -0.4545 0.5893 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0369** 0.0479 -0.0115* 0.0248 
Brand value change % 0.3566 0.4639 0.4964*** 0.6197 
Operational risk % -0.0238 0.1363 -2.9088*** 0.9388 
Ln(Asset) 0.4533* 0.3226 0.2489*** 0.0960 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.2203** 0.2704 -0.8203*** 0.4639 
R2within 0.3092  0.5457  
R2between 0.4168  0.6034  
R2overall 0.2339  0.4522  
No. of Obs. 70  30  
Table 4.25 Random-effects estimation results (EPS, UK) 
Note: *, **, ***represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Finally, we observe how different types of risk variables influence the EPS of the listed 
banks. Some consistent results are obtained. Firstly, all credit risk variables negatively 
impact EPS. However, NCO was not significant for either type of bank, which indicates 
that the NCO affects EPS negatively but is not a critical variable. For both types, NPL 
and NCO have a significant negative impact on ROE. In more detail, NPL and LoanR 
show their significance at the 5% and 10% significance level for both types of UK 
banks. With regards to coefficient values, for traditional banks, the NPL has the largest 
coefficient number, a 1% increase of the NPL will lead to a 6.4574% decrease of the 
EPS where NCO and LoanR could lead to 0.8104% and 0.0077% representatively. For 
fintechs, the NPL also has the largest coefficient number, a 1% increase of the NNPL 
will lead to a 10.5275% decrease of the EPS where NCO and LoanR could lead to 
4.4348% and 5.3857% decrease, representatively. This result indicates that reducing 
credit risks would help the UK banks to achieve a better EPS. Managers should consider 
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more on the NPL with its stronger significance level and coefficient values. Fintechs 
should consider more on credit risk management with higher coefficient values for 
credit risk variables.  
Secondly, VaR has a significant negative influence on both types of UK banks at the 
10% significance level. This indicates that the market movement influences EPS, as 
EPS is gained from the bank market performance. A 1% increase in VaR will lead to a 
0.0016% increase in traditional banks' EPS and a 0.0172% increase in fintech' EPS. In 
addition, VaR shows a different impact on different performance variables. This 
indicates the complexity of market risks and that managers should pay attention and 
stay alert to market movement and search for the balance point to reach better 
performance.  
With regards to liquidity and capital risk variables, results are consistent. For the UK's 
traditional banks, CR and T1 show significant positive impacts and D/E shows a 
significant negative influence on EPS at the 5% significance level, 1% and 
5%significance level, representatively. For coefficient values, a 1% increase in LCR 
will lead to a 0.0712% increase in EPS, where CR and T1 could lead to 0.8481% and 
0.748%, representatively. A 1% increase in the D/A or D/E will lead to a 1.2392% or 
0.0369% decrease in EPS. With the higher significance level and coefficient values, 
managers should focus more on CR during liquidity risk management and D/E during 
debt level management. This indicates that if the UK traditional banks have higher 
current assets and tier one capital holding levels and a lower debt level, better 
performance of EPS could be shown. For the UK fintechs, only CR and D/E show 
significant influence on EPS at 1% and 10% significance level, representatively. For 
coefficient values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to a 0.0581% increase in EPS, where 
CR and T1 could lead to 1.6099% and 1.3621%, representatively. A 1% increase in the 
D/A or D/E will lead to a 0.4545% or 0.0115% decrease in EPS. With the higher 
significance level and coefficient values, managers in fintechs also should focus more 
on CR during liquidity risk management and D/E during debt level management. This 
suggests that if the UK fintechs have a higher current asset level and lower debt level, 
 162 
then a higher EPS will be shown for them.  
With regards to BVC, it has a positive impact on banks' EPS. However, BVC has no 
significant influence on EPS for the UK traditional banks. One possible reason for this 
is the limited development of traditional banks in the UK during the investigating time 
period. However, managers still need to keep their brand values healthy and ideally 
increase their brand values, as a 1% increase in BVC will lead to a 0.3566% increase 
in traditional banks’ BVC. For fintechs, as they keep increasing their brand value during 
these years, the BVC is significantly positively related to fintechs’ EPS at the 1% 
significance level. Concerning the coefficient value, a 1% increase in BVC will lead to 
a 0.4964% increase in fintechs' EPS Managers need to consider fintechs' BVC more 
careful than traditional banks with its higher significance level and coefficient value. 
Similar to Cheung et al. (2011), our results proved that increasing banks' brand values 
could help them increase their EPS performance. 
Moreover, ln(asset) has a significant positive relationship to EPS in both types of banks 
with the 10% significance level for traditional banks and the 1% significance level for 
fintechs. A 1% increase in ln(asset) will lead to a 0.4533% increase in traditional banks' 
EPS and 0.2489% increase for fintechs. This suggests that with more asset, the UK 
banks will have a better EPS. Finally, operational risk variables provide consistent 
results. ORP and C/I have negative impacts on EPS for both types of banks. In more 
detail, ORP shows its significant at the 1% level for fintechs, where C/I shows it 
significant at the 5% level for traditional banks and 1% level for fintechs. This confirms 
that keeping bank operations smooth and decreasing the cost of operations could help 
the UK banks improve their EPS. With regards to coefficient values, a 1% increase in 
ORP will lead to a 0.0238% decrease in EPS for traditional banks and a 2.9088% 
decrease for fintechs. A 1% increase in C/I will lead 0.2203% decrease in EPS for UK 
traditional banks and a 0.8203% decrease for the UK fintechs. Thus, with a relatively 
weak situation of operational efficiency showed in Figure 4.13, the UK traditional 
banks should cut unnecessary costs to receive a better EPS. The UK fintechs should 
build their operational risk management system to control costs for better EPS 
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performance. 
Similarly, besides interpreting variables, we looked at the R2 for our EPS models. 
R2(within) shows a 31% variation within one traditional banks over time and a 55% 
variation within one fintech over time. R2(between) shows 42% variation between 
traditional banks and 60% variation between fintechs. R2(overall) shows 23% for 
traditional banks and 45% for fintechs. We could find out that fintechs have higher R2s, 
which indicate higher variation was presented in fintechs. 
In general, the estimates from panel data regression models provided consistent results 
for the UK traditional banks and fintechs. Differences also existed between the UK 
traditional banks and fintechs. Similar to the results from China, the first difference is 
showed in credit risk. Although all credit risk variables show negative impacts on all 
three dependent variables, the impact level is different. It shows a higher level of impact 
on fintechs than traditional banks. This result shows the importance of credit risk 
management for fintechs. With the comparisons showed in Section 4.3.1, we see that 
the UK traditional banks improved their credit risk management efficiency during the 
investigated time period. Thus, fintechs should learn from traditional banks' experience 
to more efficiently manage credits risk in the future. The second difference is market 
risk. Based on the dependent variables, VaR shows a different impact direction for both 
traditional banks and fintechs. This is due to the complexity of market movements. 
Thus, both types of banks should monitor market changes and find a balanced point of 
VaR to receive better performance. 
Thirdly, BVC has a negative impact on the UK traditional banks’ ROA, while it 
positively influenced the UK fintechs performance. The possible reason for this could 
be that UK traditional banks did not develop their brand value much during the 
investigated time period, while fintechs increased their brand value continuously. The 
final difference is ln(asset). It has a positive influence on fintechs, but it has a slightly 
negative impact on ROE for the UK traditional banks, whereas it has a significant 
positive impact on ROA and EPS for the UK traditional banks. The reason for the 
negative impact exits should be similar to Chinese traditional banks. Traditional banks 
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have been established for a long time and have reached a relatively high assets level. 
Maintaining a safe level or reducing useless assets could help them perform better. Our 
results confirmed some previous studies (e.g., Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Berger & 
Humphrey, 1994), as asset increasing to a certain level, it will hurt bank performance. 
However, as the UK banks are not as large as Chinese traditional banks, ln(asset) does 
not have a significant impact on ROE. Thus, the UK traditional banks should maintain 
and increase their asset levels to receive better performance. 
Similar to the Chinese results, besides differences, the results also showed consistent 
results between types of bank. Firstly, reducing credit risks could help both types of 
banks increase their performance, given their negative impacts. Secondly, both types of 
banks should follow the legal requirements to increase their liquidity and capital 
holding level and decrease their debt level. Based on their different significance level, 
managers should have different focuses depending on their bank type. Thirdly, because 
of the negative influence of operational risk variables, controlling operational issues 
and costs could increase performance for both types of banks. Finally, developing the 
bank's reputation could help both types of banks increase their performance. Therefore, 
for both traditional banks and fintechs, a better reputation, healthy liquidity conditions, 
efficient credit risk management, lower debt and cost levels and alertness to market 
movements could provide better performance in both returns and share market. 
4.3.7 GMM estimates for the UK 
Following section 4.2.7, this section will provide GMM to check if our results from the 
random-effects model are robust for UK banks. Similar to China, even though we called 
GMM a robustness checks for random-effects models, the results from GMM are as 
important as we got from random-effects. We will use and compare both approaches’ 
results (Random-effects and GMM) to build our discussion and conclusions. Tables 
4.26 to 4.28 GMM estimates for the impacts of risks on the bank performance (ROA, 




 Traditional banks Fintechs 
Intercept -0.0433 -0.0276 
One period lag of ROA 0.1427* 0.1348*** 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.0551** -0.0323 
Net Charge-off rate -0.1368 -0.5443*** 
Total loan loss ratio -0.1293* -0.2817*** 
Value at risk -0.0001** 0.0002* 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0005* 0.0045*** 
Current ratio 0.0056* 0.0150 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.0040** 0.0228** 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.0216* -0.0196 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0017 -0.0001** 
Brand value change % 0.0244*** 0.0034 
Operational risk % -0.0021 -0.0021*** 
Ln(Asset) 0.0128* 0.0028* 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.0220*** -0.0150*** 
F-test 502.3*** 108.1*** 
Sargan Test (p-value > 𝜒2) 43.3 (0.293) 31.4(0.300) 
AR(1) z =-3.56 
p-value = 0.00 
z = -2.9 
p-value = 0.00 
AR(2) z = -0.32 
p-value = 0.74 
z = -0.4 
p-value =0.68 
No. of Obs. 97 52 
Table 4.26 GMM estimation results (ROA, UK) 
Notes: *, **, ***represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model 
estimation. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 1 and 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
Firstly, ROA was selected as the dependent variable to establish two GMM estimates 
based on bank type. Similar to China, the F-statistics show the significance of the 
variables. The Sargan test shows that there is no evidence of over-identifying 
restrictions, and the Arellano-Bond test shows the consistency of our estimates for the 
independent variables.  
For the UK's traditional banks, firstly, the significant coefficient of the lagged ROA 
confirms the dynamic character of the model specification. 𝛿 takes a value of 0.14 
which suggests that the performance of the UK's traditional banks seems to persist. This 
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implies that the UK's traditional banks have a relatively competitive structure. This 
shows the higher competitiveness of the UK traditional banks than the Chinese 
traditional banks. 
Turning to the other independent variables, similar results are presented as shown in 
our random-effects panel data regression models. Firstly, the credit risk variables have 
negative impacts. This suggests that higher credit risks lead to poor performance. In 
details, NPL and LoanR also significantly negatively impact the ROA at 5% and 10% 
significance level. With regards to coefficient values, a 1% increase of the NPL will 
lead to 0.0551% of the ROA, where NCO and LoanR could lead to 0.1368% and 0.1293% 
representatively. Similar to random-effects models, LoanR shows its importance in 
credit risk management in both significance level and coefficient value. Thus, this 
suggests that managers should pay more attention to LoanR during credit risk 
management. Moreover, the values of the estimates are larger than were showed for 
Chinese traditional banks. This suggests that the UK traditional banks should be more 
concerned with these credit risk variables.  
With regards to market risk, VaR has a significant negative impact on ROA. This 
suggests that higher market risk could decrease the ROA performance of the UK 
traditional banks. The result is also similar to the results from random-effects estimates, 
which suggest that UK traditional banks should reduce or keep alert to the market risks.  
Next, with regards to the liquidity, capital and debt level variables, consistent results 
are shown compared with our random-effects panel data regression models. The 
positive relationship between liquidity and capital holding level and bank performance 
and the debt level variables is negatively related to bank performance. LCR, CR and 
T1 all show significant positive impacts on ROA with 10%, 10% and 5%, respectively. 
With regards to coefficient values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to a 0.0005% 
increase in ROA, where CR will lead to a 0.0056% increase and T1 will lead to a 0.004% 
increase. The results indicate that increasing the liquidity and capital holding level 
could increase their performance. For debt level variables, D/A is significant for ROA 
at the 10% level. With regards to coefficient values, a 1% increase in D/A will lead to 
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a 0.0216% decrease in ROA, where D/E will lead to a 0.0017% decrease in ROA. 
Similar to the results from random-effects, the GMM results suggest that a lower debt 
level could help banks to receive better performance. Managers should consider more 
on D/A with its higher significance level and coefficient value.  
With regards to the operational risk variables, similar to our panel data regression 
models, both variables negatively affect ROA. C/I shows a higher significant negative 
impact on the UK traditional banks at the 1% significance level. Based on the 
coefficient values, a 1% increase of ORP or C/I will lead to 0.0021% or 0.022% of 
changes in ROA. The higher significant level and coefficient value for the C/I than in 
China, which suggests that together with concerning themselves with their particular 
operational risks, UK traditional banks also need to increase their operational efficiency. 
In addition, a similar result is shown in the reputational risk variable. BVC shows a 
significant positive impact on ROA at a 1% significance level, where a 1% increase in 
BVC will lead to a 0.0244% increase in their ROA. This means that increasing 
reputation could help banks to increase ROA performance. Compared to China, as 
reputational risk variable shows a higher coefficient value and significance level, UK 
traditional banks need to be concerned more with their brand value when managing 
bank risks than Chinese traditional banks. 
Finally, with regards to bank size, it is significant and positive impacts on ROA at the 
10% significance level. A 1% increase in ln(asset) will lead to a 0.0128% increase in 
ROA. This result is consistent with the results obtained from our random-effects models.  
For UK fintechs, The F-statistics show the significance of the variables. The Sargan test 
shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. The AR tests show that the 
estimates of independent variables are consistent. With regard to lagged dependent 
variables, although it is not significant, the coefficient of the lagged ROA shows the 
dynamic character of the model specification. 𝛿 takes a value of approximately 0.13, 
which suggests that the performance of the UK fintechs seems to persist to a 
competitive market structure in ROA. However, it is lower than value showed in 
Chinese fintechs. This shows the higher competitiveness of Chinese fintechs than the 
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UK fintechs. 
Estimates for the independent variables show results for ROA consistent with our 
random-effects panel data regression models. Firstly, all credit risk variables have 
negative impacts and the coefficient values of these variables are larger than were 
obtained for traditional banks. Moreover, NCO and LoanR are significantly negatively 
impacting the ROA at the 1% significance level. In more detail, a 1% increase in NPL 
will lead to a 0.0323% decrease in ROA, NCO shows 0.5443% and LoanR shows 
0.2817%. This confirms that credit risk hurts bank performance as in traditional banks, 
but that fintechs should be more concerned with these credit risk variables, as these 
variables have higher coefficient values and significance levels. With regards to market 
risks, VaR shows a positive relationship with bank performance and is significant at the 
10% level for ROA. A 1% increase in VaR will lead to a 0.0002% increase in UK 
fintechs’ ROA. 
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, similar results are presented 
compared with results from random-effects models. Fintechs with a higher level of 
capital and liquidity holdings level and meet legal requirements for these variables 
could obtain better performance. In more detail, all three capital and liquidity variables 
positively impact the ROA. Only LCR and T1 have a 1% and 5% significantly impact, 
respectively. Based on coefficient values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to a 0.0228% 
positive change of ROA, where CR shows 0.015% and T1 shows 0.0432% positive 
changes to ROA. With regards to debt variables, the results show that both D/A and 
D/E have negative impact on UK fintechs’ ROA. In more detail, D/E shows its 
significance at the 5% level to the ROA. A 1% increase in D/A or D/E will lead to a 
0.0196% or 0.0001% decrease in ROA. This result is consistent with our random-
effects panel data regression models. Moreover, the results also present similar results 
on ROA compared with traditional banks’ results. This suggests that a lower debt level 
could help UK fintechs to achieve better performance. Thus, prioritising these variables 
in risk management based on their estimated values and significance could help 
managers achieve better efficiency and performance. 
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With regards to operational risk variables, both variables also show significant negative 
impact on ROA at the 1% significance level. A 1% change in ORP will lead to a 0.0021% 
decrease and C/I will lead to a 0.015% decrease in fintechs' ROA. Similar to GMM 
estimates shown in traditional banks, together with control over particular operational 
risks, UK fintechs also need to control their overall costs and increase their operational 
efficiency to obtain better performance. With regards to reputational risk variables, 
consistent results are shown compared with random-effects estimates for the UK 
fintechs and GMM estimates for the UK traditional banks. BVC also shows a positive 
impact on ROA, where a 1% increase in BVC will lead to a 0.0034% increase in ROA. 
Although it does not significantly impact the ROA, the manager still needs to keep 
fintech's brand value healthy, as increased reputation could help fintechs achieve better 
performance. Finally, similar to the random-effects estimates for ROA, there is 
evidence of a positive relationship between size and ROA performance. At the 10% of 
significance level, a 1% increase of fintechs' ln(asset) will lead to a 0.0028% increase 














 Traditional banks Fintechs 
Intercept 0.2661 0.6323 
One period lag of ROE 0.0246 0.0738* 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.9118** -1.3867* 
Net Charge-off rate -2.6493 -5.8154* 
Total loan loss ratio -1.4290*** -4.5436*** 
Value at risk -0.0005* 0.0026 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0075 0.0033*** 
Current ratio 0.1672 0.3108* 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.2011** 0.5045 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.1288** -0.1855* 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0202 -0.0003* 
Brand value change % 0.2119* 0.0774 
Operational risk % -0.0067 -0.0285* 
Ln(Asset) -0.0562* 0.0706* 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.3180*** -0.1966*** 
F-test 767.7*** 1198.6*** 
Sargan Test (p-value > 𝜒2) 49.8(0.115) 34.4(0.188) 
AR(1) z = -2.74 
p-value = 0.00 
z = -2.53 
p-value = 0.006 
AR(2) z = -0.54 
p-value = 0.58 
z = -0.12 
p-value = 0.90 
No. of Obs. 97 52 
Table 4.27 GMM estimation results (ROE, UK) 
Notes: *, **, ***represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model 
estimation. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 1 and 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
Besides ROA, GMM estimates for ROE also show consistent results compared with 
random-effects panel data regression estimations in Table 4.27. For traditional banks, 
similar to GMM for traditional banks in ROA, the F-statistics show the significance of 
the variables. The Sargan test shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. 
The AR tests show that the estimates of independent variables are consistent. For the 
lagged dependent variable, the significant coefficient of the lagged ROE confirms the 
dynamic character of the model specification. 𝛿  takes a value of 0.0246 when 
performance is measured by ROE. Although it is not significant, the result still could 
suggests that the performance of the UK's traditional banks seems to persist. This 
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implies that the UK's traditional banks have a relatively competitive structure. This 
shows the higher competitiveness of the UK traditional banks than the Chinese 
traditional banks. 
Turning to the other independent variables, the results here for the dependent variables 
are consistent with our random-effect panel data regression models. Firstly, credit risk 
variables have negative impacts. This suggests that higher credit risks lead to poor ROE 
for UK traditional banks. In details, NPL and LoanR significantly negatively impact 
the ROE at the 5% and 1% level. In these credit risk variables, the NCO has the largest 
coefficient number. A 1% increase of the NCO will lead to 2.6493% decrease of the 
ROE where NPL and LoanR could lead to 0.9118% and 1.429%, representatively. 
Similar to random-effects models, LoanR shows its importance in credit risk 
management based on the highest significance level and relatively higher coefficient 
value. With regards to market risk variables, VaR has a significant negative impact on 
ROE at the 10% significance level. However, the results from random-effects estimates 
show that VaR has a significant positive influence on ROE. As we tested, there is no 
endogeneity problem exist in our dataset, and the two coefficient values for VaR in 
Random-effects and GMM are closed. The difference showed here suggests that the 
UK traditional banks should be concerned more with market risks. Moreover, as the 
results for the other two dependent variables are consistent, the UK traditional banks 
should keep VaR at a reasonable level and reduce the risk if possible, to achieve better 
performance. 
Regarding the capital and liquidity risk variables, consistent results also show in GMM 
compared with random-effects. T1 has significant positive impacts on ROE with a 5% 
significance level, where a 1% increase in T1 will lead to a 0.2011% increase in ROE. 
For LCR and CR, a 1% increase in LCR or CR will lead to a 0.0075% or 0.1672% 
increase in traditional banks’ ROE. Even though LCR and CR do not appear significant 
in the ROE model, with its positive influence, managers should still keep LCR and CR 
pass the legal requirement and at a healthy level. The results show the importance of 
T1 for traditional banks. Thus, managers should follow the regulation requirements (e.g. 
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Basel Accords) and increasing the capital holding level could help banks increase their 
performance. We further notice that the debt level variables are negatively related to 
bank performance, where D/A shows its significance for ROE at the 5% level. In more 
detail, a 1% decrease in D/A will lead to a 0.1288% increase in ROE where D/E shows 
a 0.0202% influence in ROE. Similar to the results from random-effects, the GMM 
results suggest that a lower debt level could help banks receive better performance. 
Managers should consider more on D/A with its higher significance level and 
coefficient value. 
With regards to operational risk variables, GMM also provides results consistent with 
our random-effects panel data regression models. Both variables affect ROE negatively, 
where C/I is significant at the 1% level. Based on the coefficient values, a 1% increase 
of ORP or C/I will lead to 0.0067% or 0.318% decreases in ROE. Similar to the random-
effects for ROE in traditional banks, as coefficient value for C/I changes ROE more, 
together with its higher significance level, managers in UK traditional banks should be 
concerned more with overall operational risks. For reputational risk variables, BVC 
shows a significant and positive impact on ROE at the 10% significance, where a 1% 
increase in BVC will lead to a 0.2119% increase in their ROE. This suggests that 
increasing reputation could help banks increase ROE performance. Finally, the 
coefficient for bank size is significant and negatively impacts bank performance at the 
10% significance level for ROE. This result is consistent with Tan (2016), who also 
found a negative relationship between size and bank performance. Overall, similar to 
random-effects estimates, most of the coefficient values in ROE are around ten times 
larger than coefficient values in ROA. The possible reason could be that the ROE values 
are around ten times larger than ROA. The GMM further confirmed this result.  
For UK fintechs, The F-statistics show the significance of the variables. The Sargan test 
shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. The AR tests show that the 
estimates of independent variables are consistent. With regard to lagged dependent 
variables, the coefficient of the lagged ROE shows the dynamic character of the model 
specification. 𝛿  takes a value of approximately 0.0738, which suggests that the 
 173 
performance of the UK fintechs seems to near to a perfectly competitive market 
structure in ROE.  
Estimates for the independent variables show results for ROE consistent with our 
random-effects panel data regression models. Firstly, all credit risk variables have 
negative impacts and the coefficient values of these variables are larger than were 
obtained for traditional banks. Moreover, all three variables (NPL, NCO and LoanR) 
significantly negatively impact the ROE at 10%, 10% and 1% significance level. For 
coefficient values, a 1% increase in NPL will lead to a 1.3867% decrease in ROE, NCO 
shows 5.8154% and LoanR shows 4.5436%. We could see that the coefficient values 
are larger than they showed in traditional banks like random-effects models. This 
confirms that credit risk hurts bank performance as in traditional banks, but that fintechs 
should be more concerned with these credit risk variables. With regards to market risks, 
VaR shows a positive relationship with bank performance for ROE, where a 1% 
increase in VaR will lead to a 0.0026% increase in ROE.  
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, similar results are presented 
compared with results from random-effects models. Fintechs which have a higher level 
of capital and liquidity holdings level and meet legal requirements for these variables 
could obtain better performance. In more detail, all of them positively impact on ROE, 
LCR and CR show their positive impact at 1% and 5% significance level. Based on 
coefficient values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to a 0.0033% positive impact on 
ROE, where CR shows a 0.3108% and T1 shows a 0.5045% positive impact on ROE. 
With regards to debt variables, the results show that both D/A and D/E have negative 
impacts at the 10% significance level on ROE. This result is consistent with our 
random-effects panel data regression models and traditional banks’ results, which also 
presents the same results. With the coefficient values, a 1% increase in D/A will lead to 
a 0.1855% decrease in ROE, and a 1% increase in D/E will lead to a 0.0003% decrease 
in ROE. Thus, the importance of D/A is seen, which is proved by its higher coefficient 
value. This suggests that managers should consider more on D/A when managing risks.  
With regards to operational risk variables, both variables also show significantly 
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negative impacts on ROE, where the ORP shows a 10% significance level and C/I 
shows a 1% significance level. With regards to coefficient values, a 1% increase in ORP 
will lead to a 0.0285% negative change and C/I shows a 0.1966% negative impact. 
Similar to GMM estimates shown in fintechs’ ROA, together with control over 
particular operational risks, UK fintechs also need to control their overall costs and 
increase their operational efficiency to obtain better performance. With regards to 
reputational risk variables, consistent results are shown compared with random-effects 
estimates for Chinese fintechs and GMM estimates for UK traditional banks. BVC also 
shows a positive impact on ROE, which suggests that increased reputation could help 
fintechs achieve better performance.  
Finally, similar to the random-effects estimates for ROE, there is evidence of a positive 
relationship between size and ROE performance. At the 10% significance level, a 1% 
increase of fintechs' ln(asset) will lead to a 0.0706% increase of fintechs' ROE, which 
suggests that increasing size tends to result in better performance. In addition, similar 
to the results shown in random-effects estimates and unlike traditional banks, fintechs’ 
ROE coefficient values do not show ten times larger than fintechs’ ROA coefficient 
values. The possible reason could be that their ROA and ROE are not stable, as they are 












 Traditional banks Fintechs 
Intercept 0.4675 -2.0946 
One period lag of EPS 0.3522* 0.2714 
Non-performing loan ratio -1.8189** -5.1854* 
Net Charge-off rate -1.9284 -11.1896 
Total loan loss ratio -0.3169* -2.6007** 
Value at risk -0.0056* -0.0368** 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.1393* 0.0388 
Current ratio 0.2849 0.1149*** 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.6655** 0.5563* 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.2549* -0.7548 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.1732* -0.0013** 
Brand value change % 0.6290 0.0597* 
Operational risk % -0.1077** -0.9165*** 
Ln(Asset) 0.1378** 0.3571*** 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.0748* -0.5293*** 
F-test 787.2*** 308.0*** 
Sargan Test (p-value > 𝜒2) 39.1(0.465) 21.1(0.855) 
AR(1) z = -2.97 
p-value = 0.00 
z = -3.1 
p-value = 0.00 
AR(2) z = -0.52 
p-value = 0.60 
z = -0.65 
p-value = 0.52 
No. of Obs. 70 30 
Table 4.28 GMM estimation results (EPS, UK) 
Notes: *, **, ***represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model 
estimation. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 1 and 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
Finally, we are interested in observing whether the stock market's bank performance 
depends on managing different types of risks. The GMM estimates are applied to show 
coefficients and provide these results with EPS in Table 4.28.  
For traditional banks, similar to GMM for traditional banks in ROA and ROE, the F-
statistics show the significance of the variables, the Sargan test shows there is no 
evidence of over-identifying restrictions, and the AR tests show the estimates of 
independent variables are consistent. With regard to lagged dependent variables, 
although it is not significant, the coefficient of the lagged EPS shows the dynamic 
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character of the model specification. 𝛿 takes a value of 0.3522 when performance is 
measured by EPS. This result also suggests that UK traditional banks' performance 
seems to persist in a relatively competitive market structure in EPS. 
Turning to the other independent variables, the results here for the dependent variables 
are consistent with our random-effect panel data regression models. Firstly, credit risk 
variables have negative impacts on EPS. This suggests that higher credit risks lead to 
poor EPS for UK traditional banks. In details, NPL and LoanR significantly negatively 
impact the EPS at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. In these credit risk variables, the 
NCO has the largest coefficient number, a 1% increase of the NCO will lead to a 1.9284% 
decrease of the EPS where NPL and LoanR could lead to 1.8189% and 0.3169% 
decrease, representatively. Similar to random-effects models, NPL shows its 
importance in credit risk management based on the highest significance level together 
with its relatively high coefficient value. With regards to market risk variables, VaR has 
a significant negative impact on EPS at the 10% significance level which is similar to 
the results from random-effects estimates. Thus, in order to increase the bank's EPS, 
managers should control the VaR relatively low. 
Regarding the capital and liquidity risk variables, consistent results also show in GMM 
compared with random-effects that all three variables positively influence the bank 
performance. In more detail, LCR and T1 show their positive impact at 10% and 5% 
significance level. It is not the same to show in random-effects estimates where CR and 
T1 are significant at the 5% and 1% significance level. This suggests that the 
importance of T1 during capital risk management, as T1 shows its significance in both 
models. Based on coefficient values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to a 0.1393% 
increase of EPS, where CR shows a 0.2849% and T1 shows a 0.6655% increase of EPS. 
The results further indicate the importance of its higher coefficient value. Managers 
should follow the regulation requirements (e.g. Basel Accords) and increasing the 
capital holding level could help banks increase their performance. We further notice 
that the debt level variables are significantly negative related to EPS, where both of 
them are significant for EPS at the 10% level. In more detail, a 1% decrease in D/A will 
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lead to a 0.2549% increase in EPS where D/E shows 0.1732% influence in EPS. Similar 
to the results from random-effects, the GMM results suggest that a lower debt level 
could help banks to receive better performance.  
With regards to operational risk variables, GMM also provides results consistent with 
our random-effects panel data regression models. Both ORP and C/I affect EPS 
significantly and negatively at the 5% and 10% level. Based on the coefficient values, 
a 1% decrease of ORP or C/I will lead to a 0.1077% or 0.0748% increase in EPS. As 
both variables show their significance, managers in the UK traditional banks should 
control their operational risks during the business, especially in the stock market. For 
reputational risk variables, BVC shows a positive impact on EPS, where a 1% increase 
in BVC will lead to a 0.629% increase in their EPS. Although BVC is not significant 
in the EPS model, the result still suggests an increasing reputation could help bank 
increase EPS performance. Finally, the bank size significantly positive impacts bank 
performance at the 5% significant level for EPS. With a 1% increase in ln(asset), the 
UK traditional banks’ EPS will increase 0.1378%. 
For UK fintechs, The F-statistics show the significance of the variables. The Sargan test 
shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. The AR tests show that the 
estimates of independent variables are consistent. For the lagged dependent variable, 
the significant coefficient of the lagged EPS confirms the dynamic character of the 
model specification. 𝛿 takes a value of approximately 0.2714, which suggests that the 
performance of the UK fintechs seems to persist to a relatively competitive extent in 
EPS.  
Estimates for the independent variables show results for EPS consistent with our 
random-effects panel data regression models. Firstly, all credit risk variables have 
negative impacts and the coefficient values of these variables are larger than were 
obtained for traditional banks. In more detail, NPL and LoanR are significantly negative 
impacts on the EPS at 10% and 5% significance level. For coefficient values, a 1% 
increase in NPL will lead to a 5.1854% decrease in EPS, NCO shows a 11.1896% and 
LoanR shows a 2.6007% decrease in EPS. We could see that the coefficient values are 
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larger than they showed in traditional banks like random-effects models. This confirms 
that credit risk hurts bank performance as in traditional banks, but that fintechs should 
be more concerned with these credit risk variables. With regards to market risks, VaR 
shows a significantly negative relationship with EPS at the 5% level, where a 1% 
decrease in VaR will lead to a 0.0368% increase in EPS. In addition, fintechs are more 
related to other markets and have a smaller market scale than UK traditional banks. 
Thus, they should take more care about market risks with their relatively weak market 
position in the financial system, especially in the stock market.  
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, similar results are presented 
compared with results from random-effects models. Fintechs which have a higher level 
of capital and liquidity holdings level and meet legal requirements for these variables 
could obtain better performance. All of them positively impact the EPS, where CR and 
T1 show their significance at the 1% and 10% significance level. Based on coefficient 
values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to a 0.0338% positive change of EPS, where 
CR shows a 0.1149% and T1 shows a 0.5563% positive change to EPS. With regards 
to debt variables, the results show that both D/A and D/E have negative impacts on EPS, 
where D/E has a significant negative impact on EPS at the 5% significance level. This 
result is consistent with our random-effects panel data regression models, which also 
presents the same results that D/E has a higher significance level than D/A. With the 
coefficient values, a 1% increase in D/A will lead to a 0.7548% decrease in EPS, and a 
1% increase in D/E will lead to a 0.0013% decrease in EPS. Thus, the importance of 
D/E is seen, which is proved by its higher significance level. This suggests that 
managers should consider more on D/E when managing debt level risks.  
With regards to operational risk variables, both variables also show significantly 
negative impacts on EPS at the 1% level, where a 1% increase in ORP will lead to a 
0.9165% decrease and C/I shows a 0.5293% negative impact. Similar to GMM 
estimates shown in fintechs’ ROA and ROE, together with control over particular 
operational risks, managers also need to control their overall costs and increase their 
operational efficiency to obtain better performance. With regards to reputational risk 
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variables, consistent results are shown compared with random-effects estimates and 
GMM estimates for both types of banks. BVC also shows a significant positive impact 
on EPS at the 10% significance level which suggests that every 1% increase in BVC 
could help fintechs achieve a 0.0597% increase in EPS performance. Finally, similar to 
the random-effects estimates for EPS, there is evidence of a positive relationship 
between size and EPS performance. At the 1% of significance level, a 1% increase of 
fintechs' ln(asset) will lead to a 0.3571% increase of fintechs' EPS, which suggests that 
increasing size tends to result in better performance.  
In summary, Similar to China, the F-statistics show the significance of the variables. 
The Sargan test shows no evidence of over-identifying restrictions, and the Arellano-
Bond test shows the consistency of our estimates for the independent variables. 
For the UK's traditional banks, firstly, the significant coefficient of the lagged 
performance variables (ROA and EPS) confirms the dynamic character of the model 
specification. It suggests that the performance of the UK's traditional banks seems to 
persist. This implies that the UK's traditional banks have a relatively competitive 
structure. This shows the higher competitiveness of the UK traditional banks than the 
Chinese traditional banks. 
For other independent variables, similar results are presented as shown in our random-
effects panel data regression models. Firstly, the credit risk variables have negative 
impacts. This suggests that higher credit risks lead to poor performance. Moreover, 
NCO is not significant for any of the three dependent variables, which does not prove 
that the NCO is not important in credit risk management, but only shows the other two 
variables are more influential, and that NCO is not the key variable in credit risk 
management. Moreover, the values of the estimates are larger than were showed for 
Chinese traditional banks. This suggests that the UK traditional banks should be more 
concerned with these credit risk variables. 
With regards to market risk (VaR), VaR has a significant negative impact on all three 
bank performance variables. This suggests that higher market risk could decrease the 
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performance of the UK's traditional banks. However, it shows a significant positive 
impact on ROE in the panel data regression models. As we tested that there is no 
endogeneity problem in the dataset, the difference here suggests that the UK traditional 
banks should be concerned more with market risks. As the results for the other two 
dependent variables are consistent, the UK traditional banks should keep VaR at a 
reasonable level and reduce the risk if possible, to achieve better performance. Next, 
with regards to the liquidity, capital and debt level variables, consistent results are 
shown compared with our random-effects panel data regression models. The positive 
relationship between liquidity and capital holding level and bank performance and the 
debt level variables is negatively related to bank performance. This suggests that in 
order to achieve a better performance, the UK traditional banks should increase their 
liquidity and capital holding level, and reduce their debt level. Moreover, managers 
should consider their different significant levels when managing this type of risk and 
prioritise them to achieve a better performance. 
With regards to the operational risk variables, similar to our panel data regression 
models, C/I shows a higher significant impact on the UK traditional banks than in China. 
This suggests that together with concerning themselves with their particular operational 
risks, UK traditional banks also need to increase their operational efficiency. In addition, 
a similar result is shown in the reputational risk variable. BVC shows a positive impact 
on bank performance, which means that increasing reputation could increase bank 
performance. As BVC is significant for ROA and ROE at the 1% and 10% levels, 
respectively. The importance of bank reputation is shown, and similar to China, UK 
traditional banks need to be concerned with reputation when managing bank risks. 
Finally, regarding bank size, the coefficient of bank size is significant and negatively 
impacts ROE but positively on ROA and EPS. This result is consistent with the results 
obtained from our panel data regression models. With its significance for all three 
performance variables, UK traditional banks need to maintain their asset levels and find 
a balanced point to achieve better performance.  
For the UK fintechs, the significant coefficient of the lagged performance variables 
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(ROA and ROE) confirms the dynamic character of the model specification. It suggests 
that the performance of the UK's fintechs seems to persist, and shows that they have a 
relatively competitive structure. Similar to the UK traditional banks, the 
competitiveness of fintechs in the UK is also higher than in China. 
For other independent variables, consistent results are presented with our panel data 
regression models. Firstly, all credit risk variables have negative impacts, and at least 
two of them are significant. In particular, LoanR shows its significance for all three 
dependent variables. Managers, therefore, need to consider it more when managing 
credit risks. Moreover, the values of estimates are larger than was shown in traditional 
banks. This confirms that higher credit risks would reduce bank performance, and that 
fintechs should be more concerned about these credit risk variables than traditional 
banks. With regards to market risks, VaR shows results consistent with our panel data 
regression models. Unlike Chinese fintechs, there is a positive relationship between 
VaR and ROA and ROE and a negative relationship between VaR and EPS. This shows 
the complexity of market movements and the higher impact of market risk in the UK. 
Thus, UK fintechs should monitor market changes and find a balanced point of VaR to 
achieve better performance.  
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, similar results are obtained. 
Fintechs which have a higher level of capital and meet legal requirements in liquidity 
and capital holding level could achieve better performance. With regards to debt level 
variables, both of them show a negative relationship with bank performance. This 
suggests that a lower debt level could help UK fintechs to achieve a better performance. 
Thus, prioritising these variables in risk management based on their estimated values 
and significance could help managers achieve better efficiency and performance. With 
regards to operational risk variables, similar to the findings from the panel data 
regression models, the UK fintechs should be concerned to control particular 
operational risks and overall costs which could help them increase their operational 
efficiency and achieve a better performance. Concerning the reputational risk variables, 
BVC shows a positive impact on performance, which suggests that increased reputation 
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could help fintechs reach better performance. However, as BVC is only significant for 
EPS at the 10% level, this suggests that BVC could influence bank performance but is 
not as a critical variable. Finally, similar to the Chinese fintechs, there is evidence of a 
positive relationship between size and performance, which suggest that increasing size 
tends to lead to better performance.  
4.3.8 Summary 
This section analysed 22 UK banks and listed them as two types (11 traditional banks 
and 11 fintechs). Firstly, we applied figure comparisons between the traditional banks 
and fintechs. Then, descriptive statistics, stationarity, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and endogeneity tests were presented and analysed. At last, by using 
ROA, ROE, and EPS as dependent variables, we employed panel data regression 
models and GMM to study the impact of different types of risks on both types of banks' 
performance. Moreover, as we used random-effects estimates to build a generalised 
model for the dataset. We did not need to add time- or individual- influence factors in 
the analysis, as they already be analysed through R2. 
The overall conclusions were consistent with the Chinese analysis, which was that 
improving different bank risk management could help the UK banks achieve more 
successful performance. Prioritising these risks could be a possible solution. For 
traditional banks, more attention should be paid to capital and liquidity risk, than to 
operational risks, credit risks and market risks. Meanwhile, the UK traditional banks 
should keep their size and reputation at a safe level. Fintechs, on the other hand, need 
to be more concerned about their credit risk, then pay attention to liquidity and capital 
risk and operational risk to an equal degree. Also, they must stay alert to market 
movements and then improve their asset level and reputation. Based on the findings in 
this section, managers of traditional banks and fintechs could use these estimates to 
manage different types of risks and use historical data to estimate future performance. 
Therefore, managers could know the influence level of different types of risks and 
variables by prioritising these risks. They could further provide a more efficient strategy 
when managing risks. In addition, managers could estimate their future performance 
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through our models and set risk management targets. Moreover, through our models, 
managers could better understand their competitors, which could help them avoid some 
mistakes or improve some advantages through management.  
At the same time, investors and shareholders in the UK could also benefit from our 
models. By finding the relevant variables from banks/fintechs official website or any 
legal ways, investors and shareholders can receive different results based on the bank 
type. This could help them know if a bank/fintech develops or which bank/fintech is 
better to invest in these days. Similarly, policymakers and governments in the UK could 
also benefit from our models. Instead of investing in banks/fintechs, they can find 
banks/fintechs perform better or worse than others which can help them keep their eyes 
on these banks/fintechs and support or shut down these banks/fintechs. Moreover, 
through our models, policymakers and governments can understand the general 
situation for different bank types, which can help them make more targeted regulatory 
requirements based on bank type. More discussion could be found in Chapter 6. 
Differences and similarities were listed for the UK traditional banks and fintechs, as 
well as general similarities and difference between the UK banks and Chinese banks. 
Based on the process in this section, the following section applies our analysis to the 
Australia dataset. 
4.4  Data analysis, results and discussion for Australia 
In the previous sections, the risks influencing China and the UK banks' performance 
were identified for traditional banks and challenger banks/fintechs. In order to have a 
comprehensive result, this thesis will also present results for Australia following the 
same pattern as China and the UK. Similarly to Sections 4.2 and 4.3, this section also 
organised as follows: 1. Figure comparisons; 2 Descriptive statistics; 3. Panel-data unit-
root tests (Fisher's type); 4. Correlation matrix and variance influence factors (VIF); 5. 
White’s test, F-test, Lagrange Multiplier Test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test; 6. 
Panel data regression models (random-effects type); 7. GMM estimates; 8. Summary. 
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4.4.1 Comparisons between Australian traditional banks and fintechs 
Comparisons between Australian traditional banks and fintechs for bank performance 
and risk management are presented in Figures 4.15 to 4.21. Figure 4.15 shows all three 
performance variables for the Australian traditional banks and fintechs. With regards to 
ROA, similar to the profitable situation of Chinese traditional banks, the whole sample 
of Australian traditional banks achieved a positive ROA. Moreover, Australian 
traditional banks showed signs of stability with a slightly decreasing trend. With a 
similar range to Chinese traditional banks, the overall ROA performance showed 
similar results to Chinese traditional banks. At the same time, as there was no negative 
ratio of ROA, suggesting a better ROA performance than the UK traditional banks. On 
the other hand, for fintechs, ROA presented a similar situation to China and the UK 
fintechs. Some of the fintechs started with negative values and increased over the years 
to reach positive values. Some of them performed with a stable trend to keep their 
operations smooth. Even though volatility existed in ROA, the general trend was of 
growth for Australian fintechs. Similar to results in China and the UK, the ROE of 
Australian banks presented a similar trend to ROA.  
With regards to EPS, Figure 4.15 only presented traditional banks/fintechs, which 
already joined the share market. Most Australian traditional banks presented a stable 
trend, and some had signs of a slightly increasing trend with volatility. Moreover, most 
of the EPS values stayed positive, which indicates a profit-making operation for 
Australian traditional banks. With higher values and more positive earnings, the EPS 
performance of Australian traditional banks showed a relatively better situation than 
the other two countries. For fintechs, as more fintechs joined the share market in 
Australia than China and the UK, Australian fintechs provided a better view of fintechs' 
performance in the share market. Generally, the overall performance stayed at an 
acceptable level. Most of the fintechs showed a smooth trend, and others showed a 
volatile trend. In addition, we could see that there are outliers for fintechs' ROA and 
ROE. Indeed, these points have much lower values than others. This suggests that in 
the infant stage of fintechs operations, these fintechs could have negative returns at 
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different levels, but after this stage, they survived and began to have positive returns. 
Therefore, authorities could give fintechs chances even support them pass this stage. 




Figure 4. 15 Bank performance comparisons (Australia) 
With regards to credit risk variables, most values of the three variables showed signs of 
stabilising trends for Australian traditional banks. However, some of them had a trend 
of slightly increasing during the investigated time period. This result suggests that 
Australian traditional banks have effective credit risk management. However, the result 
also suggests that efficiency might be reduced during these years. Moreover, Australian 
traditional banks had a lower value of maximum credit risk level compared with 
Chinese traditional banks. This also suggested that Australian traditional banks had 
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smooth credit risk management during the investigated time period.  
For fintechs, on the other hand, an increasing trend was shown clearly in all three credit 
risk variables. A similar reason could be applied as for the Chinese fintechs, which was 
that Australian fintechs had less choice with customers and the traditional banks were 
experienced in dealing with credit risk management. Moreover, extreme values existed 
in these credit risk variables, as shown in the UK. The outlier suggests that the credit 
risks are high at the end of 2015 for ChangeFinance. After this stage, the figure shows 
that ChangeFinance reduces its credit risk levels to the average. Thus, this situation is 
acceptable. Moreover, this suggests that we should give the fintechs more time to show 
their management ability. In addition, it still indicates that fintechs in Australia had 
worse performance in credit risk management than traditional banks. It also indicates, 
similar to the UK, that Australian fintechs performed relatively worse than Chinese 
fintechs in credit risk management. 






Figure 4.16 Credit risk variables comparisons (Australia) 
With regards to market risk, VaR values in Australia showed a smaller range than in 
China and the UK. As the range of VaR in both types had a similar limit value, this 
showed that the market influence was relatively stable for the whole banking industry. 
Australian banks had less potential losses in the market and that the market influence 
was concentrated. Similar to China, Australia suffered less influence from the 2007-09 
financial crisis (Docherty & Viort, 2014). With fewer impacts of market risks on 
Australian traditional banks, they operated with earning profits over decades. In 
addition, as the scale of fintechs was much less than traditional banks, a similar impact 
factor would lead to worse consequences. Fintechs might suffer more from market risks. 
Traditional banks Fintechs 
 
 
Figure 4.17 Market risk variable comparisons (Australia) 
With regards to capital and liquidity risk, LCR, CR and T1 had a similar stable trend 
and passed the legal requirements of the Basel Accords, which shows that the liquidity 
and capital condition of the Australian traditional banks were smooth. However, unlike 
the other two countries, the liquidity and capital holding levels were not increased much 
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during the investigated time period. This situation shows that Australian traditional 
banks have not prepared enough capital or liquidity for a future financial crisis like the 
other two countries, which might cause serious consequences when a crisis happens. 
On the other hand, LCR, CR and T1 had a similar increasing trend which shows that 
the liquidity and capital condition of Australian fintechs were developed. This result 
indicates a relatively better performance of fintechs than traditional banks, but not as 
good as the other two countries. However, not all of the Australian fintechs met the 
Basel requirement for T1. Therefore, these fintechs need to operate more carefully and 
try to add more tier one capital in the future. If they cannot meet the requirement, they 
have not enough capital to prevent their possible bankruptcy. Moreover, there is an 
outlier of LCR, CR and T1 in the Australian fintechs in Figure 4.18. It can be observed 
that the outlier has a much high value than other fintechs' data. The reason to explain 
this situation could be that the outlier fintech receives liquidity and capital investment 
during that period. As the outlier fintech still stays in the absorbing investment stage, 
the situation is acceptable. However, this situation should be temporary. If the fintech 
keep has too much liquidity and capital, the authority should investigate this fintech to 
find the reason. 
With regards to debt level variables, similar to Chinese traditional banks, Australian 
traditional banks had a stable trend for both D/A and D/E. This result indicates that 
Australian traditional banks controlled their debt level. On the other hand, the fintechs' 
D/A showed a different situation compared with Chinese and UK fintechs. The D/A 
values are volatile between fintechs. Generally speaking, Australian fintechs controlled 
their D/A with an overall stable trend. With regards to D/E, some of them showed 
negative values, like the Chinese fintechs, which had a negative net value situation. 
Moreover, there is an outlier in the Australian fintechs' figure. It shows a much higher 
D/E than others which proved its high debt level at the end of 2015. Because the outlier 
is the first point of the data entity, the possible reason could be that the fintech has low 
equity at the begging stage. As the D/E drops to the average values, this situation is 
accepted with a reducing trend with its development. Thus, Australian fintechs retain 
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in a relatively high-risk situation, and they need to reduce their debt levels. 








Figure 4.18 Liquidity and capital risk variable comparisons (Australia) 
With regards to BVC, similar to the UK, the Australian traditional banks showed a 
volatile BVC, even though they had relatively good profitability during these years. 
Thus, traditional banks developed their reputation at a limited level. Australian fintechs 
also developed their reputation at a limited level. Thus, fintechs in Australia should 
learn from the other two countries to increase their reputations to attract more investors 
and customers. However, there is an outlier in the Australian fintechs' figure. It showed 
that in the middle of 2015, ChangeFinance increased its brand value much higher than 
other fintechs. As most Australian fintechs' BVC has a stable trend around zero, they 
need to increase their brand value to catch up with other countries. 
Traditional banks Fintechs 
  
Figure 4.19 Reputational risk variable comparisons (Australia) 
With regards to ORP, most Australian traditional banks stayed at a reasonable level, 
which was similar to Chinese traditional banks. In more detail, most of the ORP values 
were under 10%, which met the Basel requirement. However, similar to the UK, values 
over 15% exist, which indicates that bank costs were too high to cover the loss of 
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occurring operational risks and might cause severe consequences for bank operations. 
In addition, ORP showed signs of slightly increasing trends for Australian fintechs. This 
result indicates that operational risks might influence future performance. Managers of 
traditional banks should be concerned by and reduce operational risks and costs. With 
regards to C/I, Australian traditional banks showed better performance than the UK 
with no values over 100%. However, as Chinese traditional banks had a lower range of 
values (45%), Chinese traditional banks had the best efficiency in operations of the 
three countries. Thus, this result shows that the operational efficiency of Australian 
traditional banks performed stables but needs to be further controlled. 
Similar to the traditional banks, most of the ORP values for the Australian fintechs 
stayed at a reasonable level of less than 15%. However, similar to fintechs in the other 
two countries, extreme values exist. Two extreme examples are Ondeck and Novatti 
Group. Both of them have over 60% ORP values. As the values dropped to the average 
level after the outlier showed, this suggests that managers in these fintechs solved the 
problem and avoid high ORP keep occurring. However, as values over 15% exist, it 
suggests that these fintechs were in trouble with high costs to solve operational risk 
issues. Similar to fintechs in China and the UK, some of the Australian fintechs had 
over 100% C/I values, which suggested the cost of operation was higher than their 
income. This indicates the poor efficiency of these fintechs. Thus, both traditional banks 
and fintechs in Australia provided relatively poor performance in operational risk 
management. 




Figure 4.20 Operational risk variable comparisons (Australia) 
Figure 4.21 shows the natural logarithm of the assets. Similar to the UK, the traditional 
banks of Australia had a stable trend which showed that they kept their asset during 
operations. Fintechs, on the other hand, had increased trends for their assets. This 
indicates their development during the investigated time period.  
Traditional banks Fintechs 
  
Figure 4.21 Bank size comparison (Australia) 
In general, similar to Chinese banks, Australian banks performed relatively well during 
these years. However, both traditional banks and fintechs had shown signs of increasing 
trends in risk variables. Thus, Australian banks need to pay attention to risk 
management and be ready to react to future crises. If they failed to do so, serious trouble 
might appear during future financial crises. 
4.4.2 Descriptive statistics  
Tables 4.29 and 4.30 provide descriptive statistics for performance variables and risk 
variables based on types of bank. With regards to performance, the average ROA value 
was 0.8% for traditional banks, but -41.7% for fintechs, which suggests a worse than 
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average performance than China. Moreover, for traditional banks, as no negative values 
existed in ROA, this shows that Australian traditional banks have a better performance 
than the UK. In addition, as fintechs in all three countries had a negative average value 
for ROA, this shows that fintechs did not make a profit on average. A similar situation 
happened with the average value of ROE. These results confirm the analysis from our 
figure comparisons above. With regards to EPS, the average EPS of traditional banks 
was $1.0938. This suggests that Australian traditional banks had better performance 
than China and the UK. For fintechs, Australian fintechs performed worse during the 
investigated time period than the other two countries with a -$0.05 average value. This 
suggests that Australian fintechs had relatively worse performance than excepted. 
With respects to credit risk management variables, the average value of NPL was 0.82% 
in traditional banks, which stayed at a low level and was lower than traditional banks 
in China and the UK. NCO and LoanR were in a similar situation for Australian 
traditional banks. This suggests that, on average, Australian traditional banks had 
effective credit risk management. Fintechs had higher rate values than shown in 
Chinese fintechs. For example, the average value of NPL was 3.25%, which was higher 
than the average value of NPL in Chinese fintechs (2.2%). However, because of the 
results seen in Figure 4.16, both traditional banks and fintechs in Australia showed signs 
of increasing trends in credit risk variables. Thus, both types of banks need to check 
their credit activities and reduce risk values carefully.  
Similar to China, the last financial crisis had limited impacts on the Australian banking 
industry. Reflecting on the market risks, VaR showed a similar risk level (the average 
value was 7.5952 for traditional banks and 6.8 for fintechs) as Chinese banks and a 
lower level than UK banks. The results showed that the Australian bank market was 
relatively stable, which provided good conditions for bank development. However, with 
a lower level of the market share that fintechs had, the impact of market risks will be 
more influential in fintechs. 
Under liquidity and capital risk variables, traditional banks showed results that passed 
the Basel requirements on the average value, which was similar to traditional banks in 
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China and the UK. Moreover, because all traditional banks in Australia passed the 100% 
LCR value after 2015, this suggests that Australian traditional banks had a better 
liquidity situation than traditional banks in the other countries during the investigated 
time period. With regards to debt levels, Australian traditional banks provided higher 
average values in D/A and D/E than traditional banks in China. This suggests that there 
was room for improvement in traditional bank debt levels. For Australian fintechs, the 
average values of the liquidity and capital variables passed the Basel requirements. 
However, some of the fintechs did not meet the T1 requirement. For example, the 
minimum value of T1 was 1.36%. Moreover, the average values of D/A and D/E were 
lower than Chinese fintechs. This suggests that a relatively better debt situation for 
Australian fintechs. However, as negative D/E values existed (the minimum is -1.22), 
this indicates that negative equity existed in fintechs, which should be unacceptable. 
Therefore, regulators need to be more concerned about the fintechs which had negative 
values, monitoring their performance if they still perform poorly, and investigations 
should be applied to these fintechs. 
For reputational risk variables, Tables 4.28 and 4.29 confirm the results shown in Figure 
4.19. On average, traditional banks kept their brand value with a 2.1% average value, 
and fintechs developed their brand value with a 67.1% average value during the 
investigated time period. In addition, both traditional banks and fintechs in Australia 
had a lower average value in ln(asset) than in the UK, which suggests that they have a 
smaller size.  
With regards to operational risk variables, ORP for the Australian traditional banks 
showed a higher average value of 5.19% than China (2.4%). This result suggests that 
traditional banks in Australia should learn from China to improve operational risk 
management efficiency. ORP for Australian fintechs showed a lower average value of 
7.75% than the other two countries (China with 406%, 5.19% without extreme values 
and the UK with 11.38%). The Australian fintechs performed relatively better than 
fintechs in China and the UK. However, the average ORP value of the fintechs was still 
higher than traditional banks. This suggests that fintechs need to reduce operational risk 
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issues to prevent future disasters. Moreover, in three countries, Australian traditional 
banks had a middle position with respects to their C/I average value, where the average 
value was 55.16% for Australia, 27.67% for China and 65.68% for the UK. This 
suggests that Australian traditional banks had a lower operational efficiency than 
Chinese traditional banks but a higher operational efficiency than the UK ones. For 
fintechs, the average C/I was 120%, which suggests that the operational efficiency is 
low. Similar to the other two countries, fintechs had poor operational efficiency as their 
costs were higher than their income. Thus, they need to cut their costs or improve their 
incomes to achieve higher efficiency. 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Return on asset 0.0080 0.0029 0.0170 0.0004 
Return on equity 0.1177 0.0363 0.1880 0.0046 
Earnings per share 1.0938 1.0029 4.143 -0.1100 
Non-performing loan ratio 0.0082 0.0049 0.0180 0.0015 
Net Charge-off rate 0.0075 0.0100 0.0600 0.0001 
Total loan loss ratio 0.0245 0.0179 0.0812 0.0034 
Value at risk 7.5952 6.2850 34.000 0.2100 
Liquidity coverage ratio 1.1776 0.1290 1.7440 0.8700 
Current ratio 1.0780 0.0294 1.1747 1.0408 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.1075 0.0175 0.1560 0.0730 
Debt-to-Asset ratio 0.3951 0.2356 0.9139 0.0780 
Debt-to-Equity ratio 5.9784 4.4063 23.3136 1.0438 
Brand value change % 0.0210 0.0473 0.1580 -0.1185 
Operational risk % 0.0519 0.0236 0.1730 0.0010 
Ln(Asset) 11.5428 1.7751 13.7730 7.9990 
Cost-to-Income ratio 0.5516 0.1463 0.8955 0.3500 
Observations 95 











Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Return on asset -0.4170 0.5285 0.1112 -2.5870 
Return on equity -0.8127 1.1919 0.1580 -7.0545 
Earnings per share -0.0503 0.0929 0.1300 -0.4400 
Non-performing loan ratio 0.0325 0.0316 0.2353 0.0010 
Net Charge-off rate 0.0193 0.0159 0.0600 0.0010 
Total loan loss ratio 0.0587 0.0376 0.2497 0.1280 
Value at risk 6.7337 4.1363 21.0000 0.0500 
Liquidity coverage ratio 2.8222 3.7302 22.5700 0.9000 
Current ratio 3.7848 4.1370 22.8200 0.7200 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.1148 0.1056 0.5812 0.0136 
Debt-to-Asset ratio 0.3849 0.2552 0.9010 0.0215 
Debt-to-Equity ratio 1.3223 4.9327 43.1517 -1.2200 
Brand value change % 0.6713 1.8021 12.4690 -0.6680 
Operational risk % 0.0775 0.1074 0.6940 0.0030 
Ln(Asset) 3.1775 1.5780 6.0490 -1.897 
Cost-to-Income ratio 1.2041 1.0010 5.1700 0.193 
Observations 82 
Table 4.30 Descriptive statistics (Australian challenger banks/fintechs) 
Notes: Not all Australian traditional banks are listed, observations are 81 for EPS 
Not all Australian challenger banks/fintechs are listed, observations are 72 for EPS. 
Through examining the descriptive statistics, we conclude that Australian traditional 
banks’ performance and risk management were relatively better than fintechs. However, 
both types of banks had higher risk potential, which might cause problems with their 
future performance. Thus, they were valuable to investigate to help them improve their 
performance in the future. 
4.4.3 Panel data unit root test 
Similar to China and UK, before applying the regression model, we apply a unit root 
test for panel data to test the stationarity of the data set at first. In more detail, Fisher-
type unit root tests were implemented based on ADF tests to test the stationarity of the 
data. The null and alternative hypotheses are H0 is that the data are non-stationary or 
have unit roots, and H1 that the data are stationary or do not have unit roots. The results 
of the unit root based on bank type are shown in Table 4.31. The results show that all 
variables are stationary at the 1% level of significance. The null hypothesis for the 
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variables is rejected, indicating that there is no evidence of unit root and the data are 
stationary. 
 Traditional banks Challenger banks/fintechs 
Variable Statistics P-value Statistics P-value 
ROA 55.49 0.000 113.85 0.000 
ROE 52.85 0.000 101.22 0.000 
EPS 51.18 0.000 55.44 0.000 
NPL 43.36 0.000 95.68 0.000 
NCO 68.12 0.000 90.20 0.000 
LoanR 61.30 0.000 96.29 0.000 
VaR 53.48 0.000 95.21 0.000 
LCR 45.78 0.000 85.98 0.000 
CR 73.26 0.000 74.35 0.000 
T1 45.97 0.000 81.20 0.000 
D/A 44.57 0.000 79.93 0.000 
D/E 53.60 0.000 75.76 0.000 
BVC 67.47 0.000 82.56 0.000 
ORP 58.70 0.000 84.84 0.000 
Ln(Asset) 79.85 0.000 78.00 0.000 
C/I 47.79 0.000 85.45 0.000 
Table 4.31 Fisher’s type unit root tests (Australia) 
4.4.4 Correlation matrix and variance inflation factors 
Tables 4.32 and 4.33 show the correlations of the explanatory variables for Australian 
banks based on bank types. Similar to the results from China and the UK, there was no 
two variables that had a correlation coefficient over 0.8. Thus, no multicollinearity 
problem exists. However, we could also see that there is some relatively high 
correlations (close to and over 0.7) that exist between independent variables in matrices 
showed above. Thus, we apply VIF for our dataset to double-check for multicollinearity 
problems. Table 4.34 presents the VIFs for all variables based on types of banks. Smilar 
to China and the UK, some variables show a relatively high VIF, which indicates their 
higher interaction with other independent variables, such as ln(asset)for traditional 
banks and D/A for fintechs. This indicates the importance of asset management for 
Australian traditional banks and debt management for Australian fintechs. As all VIFs 
are below 10, the results double-check the correlation matrix results and indicate that 
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there are no issues of multiple correlation in this study. 
 
Table 4. 32 Cross correlation matrix (Australian traditional banks) 
 





Variable Traditional banks Challenger banks/fintechs 
NPL 2.585 3.248 
NCO 4.246 4.574 
LoanR 4.445 4.571 
VaR 2.975 1.458 
LCR 1.324 4.106 
CR 4.317 4.387 
T1 2.593 1.697 
D/A 4.248 4.881 
D/E 4.421 3.424 
BVC 1.308 1.216 
ORP 2.070 1.432 
Ln(Asset) 4.940 1.473 
C/I 3.266 1.418 
Table 4.34 Variance inflation factors (Australia) 
4.4.5 Tests for heteroscedasticity, endogeneity and model determination 
Similar to China and UK, we tested heteroscedasticity for Australia, White’s general 
heteroscedasticity test is employed and the results are shown in Table 4.35. The results 
of White’s test show that heteroscedasticity is present. Since heteroscedasticity causes 
standard errors to be biased, after finding the proper static panel model, we used robust 
standard errors. 




Traditional banks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Fintechs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 4.35 Tests for heteroscedasticity 
Moreover, we tested the endogeneity of the Australia dataset through the DWH test. 
Table 4.36 show that we could not reject the null hypothesis (H0: there is no endogeneity 
exist, and random-effects is more appropriate), we could see that there is no 
endogeneity problem for this study. Moreover, as mentioned in Section 4.2.5 and 
Section 4.3.5, we need to apply three tests to find the most appropriate approach to 
obtain our panel regression results. Table 4.36 shows the p-values of this test for the 
Australia dataset. The results show that we need to reject the null hypothesis of the F 
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test and Lagrange Multiplier test (H0: the pooled OLS is more appropriate). This 
suggests that models with fixed- and random-effects are more appropriate than pooled 
OLS with zero p-values for all dependent variables and bank types. All p-values are 
greater than 5% for all three dependent variables in the DWH test, so we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis. This suggests that random-effects models are suitable.  
Test Bank type ROA model ROE model EPS model 
 𝑝-values 
F  Traditional banks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Fintechs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LM Traditional banks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Fintechs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DWH Traditional banks 0.1965 0.5112 0.3307 
Fintechs 0.4575 0.1223 0.3220 
Table 4.36 Tests for determination the most appropriate approach for data analysis 
(Australia) 
4.4.6 Panel data regression analysis 
Based on the three dependent variables, we constructed six random-effects panel data 
regression models to test the influences of risk variables on the bank performance 
variables based on different bank types. The random-effects model estimation results 












 Fintechs  




Intercept 0.0652 0.0204 -0.5213 0.1864 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.1614** 0.0735 -1.7167* 1.3951 
Net Charge-off rate -0.0752* 0.0613 -2.6275 1.9310 
Total loan loss ratio -0.0121* 0.0377 -2.2130* 1.2462 
Value at risk -0.0001*** 0.0007 -0.0039* 0.0110 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0008* 0.0022 0.0148* 0.0688 
Current ratio 0.0093 0.0197 0.0127* 0.0226 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.0513** 0.0234 0.4778 0.5685 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.0128*** 0.0055 -0.4137*** 0.1541 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0006*** 0.0003 -0.0036 0.0027 
Brand value change % 0.0045*** 0.0059 0.0792*** 0.0211 
Operational risk % -0.0322** 0.0127 -0.0045 0.0872 
Ln(Asset) 0.0002** 0.0003 0.1025*** 0.0336 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.0045 0.0039 -0.0119** 0.0431 
R2within 0.6914  0.6547  
R2between 0.7337  0.6744  
R2overall 0.5582  0.3907  
No. of Obs. 95  82  
Table 4.37 Random-effects estimation results (ROA, Australia) 
Note: *, **, ***represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
The first dependent variable is ROA. With regards to credit risk variables, similar 
results have been shown for China and the UK. All credit variables have a negative 
influence on Australian traditional banks and fintechs. In more detail, all three variables 
(NPL, NCO and LaonR) have significant negative impacts on Australian traditional 
banks' ROA at the 5%, 10% and 10% significance level, respectively. The NPL has the 
largest coefficient number, a 1% increase in the NPL will lead to a 0.1614% decrease 
in the ROA where NCO and LoanR can lead to a 0.0752% decrease and a 0.0121% 
decrease, representatively. When managing credit risks, managers should consider 
more on the NPL with its higher significance levels and coefficient value. This suggests 
that Australian traditional banks should be more concerned about credit risk 
management as all three variables are significant and have a slightly increasing trend 
in these credit risk variables shown in Figure 4.16. For fintechs, consistent results were 
also seen. NPL and LoanR show a significant negative impact on ROA at the 10% level. 
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With regards to coefficient values, the NCO has the largest coefficient number, a 1% 
increase of the NCO will lead to a 2.6275% decrease of the ROA where NPL and LoanR 
could lead to 1.7167% and 2.213% decrease, representatively. Thus, based on the 
significance level and coefficient value, managers in Australian fintechs should focus 
more on LoanR with its relatively higher levels when managing credit risks. Moreover, 
as higher estimates are seen for fintechs, credit risks have stronger influences for 
fintechs than traditional banks.  
With regard to VaR, it has a significant negative impact on both traditional banks and 
fintechs. This result suggests that market movement has a more significant impact on 
Australian banks than Chinese banks, as VaR significantly impact ROA for Chinese 
traditional banks. Contrary to the results from the UK fintechs, VaR also negatively 
influence the ROA of Australian fintechs, which suggests that even some market 
movement could bring profits, while losses from the market risk occur more for 
Australian fintechs. In more detail, a 1% increase in VaR will lead to a 0.0001% 
decrease in traditional banks' ROA and a 0.0039% decrease in fintechs' ROA. 
For the liquidity and capital risk variables, consistent results are achieved for both types 
of banks. LCR and T1 show significant positive impacts on traditional banks' ROA at 
10% and 5% significant level, respectively. For fintechs, LCR and CR show significant 
positive impacts on ROA at the 10% significance level. For coefficient values, a 1% 
increase in LCR will lead to a 0.0008% increase in ROA, where CR and T1 could lead 
to 0.0093% and 0.0513%, representatively, for Australian traditional banks. For 
fintechs, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to a 0.0148% increase in ROA, where CR and 
T1 could lead to 0.0127% and 0.4778%, representatively. This shows that increasing 
liquidity coverage, current assets and tier one capital holding percentage could help 
both types of banks to improve ROA performance. As T1 has the highest significance 
level and the coefficient value for Australian traditional banks, managers should take 
extra care about T1. For Australian fintechs, as LCR has the highest significance level 
combined with a relatively high coefficient value, managers should take extra care 
about LCR. With regards to debt level variables, D/A and D/E show significant negative 
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impacts on ROA at the 1% significant level for traditional banks and only D/A shows a 
significant negative impact on fintechs. With regards to coefficient values, a 1% 
increase in D/A or D/E will lead to a 0.0128% or 0.0006% decrease in ROA for 
traditional banks. In contrast, a 1% increase in D/A or D/E will lead to a 0.4137% or 
0.0036% decrease in ROA for fintechs. This result indicates that a reduced debt level 
could help both types of banks improve ROA performance. Moreover, as both variables 
are significant for traditional banks, managers should pay more attention to debt level 
when managing risks. For fintechs, managers could pay more attention to D/A as it has 
a higher significance level. In summary, together with the findings shown in Section 
4.4.1, Australian banks should pay more attention to this type of risk, because of their 
higher risk management failure potential.  
Next, with regards to reputation risks, BVC shows a significant positive impact on ROA 
for both types of banks at the 1% significance level. Moreover, a 1% increase in BVC 
will lead to a 0.0045% increase in traditional banks' ROA and a 0.0792% increase in 
fintechs. Similar to Chinese banks, this result shows that the more significant an 
improvement of the bank brand value, the better the ROA will be. Moreover, similar to 
the UK banks, there is evidence of a significant positive relationship between bank size 
and ROA for traditional banks and fintechs, which suggests that increasing size tends 
to give higher ROA. In more detail, ln(asset) shows its significance at the 5% level for 
traditional banks and the 1% level for fintechs. A 1% increase in ln(asset) will lead to a 
0.0002% increase in traditional banks' ROA and a 0.1025% increase in fintechs' ROA. 
Finally, with regards to operational risk, both variables show their negative impact on 
both types of banks'/fintechs' ROA. ORP is a significant negatively influencing factor 
on the traditional banks' ROA. When issues related to operational risks occur, 
traditional banks decrease their ROA performance. Moreover, a 1% increase in ORP 
will lead to a 0.0322% decrease in traditional banks' ROA and a 0.0045% decrease in 
fintechs' ROA. Concerning C/I, this shows a significant negative impact on Australian 
fintechs, which suggests that the lower the efficiency of operations, the lower the ROA 
that will be achieved. Moreover, a 1% increase in C/I will lead to a 0.0045% decrease 
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in traditional banks' ROA and a 0.0119% decrease in fintechs' ROA. Thus, managers 
for both types of banks need to control issues related to the probability of occurred 
operational risks and reduce the overall cost of operations to achieve a better ROA 
performance. As C/I shows a higher significance level coefficient value for fintechs, 
fintechs' managers should pay more attention to this variable than traditional banks 
during operational risk management. For a similar reason, managers for traditional 
banks should concern more about ORP. 
Similar to China and UK, besides interpreting variables, we looked at the R2 for our 
ROA models. R2(within) shows a 69% variation within one traditional banks over time 
and a 65% variation within one fintech over time. R2(between) shows 73% variation 
between traditional banks and 67% variation between fintechs. R2(overall) shows 55% 
for traditional banks and 39% for fintechs. We could find out that traditional banks have 
















 Fintechs  




Intercept -0.7463 0.2252 -0.5546 0.4478 
Non-performing loan ratio -1.9657*** 0.8126 -1.1539* 1.9445 
Net Charge-off rate -0.5286* 0.6722 -5.2338* 2.1428 
Total loan loss ratio -0.3678* 0.4127 -2.9929** 1.9008 
Value at risk -0.0006** 0.0008 0.0115 0.0317 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0197 0.0242 0.0105* 0.1997 
Current ratio 0.4364*** 0.2179 0.0268 0.0686 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.8019*** 0.2517 0.7972** 1.4965 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.0452*** 0.0609 -1.2218*** 0.3801 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0056* 0.0032 -0.0180** 0.0069 
Brand value change % 0.1467** 0.0648 0.1235** 0.0620 
Operational risk % -0.0145** 0.1393 -0.1632 0.1134 
Ln(Asset) 0.0527*** 0.0034 0.0184* 0.0830 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.0170 0.0426 -0.0266** 0.0803 
R2within 0.6177  0.4506  
R2between 0.6472  0.5082  
R2overall 0.5176  0.2153  
No. of Obs. 95  82  
Table 4.35 Random-effects estimation results (ROE, Australia) 
Note: *, **, ***represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
For ROE, the results are similar. Firstly, all credit risk variables have significant 
negative impacts on ROE, where they have higher impacts on the fintechs. As all three 
variables show the significance of both types of banks, managers should focus more on 
their significance levels and the coefficient values. As a 1% increase in NPL will lead 
to a 1.9657% decrease in ROE at the 1% significance level, managers should concern 
more on NPL for Australian traditional banks. For fintechs, managers should consider 
more on LoanR as it has the highest significance and a relatively high coefficient value. 
Next, with regards to market risk, VaR presents a similar result to the Chinese results. 
It shows a significant negative impact on traditional banks at the 5% significance level 
but a positive impact on fintechs. A 1% increase in VaR will lead to a 0.0006% decrease 
in traditional banks' ROE and a 0.0115% increase in fintechs' ROE. The possible reason 
could be that market movement may bring opportunities for fintechs to earn some 
returns. As the estimate for fintechs is not significant, fintechs still need to control 
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market risk levels to ensure a performance improvement.  
Thirdly, with regards to liquidity and capital risk variables, consistent estimates are seen. 
For traditional banks, CR and T1 have significant positive impacts on ROE at the 1% 
significant level. For fintechs, LCR and T1 have significant positive impacts on ROE 
at 10% and 5% significance levels. In addition, with regards to coefficient values, T1 
shows the highest value for both types of banks. For traditional banks, a 1% increase in 
T1 will lead to a 0.8019% increase in traditional banks' ROE and a 0.7972% increase 
in fintechs' ROE. Moreover, with regards to debt level, D/A and D/E significantly 
negatively influence ROE for both traditional banks and fintechs. With regards to 
coefficient values, D/A shows a higher impact than D/E for both types of banks. Similar 
to Chinese banks, in order to have a better performance in ROE, Australian banks need 
to keep liquidity and capital holding percentages at a healthy level and reduce debt to a 
reasonable level. In addition, as these variables show different levels of significance 
and coefficient values, managers should prioritise these variables based on their 
significance level and estimation values when managing liquidity and capital risks. 
Based on the coefficient values and significance levels, both types of Australian banks 
should concern more about T1 and D/A. 
With regards to reputational risks and bank size, similar to the results obtained from 
ROA, BVC and ln(asset) have a significant positive impact on ROE for both types of 
bank. This means that increase brand value and bank size could help Australian banks 
to improve their performance. Finally, concerning operational risk variables, the results 
are consistent with the other two countries. Both variables have negative impacts on 
ROE. In more detail, OPR shows a significant negative impact on ROE for traditional 
banks at the 5% significance level, and C/I shows a significant negative impact on ROE 
for fintechs at the 5% significance level. With regards to coefficient values, a 1% 
increase in ORP will lead to a 0.0145% decrease in ROE for traditional banks and a 
0.1632% decrease for fintechs. A 1% increase in C/I will lead 0.0170% decrease in 
ROE for UK traditional banks and a 0.0266% decrease for the UK fintechs. This 
suggests that traditional banks should pay more attention to particular issues of 
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operational risks, with OPR having a higher significance level and coefficient value. 
Fintechs should concern the overall operational costs and operational efficiency 
together. This confirms that keeping bank operations smooth and decreasing 
operational issues and costs could help Australian banks to improve their ROE. 
Similar to China and UK, besides interpreting variables, we looked at the R2 for our 
ROE models. R2(within) shows a 61% variation within one traditional banks over time 
and a 45% variation within one fintech over time. R2(between) shows 64% variation 
between traditional banks and 51% variation between fintechs. R2(overall) shows 51% 
for traditional banks and 21% for fintechs. We could find out that traditional banks have 
higher R2s, which indicate higher variation was presented in traditional banks. 
 Traditional banks Fintechs 




Intercept -8.3585 10.9193 0.0193 0.0524 
Non-performing loan ratio -65.9641** 33.9845 -3.3560* 2.2511 
Net Charge-off rate -8.1478* 17.2592 -3.2227 2.4406 
Total loan loss ratio -13.4135 12.6794 -1.0387* 2.1490 
Value at risk -0.0142* 0.0184 -0.0030* 0.0035 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.1536* 0.5338 0.0061** 0.0205 
Current ratio 7.2401** 9.8203 0.1816 0.0194 
Tier 1 capital ratio 12.0902* 9.1940 0.2002* 0.1690 
Debt-to Asset ratio -2.0723* 3.3781 -0.0180 0.0419 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0683 0.2244 0.0012*** 0.0008 
Brand value change % 0.8254** 1.3640 0.0015* 0.0088 
Operational risk % -0.1201*** 3.1666 -0.1495** 0.1145 
Ln(Asset) 0.3414*** 02606 0.0185** 0.0098 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.2639** 1.3179 -0.0065 0.0129 
R2within 0.6158  0.5901  
R2between 0.7126  0.6782  
R2overall 0.5605  0.3309  
No. of Obs. 81  72  
Table 4.39 Random-effects estimation results (EPS, Australia) 
Note: *, **, ***represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Finally, we observed how different types of risk variables influence the EPS of selected 
listed Australian banks. Our results show some similarity to the above results. For 
examples, all credit risk variables impact negatively on the EPS. In more detail, 
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managers should pay more attention to variables that show a higher significance level, 
such as NPL and NCO for traditional banks and NPL and LoanR for fintechs. Managers 
should also focus on the coefficient values. As a 1% increase in NPL will lead to a 
65.9641% decrease in EPS for traditional banks and a 3.3560% decrease in EPS for 
fintechs, managers should concern more on NPL for both types of Australian banks. 
Secondly, market risk also has a significant negative influence on both types of 
Australian banks at the 10% significant level. A 1% increase in VaR will lead to a 
0.0142% decrease in traditional banks' EPS and a 0.003% decrease in fintechs' EPS. 
This suggests that reducing VaR could help them to achieve better performance.  
Thirdly, with regards to the liquidity and capital risk variables, similar results are seen. 
LCR, CR, T1 and D/A have significant impacts on EPS for traditional banks and LCR, 
T1 and D/E have significant impacts on EPS for fintechs. With regards to coefficient 
values, T1 shows its highest impact in three capital and liquidity variables and D/A 
shows a higher impact than D/E for both types of banks. These results suggest that 
similar to the other two countries' results, higher liquidity and capital holding 
percentages combined with a relatively low and stable debt level would help banks and 
fintechs perform better in EPS. Managers could manage these risks according to their 
different significance levels and estimated values. Fourthly, similar to the results for 
ROA and ROE, BVC and ln(asset) also have significant positive influences on EPS for 
both types of bank. This suggests that a better bank reputation and a higher size level 
could help traditional banks and fintechs reach a higher value of EPS.  
Finally, the operational risk variables also have a consistent result in both types of banks. 
Similar to China, ORP and C/I have significant negative influences on EPS for 
Australian traditional banks. Thus, Australian traditional banks should be concerned 
with their operational efficiency and reduce issues of operational risks to achieve better 
EPS values. For fintechs, ORP and C/I have negative influences on EPS, and only ORP 
is significant at the 5% level. Moreover, a 1% increase in OPR will lead to a 0.1495% 
decrease in fintechs' EPS which is higher than the influence of C/I (e.g., 0.0065% 
decrease in EPS). Thus, the Australian fintechs should focus on particular issues of 
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operational risks and reduce the costs of these to achieve better EPS values. Besides the 
similarities, one main difference is that risk variables show a higher influence level for 
traditional banks than fintechs with higher estimates. With respect to ROA and ROE 
performance, risk variables show higher impacts on fintechs than traditional banks with 
higher estimates. This indicates that traditional banks in Australia should pay more 
attention to risk management than the other two countries. 
Similar to China and UK, besides interpreting variables, we looked at the R2 for our 
EPS models. R2(within) shows a 62% variation within one traditional banks over time 
and a 59% variation within one fintech over time. R2(between) shows 71% variation 
between traditional banks and 68% variation between fintechs. R2(overall) shows 56% 
for traditional banks and 33% for fintechs. We could find out that traditional banks have 
higher R2s, which indicate higher variation was presented in traditional banks. 
Moreover, we could see that the R2 for Australian traditional banks are all higher than 
fintechs which is opposite in China and the UK. This suggests Australian traditional 
banks have higher variation and they need to concern more about risk management as 
more differences exists between individuals over time.  
In general, the estimates from our panel data regression models of traditional banks and 
fintechs in Australia provided similar results as showed in the other two countries. 
Firstly, all credit risk variables showed a negative influence on bank performance. This 
suggests that reducing credit risks could help both types of banks increase their 
performance. The difference is also visible for credit risk. Although all credit risk 
variables show a negative impact on the three countries' different bank performance, a 
different level of impact is indicated. Similar to the UK and Chinese banks, for ROA 
and ROE, credit risk has higher impacts on fintechs. However, it showed a higher 
impact on traditional banks than fintechs for EPS. This result shows (1) the importance 
of credit risk management in bank operations for both types of banks; and (2) the 
increasing trend of credit risk in traditional banks in Australia that cause concern with 
the market investment. 
Secondly, LCR, CR and T1 showed a positive influence on bank performance. Thus, 
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both types of banks should follow legal requirements to increase their liquidity and 
capital holding levels, which could help them reach a better level of performance. 
Thirdly, D/A and D/E showed a negative influence on bank performance. Thus, 
controlling the debt level could also help both types of banks improve their performance. 
For operational risks, the relevant variables showed a negative influence on bank 
performance. This suggests that for both types of banks, reducing operational issues 
and costs could increase their performance. Finally, developing the bank's reputation 
could help both types of banks increase their performance.  
Furthermore, besides differences in credit risk variables and compared with the other 
two countries, ln(asset) has a positive impact on ROA, ROE and EPS for traditional 
banks, which suggests increasing bank size will help Australian traditional banks 
develop their performance. However, for Chinese traditional banks, ln(asset) have a 
negative impact on ROA, ROE and EPS, which suggests reducing useless or safety 
amount of assets will help Chinese traditional banks develop their performance. The 
possible reason for this is that traditional Banks in Australia are relatively small 
compared with those in China and have some room for development. 
Therefore, for both traditional banks and fintechs, similar to the other two countries, a 
better reputation, healthy liquidity conditions, efficient credit risk management, lower 
debt and cost levels and alertness to market movements could provide better 
performance in both returns and on the stock market.  
4.4.7 GMM estimates for Australia 
Following section 4.2.7 and 4.3.7, this section will provide GMM to check if our results 
from the random-effects model are robust for Australian banks. Similar to China and 
UK, even though we called GMM a robustness checks for random-effects models, the 
results from GMM are as important as we got from random-effects. We will use and 
compare both approaches’ results (Random-effects and GMM) to build our discussion 
and conclusions. Tables 4.40 to 4.42 GMM estimates for the impacts of risks on the 
bank performance (ROA, ROE and EPS, respectively) in Australia. 
 211 
 Estimations 
 Traditional banks Fintechs 
Intercept 0.1972 -0.962 
One period lag of ROA 0.0590 0.0482 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.3529* -5.4985** 
Net Charge-off rate -0.2307 -10.9340* 
Total loan loss ratio -0.4400** -7.4496* 
Value at risk -0.0001* -0.0053 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0014** 0.0108* 
Current ratio 0.1481 0.0069 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.0648* 0.9913*** 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.0167** -0.7458*** 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0004* -0.0120*** 
Brand value change % 0.0045** 0.1050*** 
Operational risk % -0.1495* -0.1791 
Ln(Asset) -0.0002*** 0.0458* 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.0147 -0.0436** 
F-test 459.2*** 610.9*** 
Sargan Test (p-value > 𝜒2) 29.7 (0.429) 28.8(0.151) 
AR(1) z = -3.76 
p-value = 0.00 
z = -2.83 
p-value = 0.00 
AR(2) z = -0.15 
p-value = 0.88 
z = -0.96 
p-value = 0.34 
No. of Obs. 95 82 
Table 4.40 GMM estimation results (ROA, Australia) 
Notes: *, **, ***represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model 
estimation. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 1 and 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
Firstly, ROA was selected as the dependent variable to establish two GMM estimates 
based on bank type. Similar to China and UK, the F-statistics show the significance of 
the variables. The Sargan test shows that there is no evidence of over-identifying 
restrictions, and the Arellano-Bond test shows the consistency of our estimates for the 
independent variables.  
For the Australian traditional banks, firstly, the significant coefficient of the lagged 
ROA confirms the dynamic character of the model specification. 𝛿 takes a value of 
0.059, which suggests that the performance of the Australian traditional banks seems to 
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persist. This implies that the Australian traditional banks have a nearly perfect 
competitive structure. This shows the higher competitiveness of the Australian 
traditional banks than the Chinese and UK traditional banks. 
Turning to the other independent variables, similar results are presented as shown in 
our random-effects panel data regression models. Firstly, the credit risk variables have 
negative impacts. This suggests that higher credit risks lead to poor performance. In 
details, NPL and LoanR also significantly negatively impact the ROA at 10% and 5% 
significance level. With regards to coefficient values, a 1% increase of the NPL will 
lead to a 0.35291% decrease of the ROA, where NCO and LoanR could lead to a 0.2307% 
and a 0.44% decrease, representatively. Similar to random-effects models, LoanR 
shows its importance in credit risk management in both significance level and 
coefficient value. Thus, this suggests that managers should pay more attention to LoanR 
during credit risk management. Moreover, the values of the estimates are larger than 
were showed for Chinese and UK traditional banks. This suggests that the Australian 
traditional banks should be more concerned with these credit risk variables.  
With regards to market risk, VaR has a significant negative impact on ROA at the 10% 
significance level. This suggests that higher market risk could decrease the ROA 
performance of Australian traditional banks. The result is also similar to the results from 
random-effects estimates, which suggest Australian traditional banks should reduce or 
keep alert to the market risks. Next, with regards to the liquidity, capital and debt level 
variables, consistent results are shown compared with our random-effects panel data 
regression models. The positive relationship between liquidity and capital holding level 
and bank performance and the debt level variables is negatively related to bank 
performance. LCR, CR and T1 all show positive impacts on ROA, where LCR and T1 
are significant at the 5% and 10% level. With regards to coefficient values, a 1% 
increase in LCR will lead to a 0.0014% increase in ROA, where CR will lead to a 
0.1481% increase and T1 will lead to a 0.0648% increase. The results indicate that 
increasing the liquidity and capital holding level could increase their performance. For 
debt level variables, both D/A and D/E negatively impact to ROA at the 5% and 10% 
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significance level. With regards to coefficient values, a 1% increase in D/A will lead to 
a 0.0167% decrease in ROA, where D/E will lead to a 0.0004% decrease. Similar to the 
results from random-effects, the GMM results suggest that a lower debt level could help 
banks to receive better performance. Managers should consider more on D/A with its 
higher significance level and coefficient value.  
With regards to the operational risk variables, similar to our panel data regression 
models, both variables negatively affect ROA. ORP shows a higher significant impact 
on Australian traditional banks at the 10% significance level. Based on the coefficient 
values, a 1% increase of ORP or C/I will lead to a 0.1495% or 0.0147% decrease in 
ROA. A higher significance level and coefficient value for the ORP suggesting that 
Australian traditional banks need to concern more about their particular operational 
risks. In addition, a similar result is shown in the reputational risk variable. BVC shows 
a significant positive impact on ROA at the 5% significance level, where a 1% increase 
in BVC will lead to a 0.0045% increase in their ROA. This means that increasing 
reputation could help banks to increase ROA performance. Finally, with regards to bank 
size, ln(asset) significantly negative impacts on ROA at the 1% significance level. A 1% 
increase in ln(asset) will lead to a 0.0002% decrease in ROA. This result is not 
consistent with the results obtained from our random-effects models. As we already 
proved there is no endogeneity problem in our dataset, and the difference between the 
estimate is small. We could retain our suggestion, Australian traditional banks could 
keep their bank size to have a better performance.  
For Australian fintechs, The F-statistics show the significance of the variables. The 
Sargan test shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. The AR tests 
show that the estimates of independent variables are consistent. With regard to lagged 
dependent variables, although it is not significant, the coefficient of the lagged ROA 
shows the dynamic character of the model specification. 𝛿  takes a value of 
approximately 0.0483, which suggests that the performance of the UK fintechs seems 
to persist to a perfectly competitive market structure in ROA. However, it is still lower 
than value showed in Chinese fintechs. This shows the higher competitiveness of 
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Chinese fintechs than Australian fintechs. 
Estimates for the independent variables show results for ROA consistent with our 
random-effects panel data regression models. Firstly, all credit risk variables have 
negative impacts and the coefficient values of these variables are larger than were 
obtained for traditional banks. This confirms that credit risk hurts bank performance as 
in traditional banks, but that fintechs should be more concerned with these credit risk 
variables, as these variables have higher coefficient values and significance levels. 
Moreover, all three of them show their significance impact to fintechs’ ROA. In these 
thee variables, NCO shows highest coefficient value, a 1% increase in NCO will lead 
to a 10.934% decrease in ROA. Thus, mangers should concern NCO more based on 
their coefficient values. With regards to market risks, result is consistent with random-
effects. VaR shows a negative relationship with fintechs’ ROA. A 1% increase in VaR 
will lead to a 0.0053% decrease in Australian fintechs’ ROA.  
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, similar results are presented 
compared with results from random-effects models. Fintechs with a higher level of 
capital and liquidity holdings level and meet legal requirements for these variables 
could obtain better performance. In more detail, all three capital and liquidity variables 
positively impact the ROA. LCR and T1 have a 10% and 1% significantly impact, 
respectively. Based on coefficient values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to a 0.0108% 
positive change of ROA, where CR shows 0.0069% and T1 shows 0.9913% positive 
changes to ROA. With regards to debt variables, the results show that both D/A and 
D/E have significant negative impact on Australian fintechs’ ROA at the 1% level. A 1% 
increase in D/A or D/E will lead to a 0.7458% or 0.012% decrease in ROA. This result 
is consistent with our random-effects panel data regression models. Moreover, the 
results also present similar results on ROA compared with traditional banks’ results. 
This suggests that a lower debt level could help Australian fintechs to achieve better 
performance. Thus, prioritising these variables in risk management based on their 
estimated values and significance could help managers achieve better efficiency and 
performance. For Australian fintechs, managers should concern more about T1 and D/A 
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based on their higher significance level and coefficient values. 
With regards to operational risk variables, both variables also show negative impact on 
ROA, where C/I is significant at the 5% level. A 1% change in ORP will lead to a 
0.1791% decrease and C/I will lead to a 0.0436% decrease in fintechs' ROA. Similar to 
GMM estimates shown in fintechs for the other two countries, together with control 
over particular operational risks, Australian fintechs need to control their overall costs 
and increase their operational efficiency to obtain better performance. With regards to 
reputational risk variables, consistent results are shown compared with random-effects 
estimates for Australian fintechs and GMM estimates for Australain traditional banks. 
BVC also shows a significant positive impact on ROA at the 1% significance level, 
where a 1% increase in BVC will lead to a 0.105% increase in ROA. Thus, with is 
higher coefficient value, manager needs to keep fintech's brand value healthy, as 
increased reputation could help fintechs achieve better performance. Finally, similar to 
the random-effects estimates for ROA, there is evidence of a positive relationship 
between size and ROA performance. At the 10% of significance level, a 1% increase of 
fintechs' ln(asset) will lead to a 0.0458% increase of fintechs' ROA, which suggests that 












 Traditional banks Fintechs 
Intercept -0.2395 -2.3373 
One period lag of ROE 0.1279* 0.2415*** 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.2005** -2.2513* 
Net Charge-off rate -0.3415 -14.2171* 
Total loan loss ratio -0.2746* -7.8635** 
Value at risk -0.0004* -0.0181* 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0063 0.0836* 
Current ratio 0.2053** 0.0034 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.0897* 0.2036* 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.6153* -0.0743 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0211** -0.0156* 
Brand value change % 0.0117* 0.0861* 
Operational risk % -0.1273* -0.1028** 
Ln(Asset) 0.0204** 0.0128** 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.2746 -0.1452* 
F-test 412.4*** 369.1*** 
Sargan Test (p-value > 𝜒2) 22.5 (0.799) 22.0(0.460) 
AR(1) z = -3.1 
p-value = 0.00 
z = -3.39 
p-value = 0.00 
AR(2) z = -0.2 
p-value = 0.84 
z = -0.52 
p-value = 0.60 
No. of Obs. 95 82 
Table 4.41 GMM estimation results (ROE, Australia) 
Notes: *, **, ***represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model 
estimation. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 1 and 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
Besides ROA, GMM estimates for ROE also show consistent results compared with 
random-effects panel data regression estimations. For traditional banks, similar to 
GMM for traditional banks in ROA, the F-statistics show the significance of the 
variables. The Sargan test shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. 
The AR tests show that the estimates of independent variables are consistent. For the 
lagged dependent variable, the significant coefficient of the lagged ROE confirms the 
dynamic character of the model specification. 𝛿  takes a value of 0.1279 when 
performance is measured by ROE. The result suggests that the performance of the UK's 
traditional banks seems to persist. This implies that the Australian traditional banks 
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have a relatively competitive structure. This shows the higher competitiveness of the 
Australian traditional banks than the Chinese traditional banks, but lower 
competitiveness than the UK traditional banks. 
Turning to the other independent variables, the results here for the dependent variables 
are consistent with our random-effect panel data regression models. Firstly, credit risk 
variables have negative impacts. This suggests that higher credit risks lead to poor ROE 
for Australian traditional banks. In details, NPL and LoanR significantly negatively 
impact the ROE at the 5% and 10% level. In these credit risk variables, the NCO has 
the largest coefficient number. A 1% increase of the NCO will lead to 0.3415% decrease 
of the ROE where NPL and LoanR could lead to 0.2005% and 0.2746%, 
representatively. Moreover, LoanR shows its importance in credit risk management 
based on the relatively high significance level and relatively highe coefficient value. 
With regards to market risk variables, VaR has a significant negative impact on ROE at 
the 10% significance level. The results are consistent with random-effects estimates. 
Australian traditional banks should keep VaR at a reasonable level and reduce the risk 
if possible, to achieve better performance. 
Regarding the capital and liquidity risk variables, consistent results also show in GMM 
compared with random-effects. CR and T1 have significant positive impacts on ROE 
with the 5% and 10% significance level, where a 1% increase in LCR will lead to a 
0.0063% increase in ROE. For CR and T1, a 1% increase in CR or T1 will lead to a 
0.2053% or 0.0897% increase in traditional banks’ ROE. Even though LCR do not 
appear significant in the ROE model, with its positive influence, managers should still 
keep LCR pass the legal requirement and at a healthy level. Moreover, the results show 
the importance of CR for traditional banks based on its high significance level and 
coefficient value. Thus, managers should follow the regulation requirements (e.g. Basel 
Accords) and increasing the capital holding level could help banks increase their 
performance. We further notice that the debt level variables are significant negatively 
related to bank performance at the 10% and 5% level. In more detail, a 1% decrease in 
D/A will lead to a 0.6153% increase in ROE where D/E shows a 0.0211% increase. 
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Similar to the results from random-effects, the GMM results suggest that a lower debt 
level could help banks receive better performance. Managers should consider more on 
D/A with its significance level and higher coefficient value. 
With regards to operational risk variables, GMM also provides results consistent with 
our random-effects panel data regression models. Both variables affect ROE negatively, 
where ORP is significant at the 10% level. Based on the coefficient values, a 1% 
increase of ORP or C/I will lead to 0.1273% or 0.2746% decreases in ROE. Similar to 
the random-effects for ROE in traditional banks, managers in UK traditional banks 
should be concerned more with particular operational risks. For reputational risk 
variables, BVC shows a significant and positive impact on ROE at the 10% significance, 
where a 1% increase in BVC will lead to a 0.0117% increase in their ROE. This 
suggests that increasing reputation could help banks increase ROE performance. Finally, 
the coefficient for bank size significant positively impacts bank performance at the 5% 
significance level for ROE. This result is consistent with random-effects. 
For Australian fintechs, The F-statistics show the significance of the variables. The 
Sargan test shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. The AR tests 
show that the estimates of independent variables are consistent. With regard to lagged 
dependent variables, the coefficient of the lagged ROE shows the dynamic character of 
the model specification. 𝛿 takes a value of approximately 0.2415, which suggests that 
the performance of Australian fintechs seems to a relatively competitive market 
structure in ROE. This shows a similar competitiveness of the Australian traditional 
banks with the Chinese traditional banks, but lower competitiveness than the UK 
traditional banks. 
Estimates for the independent variables show results for ROE consistent with our 
random-effects panel data regression models. Firstly, all credit risk variables have 
negative impacts and the coefficient values of these variables are larger than were 
obtained for traditional banks. Moreover, all three variables (NPL, NCO and LoanR) 
significantly negatively impact the ROE at 10%, 10% and 5% significance level. For 
coefficient values, a 1% increase in NPL will lead to a 2.2513% decrease in ROE, NCO 
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shows 14.2171% and LoanR shows 7.8635%. We could see that the coefficient values 
are larger than they showed in traditional banks like random-effects models. This 
confirms that credit risk hurts bank performance as in traditional banks, but that fintechs 
should be more concerned with these credit risk variables. Managers should focus more 
on NCO with its largest coefficient value, as all three variables show significant to ROE 
performacne. With regards to market risks, VaR shows a significant negative 
relationship with bank performance for ROE, where a 1% increase in VaR will lead to 
a 0.0026% decrease in ROE. However, the results from random-effects estimates show 
that VaR has a positive influence on ROE. As we tested, there is no endogeneity 
problem exist in our dataset, and the VaR is significant in GMM but not in random-
effects. The result show here suggests that Australian fintechs should be concerned 
more with market risks. Moreover, as the results for the other two dependent variables 
are consistent, Australian fintechs should keep VaR at a reasonable level and reduce the 
risk if possible, to achieve better performance. 
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, similar results are presented 
compared with results from random-effects models. Fintechs which have a higher level 
of capital and liquidity holdings level and meet legal requirements for these variables 
could obtain better performance. In more detail, all of them positively impact on ROE, 
LCR and T1 show their positive impact at 10% significance level. Based on coefficient 
values, a 1% increase in LCR will lead to a 0.0836% positive impact on ROE, where 
CR shows a 0.0034% and T1 shows a 0.2036% positive impact on ROE. With regards 
to debt variables, the results show that both D/A and D/E have negative impacts, where 
D/E is significant at the 10% significance level on ROE. This result is consistent with 
our random-effects panel data regression models and traditional banks’ results, which 
also presents the same results. With the coefficient values, a 1% increase in D/A will 
lead to a 0.0743% decrease in ROE, and a 1% increase in D/E will lead to a 0.0156% 
decrease in ROE. Thus, the importance of D/A is seen, which is proved by its higher 
coefficient value and significance level. This suggests that managers should consider 
more on D/A when managing risks.  
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With regards to operational risk variables, both variables also show significantly 
negative impacts on ROE, where the ORP shows a 5% significance level and C/I shows 
a 10% significance level. With regards to coefficient values, a 1% increase in ORP will 
lead to a 0.1028% negative change and C/I shows a 0.1452% negative impact. Similar 
to GMM estimates shown in fintechs’ ROA, together with control over particular 
operational risks, UK fintechs also need to control their overall costs and increase their 
operational efficiency to obtain better performance. With regards to reputational risk 
variables, consistent results are shown compared with random-effects estimates, BVC 
also shows a significant positive impact on ROE at the 10% significance level, which 
suggests that increased reputation could help fintechs achieve better performance.  
Finally, similar to the random-effects estimates for ROE, there is evidence of a positive 
relationship between size and ROE performance. At the 5% significance level, a 1% 
increase of fintechs' ln(asset) will lead to a 0.0128% increase of fintechs' ROE, which 

















Intercept -0.9169 0.1010 
One period lag of EPS 0.6175** 0.0585 
Non-performing loan ratio -2.1974** -3.1224*** 
Net Charge-off rate -2.779 -5.3974*** 
Total loan loss ratio -0.9068* -4.3349*** 
Value at risk -0.0051* -0.0052** 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.1119* 0.0035* 
Current ratio 0.1459* 0.0014 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.9032* 0.1082* 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.6208** -0.0757*** 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.2171 -0.0004* 
Brand value change % 0.1253* 0.0098* 
Operational risk % -0.1585* -0.2754*** 
Ln(Asset) 0.0479** 0.0003* 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.1163* -0.0217*** 
F-test 1245.7*** 277.8*** 
Sargan Test (p-value > 𝜒2) 35.9(0.176) 15.3(0.849)  
AR(1) z = -4.59 
p-value = 0.00 
z =-3.17 
p-value = 0.00 
AR(2) z = -0.69 
p-value = 0.50 
z = -0.45 
p-value = 0.66 
No. of Obs. 81 72 
Table 4.42 GMM estimation results (EPS, Australia) 
Notes: *, **, ***represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model 
estimation. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 1 and 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
Finally, we are interested in observing whether the stock market's bank performance 
depends on managing different types of risks. The GMM estimates are applied to show 
coefficients and provide these results with EPS in Table 4.42.  
For traditional banks, similar to GMM for traditional banks in ROA and ROE, the F-
statistics show the significance of the variables, the Sargan test shows there is no 
evidence of over-identifying restrictions, and the AR tests show the estimates of 
independent variables are consistent. With regard to lagged dependent variables, the 
coefficient of the lagged EPS shows the dynamic character of the model specification. 
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𝛿 takes a value of 0.6175 when performance is measured by EPS. This result also 
suggests that Australian traditional banks' performance seems to persist in a moderate 
competitive market structure in EPS. 
Turning to the other independent variables, the results here for the dependent variables 
are consistent with our random-effect panel data regression models. Firstly, credit risk 
variables have negative impacts on EPS. This suggests that higher credit risks lead to 
poor EPS for UK traditional banks. In details, NPL and LoanR significantly negatively 
impact the EPS at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. In these credit risk variables, the 
NCO has the largest coefficient number, a 1% increase of the NCO will lead to a 2.779% 
decrease of the EPS where NPL and LoanR could lead to 2.1974% and 0.9068% 
decrease, representatively. Similar to random-effects models, NPL shows its 
importance in credit risk management based on the highest significance level together 
with its relatively high coefficient value. With regards to market risk variables, VaR has 
a significant negative impact on EPS at the 5% significance level, which is similar to 
the results from random-effects estimates. Thus, in order to increase the bank's EPS, 
managers should control the VaR relatively low. 
Regarding the capital and liquidity risk variables, consistent results also show in GMM 
compared with random-effects that all three variables positively significant influence 
the bank performance at the 10% significance level. As all variables is significant, 
managers should consider more on coefficient. Based on coefficient values, T1 shows 
the highest where a 1% increase T1 will lead to a 0.9032% increase of EPS. This 
suggests that the importance of T1 during capital risk management. Managers should 
follow the regulation requirements (e.g. Basel Accords) and increasing the capital 
holding level could help banks increase their performance. We further notice that the 
debt level variables are negative related to EPS, where D/A is significant for EPS at the 
5% level. In addition, D/A also shows higher coefficient value than D/E, where a 1% 
increase in D/A will lead to a 0.6208% decrease in EPS. Similar to the results from 
random-effects, the GMM results suggest that a lower debt level could help banks to 
receive better performance.  
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With regards to operational risk variables, GMM also provides results consistent with 
our random-effects panel data regression models. Both ORP and C/I affect EPS 
significantly and negatively at the 10% level. Based on the coefficient values, a 1% 
decrease of ORP or C/I will lead to a 0.1585% or 01163% increase in EPS. As both 
variables show their significance, managers in Australian traditional banks should 
control their operational risks during the business, especially in the stock market. For 
reputational risk variables, BVC shows a positive impact on EPS at the 10% 
significance level, where a 1% increase in BVC will lead to a 0.1253% increase in their 
EPS. The result suggests an increasing reputation could help bank increase EPS 
performance. Finally, the bank size significantly positive impacts bank performance at 
the 5% significant level for EPS. With a 1% increase in ln(asset), the UK traditional 
banks’ EPS will increase 0.0479%. The result is consistent and managers should 
improve their bank size to increase EPS performance. 
For Chinese fintechs, the F-statistics show the significance of the variables. The Sargan 
test shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. The AR tests show that 
the estimates of independent variables are consistent. For the lagged dependent variable, 
the significant coefficient of the lagged EPS confirms the dynamic character of the 
model specification. 𝛿 takes a value of approximately 0.0585, which suggests that the 
performance of the Australian fintechs seems to persist to a perfectly competitive extent 
in EPS.  
Estimates for the independent variables show results for EPS consistent with our 
random-effects panel data regression models. Firstly, all credit risk variables have 
negative impacts and the coefficient values of these variables are relatively larger than 
were obtained for traditional banks. This confirms that credit risk hurts bank 
performance as in traditional banks, but that fintechs should be more concerned with 
these credit risk variables. As all three variables are significant at the 1% level, 
managers should concern more on NCO because of its highest coefficient value. With 
regards to market risks, VaR shows a significantly negative relationship with EPS at the 
5% level, where a 1% decrease in VaR will lead to a 0.0052% increase in EPS. In 
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addition, fintechs are more related to other markets and have a smaller market scale 
than UK traditional banks. Thus, they should take more care about market risks with 
their relatively weak market position in the financial system, especially in the stock 
market.  
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, similar results are presented 
compared with results from random-effects models. Fintechs which have a higher level 
of capital and liquidity holdings level and meet legal requirements for these variables 
could obtain better performance. All of them positively impact the EPS, where LCR 
and T1 show their significance at the 10% significance level. Based on coefficient 
values, T1 shows the highest value, where a 1% increase in T1 will lead to a 0.5563% 
positive change to EPS. With regards to debt variables, the results show that both D/A 
and D/E have significant negative impacts on EPS at the 1% and 10% significance level. 
This result is consistent with our random-effects panel data regression models. With the 
coefficient values, D/A has higher coefficient value than D/E. A 1% increase in D/A 
will lead to a 0.0757% decrease in EPS. Thus, the importance of D/A is seen, which is 
proved by its higher significance level and coefficient value. This suggests that 
managers should consider more on D/A when managing debt level risks.  
With regards to operational risk variables, both variables also show significantly 
negative impacts on EPS at the 1% level, where a 1% increase in ORP will lead to a 
0.2754% decrease and C/I shows a 0.0217% negative impact. Similar to GMM 
estimates shown in fintechs’ ROA and ROE, together with control over particular 
operational risks, managers also need to control their overall costs and increase their 
operational efficiency to obtain better performance. With regards to reputational risk 
variables, consistent results are shown compared with random-effects estimates and 
GMM estimates for both types of banks. BVC also shows a significant positive impact 
on EPS at the 10% significance level which suggests that every 1% increase in BVC 
could help fintechs achieve a 0.0098% increase in EPS performance. Finally, similar to 
the random-effects estimates for EPS, there is evidence of a positive relationship 
between size and EPS performance. At the 10% of significance level, a 1% increase of 
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fintechs' ln(asset) will lead to a 0.003% increase of fintechs' EPS, which suggests that 
increasing size tends to result in better performance. 
Similar to China and the UK, the F-statistics show the significance of the variables, the 
Sargan test shows there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions, and the Arellano-
Bond test shows the consistency of the estimates for the independent variables. For the 
Australian traditional banks, firstly, the significant coefficient of the lagged 
performance variables (ROE and EPS) confirms the dynamic character of the model 
specification. This suggests that the performance of the Australian traditional banks 
seems to persist and implies that Australian traditional banks have a relatively 
competitive structure. This result indicates that the UK traditional banking industry has 
the most competitive structure of all three countries.  
Turning to the other independent variables, similar results are presented, as shown in 
Chinese and UK traditional banks. Firstly, credit risk variables have negative impacts. 
This suggests that higher credit risks lead to poor performance which is also 
demonstrated through our random-effects panel data regression models. With regards 
to market risk, VaR has a significant negative impact on all three bank performance 
variables. This suggests that higher market risk could decrease the performance of 
Australian traditional banks, which suggests that Australian traditional banks should 
reduce their market risk to achieve better performance. With its high significance, 
managers should be focused more on VaR when managing bank operations.  
With regards to liquidity, capital and debt level variables, consistent results are shown 
compared with our random-effects panel data regression models. There is a positive 
relationship between liquidity and capital holding level and bank performance while 
the debt level variables are negatively related to bank performance. This suggests that 
in order to obtain better performance, Australian traditional banks should increase their 
liquidity and capital holding levels, and reduce their debt level. Based on their different 
significant levels, managers could prioritise them during management to achieve higher 
efficiency. Moreover, consistent results are shown in operational risk variables and the 
reputational risk variable. In more detail, Australian traditional banks should be 
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concerned more with particular operational risks, then with controlling their general 
costs of operation. Also, Australian traditional banks should increase their reputation, 
which could help them to increase bank performance. Finally, with regards to bank size, 
the coefficient of bank size is significant and negatively impacts on ROA, but positively 
impacts on ROE and EPS. This result is also not consistent with the results received 
from our panel data regression models for ROA. However, the difference between the 
estimates is small and results still consistent for the ROE and EPS. Our overall 
suggestion for Australian traditional banks is retained, and is to maintain assets at a 
similar level and find a balanced point to achieve better performance.  
For Australian fintechs, firstly, the significant coefficient of the lagged performance 
variable (ROE) confirms the dynamic character of the model specification.This 
suggests that the performance of Australian fintechs seems to persist, and shows that 
they have a relatively competitive structure. Similar to traditional banks, the result 
suggests that the UK fintechs also have a more competitive structure than the other two 
countries.  
Turning to the other independent variables, GMM estimations also provide consistent 
results. Firstly, similar to the Chinese and UK fintechs, all credit risk variables have 
negative impacts on bank performance. Moreover, the values of the estimates are larger 
than shown in traditional banks. This confirms that credit risk hurts bank performance, 
and fintechs should be concerned about these credit risk variables. A difference exists 
in EPS for the Australia dataset. With the random-effects panel data regression models, 
the impact level is much higher in traditional banks, but in the GMM estimates, the 
impact level is similar to fintechs. As they all have negative impacts on bank 
performance, this suggests that both types of Australian banks should pay more 
attention to credit risk than the other two countries. With regards to market risks, VaR 
shows consistent results with Australian traditional banks. VaR has a negative 
relationship with all three dependent variables. Moreover, as VaR is significant for ROE 
and EPS at the 10% and 5% level, Australian fintechs should monitor market changes 
and reduce VaR to achieve better performance.  
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With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, consistent results are seen. Thus, 
fintechs which have a higher level of liquidity and capital and meet the legal 
requirements in liquidity and capital holding level could achieve better performance. 
With regards to the debt level variables, both of them show a negative relationship to 
bank performance. This suggests that a lower debt level could help Australian fintechs 
to achieve better performance. Thus, with regards to this type of risk, managers should 
prioritise these risk variables to achieve better management efficiency. In addition, 
similar results were also obtained for the operational risk variables. Both ORP and C/I 
show their significant negative impact on ROE and EPS, and C/I is also significant for 
ROA at the 5% level. This shows the importance of operational risk management. Thus, 
Australian fintechs should control in particular their operational risks and overall costs, 
which could help them increase their operational efficiency and achieve better 
performance. Finally, both BVC and ln(asset) show a significant positive impact on 
bank performance. Thus, in order to have good performance, Australian fintechs should 
increase their reputation and size during operation. 
In summary, the GMM estimations provided consistent results for traditional banks and 
fintechs in Australia as those shown in our panel data regression models. The robustness 
check reinforced our findings of the impact of risks on Australian bank performance.  
4.4.8 Summary 
In this section, we analysed 22 Australian banks and listed them as two types (11 
traditional banks and 11 fintechs). Firstly, we applied figure comparisons between 
traditional banks and fintechs. Then, descriptive statistics, stationarity, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and endogeneity tests were presented and analysed. Finally, by using 
ROA, ROE and EPS as dependent variables, we employed panel data regression models 
to study the impact of different types of risks on the performance of both types of banks. 
Moreover, as we used random-effects estimates to build a generalised model for the 
dataset. We did not need to add time- or individual- influence factors in the analysis, as 
they already be analysed through R2.  
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The overall conclusions were consistent with the Chinese and the UK analysis, which 
was that improving different bank risk management could help the Australian banks 
achieve more successful performance. However, Australian banks showed more 
potential for risk management failure. Thus, prioritising these risks should be more 
meaningful to help Australian banks achieve better future performance. For traditional 
banks, more attention should be paid to capital and liquidity risk. Secondly, they need 
to consider their credit risks and not let them grow through time. Next, traditional banks 
should be concerned with market risks and operational risks. Moreover, Australian 
traditional banks should keep their size and reputation at a safe level. Fintechs, on the 
other hand, need to be more concerned about their liquidity and capital risks, then pay 
attention to credit risks and operational risks at the same time. Thirdly, fintechs need to 
stay alert to market movement. Finally, they need to try to increase bank size and 
reputation if possible. Therefore, managers could know the influence level of different 
types of risks and variables by prioritising these risks. They could further provide a 
more efficient strategy when managing risks. In addition, managers could estimate their 
future performance through our models and set risk management targets. Moreover, 
through our models, managers could better understand their competitors, which could 
help them avoid some mistakes or improve some advantages through management.  
At the same time, investors and shareholders in Australia could also benefit from our 
models. By finding the relevant variables from banks/fintechs official website or any 
legal ways, investors and shareholders can receive different results based on the bank 
type. This could help them know if a bank/fintech develops or which bank/fintech is 
better to invest in these days. Similarly, policymakers and governments in Australia 
could also benefit from our models. Instead of investing in banks/fintechs, they can find 
banks/fintechs perform better or worse than others which can help them keep their eyes 
on these banks/fintechs and support or shut down these banks/fintechs. Moreover, 
through our models, policymakers and governments can understand the general 
situation for different bank types, which can help them make more targeted regulatory 
requirements based on bank type. More discussion could be found in Chapter 6. 
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Differences and similarities were listed for Australian traditional banks and fintechs, as 
well as general similarities and difference between Australian banks, UK banks and 
Chinese banks. Based on the process in this section, the following section applies 
conclusions for this chapter. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented our quantitative results and discussed risk management and its 
impacts on bank performance through panel data regression models. Findings are 
further reinforced through GMM estimates. The discussions centred on the risk 
characteristics that were developed in Chapter 2 on the basic ingredients and strategies 
required by traditional banks and fintechs to create smooth risk management and 
operations.  
The findings in this research showed that different kinds of risks have different impact 
levels based on the type of bank and the country where the bank resides. The main 
contribution of this chapter is that it not only analysed traditional banks in random-
effects and GMM estimates. It also applied these approaches to the new types of banks 
-i.e. challenger banks and fintechs - to obtain results and compare them with the results 
from traditional banks. The results suggest that, in general, traditional banks performed 
relatively stables during the investigated time period. However, the fintechs' 
performance was not as good as expected, and there was a room for fintechs to improve 
their performance and risk management. Moreover, the results were also influenced by 
the country where these banks mainly operate. In summary, all banks need to improve 
their risk management efficiency and prioritise risks based on their significance and 
estimated values which could help them to achieve better performance.  
Moreover, during analysis, we found out that outliers existed in fintechs' dataset. 
Although outliers are a part of the performance of these fintechs, we should keep them 
in the analysis. In order to check the influence of these outliers, we rerun the random-
effects and GMM estimates for Australian fintechs without outliers. The reason for the 
only rerun of the Australian dataset is that for Chinese and UK fintechs, there are not 
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enough observations to test the EPS by deleting the outliers. Thus, we should give 
fintechs a longer time to join the share market, and then we will have enough data to 
analyse. The detailed analysis for Australian fintechs can be found in Appendix 3 and 
4.  
Based on the analysis in Appendix 3 and 4, we could find consistent results. For 
random-effects estimates, the results are consistent with all dependent variables (ROA, 
ROE and EPS) found in Section 4.5, except for the D/E influence on EPS. D/E shows 
a negative impact on the EPS in random-effects estimates without outliers. However, 
the change of influence of the D/E does not impact our suggestion as we found the 
negative impact of D/E on the EPS in GMM estimates within outliers. Our results 
provide further evidence of the importance of running random-effects and GMM 
estimates simultaneously to test the dataset. Thus, our suggestion is consistent: 
managers should control and reduce the debt level, which will improve the fintechs' 
performance in the risk management process. For GMM estimates, the results are 
consistent with all dependent variables (ROA, ROE and EPS) found in Section 4.5. 
Thus, based on our analysis for Australian fintechs without outliers, the overall 
conclusions are consistent with the analysis in Section 4.5. This suggests that outliers 
will influence the estimates when analysing the dataset, but the influence is limited, the 
overall conclusions will be consistent. Even without outliers, fintechs still need to 
improve the efficiency of their risk management to help them achieve successful 
performance. Furthermore, as outliers are part of the performance of these fintechs, we 












As mentioned in Chapter 3, Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) said that a mixed research 
method could provide more significant empirical results and support for the research 
question. Thus, in order to have more significant results and achieve the research aim, 
besides analysing panel data regression estimates and GMM estimates, case studies are 
applied in this research for all three countries (China, the UK and Australia). Similar to 
the quantitative method, the investigation period started in 2013, when the influence of 
the 2007-09 financial crisis was still silt, and governments had begun to publish new 
requirements for banks. Thus, it is essential to investigate how these banks managed 
their risks during operations. On the other hand, as technology develops, the fintechs 
began to establish and develop during the investigation period. It is also essential to 
investigate how these newly established fintechs managed risks. However, there are 
limitations when selecting fintech cases. For the failure cases, we cannot access their 
data to analyse. The main reason is that almost every fintech operates online. When it 
closes its business, the data vanishes from the internet. Thus, we could not access any 
data for closed fintechs. Moreover, fintechs that operate poorly could either delay or 
not publish their financial and risk performance. Therefore, in this research, we could 
only choose those fintechs that published annual or interim reports. Although there are 
limitations in selecting fintech cases, our selected cases can still help us to see how 
fintechs operate in risk management. We can also provide suggestions for fintechs' 
managers based on our findings on selected cases. 
Therefore, following Docherty and Viort (2014), we selected six banks and listed them 
in Sections 5.2 to 5.7. These cases contain lessons on the themes of risk management 
in the bank and their supervision. In selecting the cases, we attempted to cover risk 
management development and performance. In general, we could say that banks with 
better risk management might claim better performance. Moreover, we chose these 
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cases where there was a public information source about their risk management process. 
After analysing these cases individually, Section 5.8 provides a comparison between 
these cases. Finally, Section 5.9 concludes this chapter. 
5.2 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
ICBC is one of the world's largest traditional banks. It was founded in 1984, joined the 
share market in 2006, and became the most valuable bank in the world by 2008 (ICBC, 
2014). Based on the global economic environment and internal competencies, the 
strategy of ICBC is divided into three parts. Firstly, risk management should be mainly 
considered during operations. Secondly, a stable and balanced condition in assets and 
liabilities need to be maintained during operations. Finally, management skills, 
information technology, business cooperation, and global involvements need to be kept 
innovating during operations (ICBC, 2015). 
Development of ICBC 
The main reason for the establishment of the ICBC was the Chinese economic reform 
in 1978. The Chinese government operated the ICBC from 1984 to 2005. Since China 
joined the WTO in 2001, the ICBC began a plan to join the share market. At the end of 
2006, the ICBC joined both Shanghai and Hong Kong share market and became the 
second most valuable bank in market capitalisation in the world (ICBC, 2014).  
ICBC published its first annual report in the year 2002. From 2002 to 2006, the annual 
reports just published information based on the Chinese regulations and the Basel 
Accords, such as general performance during the year, financial statements, and 
governance statements. In 2006, the annual report mainly focused on the event, which 
was that the ICBC joined both the Shanghai and Hong Kong share markets. In this study, 
we will mainly focus on risk management and financial statements. However, before 
the financial crisis, the ICBC annual reports did not have separate risk reports. It was 
only one part of the management reports. One possible reason for this could be that risk 
management was not seriously considered during the management process before the 
financial crisis.  
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The consequences of the financial crisis led many banks and financial institutions to 
bankruptcy and influenced the global financial system, such as share markets falling 
globally, especially in Western countries. In China, the speed of development slowed, 
but there was an increasing trend. With the involvement of the Chinese government, as 
reflected in annual reports, ICBC began to pay more attention to risk management. For 
example, it established separate risk reports alongside its management reports. It also 
added more analysis of different types of risks, particularly in credit risk and liquidity 
risk. 
Risk management development 
Before the financial crisis, the whole enterprise risk management system was straight 
forward and simple. Because of the financial crisis and the publishing of Basel II, ICBC 
strengthened innovations in its risk management system, which tried to optimise the 
bank's risk appetite indicators. Figure 5.1 shows the development of risk management 
systems for ICBC. In general, risk management in ICBC had four principles. The first 
is that it divided risk management responsibility. The second is of a centralised 
management role in monitoring risks. Thirdly, it divides the functions of front, middle 
and back offices. Finally, it provides a matrix-form risk report system for the bank. Also, 
with development, risk management became more detailed and comprehensive. 
 
Risk management system in 2005 
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Risk management system in 2010 
 
Risk management system in 2017 
Figure 5.1 Risk management system development (ICBC) 
In more detail, with the risk variables we collected, the risk management performance 
for ICBC is shown in Figure 5.2. The credit risk management of ICBC provided a low 
level of credit risks. This suggests that the general credit risks for ICBC were held at a 
lower level. However, for NCO and total LoanR, it had an increasing trend before 2015 
and decreasing after 2015. This shows that although the impact of the financial crisis 
was limited for Chinese traditional banks, it still increased the credit risk level. With 
efficient risk management and regulations, it then decreased. For market risk, as one of 
the Chinese traditional banks, market risk showed limited impact during its operation 
with relatively low VaR values. 
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With regards to the capital and liquidity risks, these showed an increased capital level, 
a stable liquidity situation and a controllable debt level that suggests smooth liquidity 
and capital risk management of the ICBC. For the reputational risks, as the ICBC 
developed, in general, the bank increased its brand value. Finally, the operational risk 






   





Figure 5.2 Risk performance of ICBC 
Lessons 
Although Chinese traditional banks, including ICBC, did not suffer a lot in the crisis, 
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their development rate slowed down. At the same time, the Chinese government 
released a series of regulations to protect Chinese banks from the financial crisis with 
its further recessions. In 2009, ICBC began to follow a new regulation called 'Measures 
for capital adequacy ratio management of commercial Banks'. In 2012, it began to 
follow the developed regulation called 'Measures for the administration of capital and 
liquidity management in Chinese commercial banks'. Besides following the regulations, 
ICBC also improved its risk management in the management group, as well as its skills 
and models.  
In summary, the annual reports of ICBC became more and more transparent and easy 
to understand and analyse. This reflects the ICBC's situation in each year and its 
development. In general, by following the government regulations, ICBC got though 
the recent financial crisis smoothly and became the world's most valuable bank. As an 
example of the Chinese traditional banks, it provided a relatively stable performance 
and had efficient risk management amongst the Chinese traditional banks. 
5.3 YiRenDai (YRD) 
Yirendai is one of the most famous fintechs in China. It was founded in 2012, joined 
the share market in 2015 and became the first fintech of China which joined the NYSE. 
YRD had a risk management system that mainly focused on credit management and 
fraud detection. YRD aimed to use the risk management system to operate more 
effectively in the market (YRD, 2016). 
Development of YRD 
Under the impact of the financial crisis, there was an explosion in financial technology. 
Together with the support of the Chinese government for fintechs, the YRD was 
established. Before 2015, as a newly established fintech company, it concentrated on 
public benefits and advertised itself to build better brand value in order to attract more 
customers and investors. In 2013, it received the 'Good Picture Winners' and 'Social 
Responsibility Award'. At the same time, with its development in its operations, it also 
received the 'Top ten fintechs brand in China' (YRD, 2018). After joining the share 
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market, YRD developed rapidly, with a series of awards in China, and it became one of 
the most influential Chinese fintechs. YRD published its first annual report at the end 
of 2015 after it joined the share market. YRD published risks analysis in different parts 
of its annual reports in line with the traditional banks. As a newly established fintech, 
it presented fewer changes in its annual report during the investigated period. 
Risk management development 
Risk management performance for YRD was shown in Figure 5.3. Credit risk 
management of YRD showed a relatively higher level of credit risks than ICBC, which 
was consistent with the results showed from our quantitative analysis. However, as 
these variables had a decreasing trend, this suggests that the general credit risks for 
YRD were under control. For market risk, even though YRD joined the NYSE, the 
main investments and operations of YRD were in China. As the small size of YRD, the 
general level of the VaR was small. With development, the VaR would near the level of 
ICBC. Also, because of its small size, even the low VaR may cause issues, so YRD, as 
well as other Chinese fintechs, need to be alert to market movements to maintain 
efficient operations. 
With regards to the capital and liquidity risks, YRD passed the Basel Accords 
requirements in liquidity coverage and tier one capital holdings. This suggests a 
relatively good position of YRD for preparing liquidity and capital to prevent 
bankruptcy. For the debt level variables, both variables had a low and stable portion 
which suggests a relatively good debt level. For the reputational risks, as YRD 
developed, it had an explosion in brand value at the beginning when it was established. 
As it operated for a longer time, the increase in brand value slowed to a small level. At 
last, with regards to the operational risk variables, these show increased efficiency of 






   





Figure 5.3 Risk performance of YRD 
Lessons 
In summary, as an example of Chinese fintechs, YRD was relatively well developed in 
its performance and risk management during the investigated time period. With 
experiences from the traditional banks, the annual report of YRD started from a clear 
and easy format to understand and analyse. It reflected a good start point and its 
development during the years was also relatively good. In general, by following 
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government regulations, YRD developed itself quite a lot and became one of the most 
famous Chinese fintechs, and good future performance could be expected. 
5.4 HSBC 
HSBC is one of the world's largest and most influential traditional banks. It was 
founded in 1836 and had an over 180-year history. At the end of 2017, its balance sheet 
was $2,522bn in size, its equity was $198bn, and it had 228,687 employees (HSBC, 
2019). 
Based on the global economic environment, a low-risk strategy is the primary strategy 
of HSBC during its operations. HSBC maintained a conservative and consistent 
approach to its risks throughout its history. The key elements include: keeping a stable 
balance in equity, keeping a worked risk profile strategic and financial planning process; 
and keeping operating smooth. With its vital risk appetite metrics, until 2018, capital 
and credit risks were two main risks faced by the HSBC groups (HSBC, 2019). 
Impacts of the last financial crisis on HSBC 
Because of the global operations of HSBC, the last financial crisis showed more 
impacts on HSBC than it showed on ICBC. For example, in February 2007, HSBC 
informed the market that its mortgage losses in the US were significantly worse than 
market assumptions. With this impact, its share price dropped to a low in March 2009, 
and after March 2009, it has been recovering. This shows that even an experienced 
institution could get the financial crisis wrong in the case of HSBC in its expansion into 
the US subprime problem. However, with its scale and diversification, this enabled 
HSBC to take the losses fine and stay solid. Since then, HSBC has kept tighter control 
and process reviews for its risks (Docherty & Viort, 2014; HSBC, 2010; HSBC, 2013). 
Risk management development 
Risk management performance for HSBC is shown in Figure 5.4. With the impacts of 
the financial crisis, the credit risk management of HSBC provided relatively high 
starting points. Similar to the overall traditional bank performance in the UK, credit 
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variables showed a decreasing trend. This suggests that HSBC increased its credit risk 
management efficiency. For market risk, there shows similar results for HSBC as it 
shows in the descriptive statistics. With the higher global connections of the UK and its 
higher currency value, the VaR of HSBC stayed at a higher level than that of ICBC. 
With regards to capital and liquidity risks, the liquidity and capital levels of HSBC 
showed a flat trend with its development. This suggests that HSBC kept its situation 
stable from the financial crisis in liquidity and capital level. With respect to reputational 
risks, with the influences of the financial crisis, the movement of the HSBC brand value 
wavered. In general, HSBC increased its brand value slightly, and its brand value 
remained healthy and unchanged. Finally, the ORP of HSBC was always controllable. 
However, the operational efficiency stayed at a relatively low level after the 2007-09 
financial crisis. Moreover, with an increasing trend of C/I, the priority of operational 
risks became high. Managers should pay more attention to controlling their operational 












Figure 5.4 Risk performance of HSBC 
Lessons 
HSBC suffered more than ICBC during the last financial crisis, but through a low-risk 
strategy and well-established operations systems, the performance of risk management 
was under control during the following years. In summary, risk management reports in 
annual reports of HSBC were already developed well with its long history, which made 
it easy to access risk reports to analyse. In general, HSBC applied consistent and diverse 
risk management, has stayed strong in recent years and is still one of the most important 
traditional banks in the world. 
5.5 Atom Bank (Atom) 
Atom was the first fintech that received a bank licence to be established in the UK. It 
was founded in 2014 and planned to join the share market with pre-IPO. In June 2015, 
Atom received its licence from the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the FCA 
before it launched in November 2015. With its development, the Atom team had grown 
to 350 people in 2019 (Atom, 2019). 
Development of Atom 
As mentioned above, Atom bank had a short history. After it received a bank licence 
and launched in 2015, in December 2016, it launched residential mortgages. In January 
2017, it launched new products in its fixed saving business. By increasing its saving 
rates higher than all other banks, it attracted media attention and UK customers. In the 
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same year, it was named one of the UK's top 25 start-ups, and in 2018, it was named in 
KPMG's Global 100 fintechs list with a ranking at nine, which is the highest-ranked 
business in the UK (Atom, 2019). With these benchmarks happening for Atom, it shows 
quite a lot of development for Atom. 
Risk management development 
Besides developing, Atom also built a risk management framework to help improve 
efficiency in its operations. It listed several risks faced by Atom and applies risk 
management strategies. The performance of risk management is shown in Figure 5.5. 
In more detail, with respect to credit risks, the overall credit risk values are larger than 
HSBC. The results are similar to China, where fintechs (e.g., YRD) has higher credit 
risk values than traditional banks (e.g., ICBC). Moreover, the credit risks were all under 
control. This suggests that the credit risk management of Atom stayed at a relatively 
good level. For market risk, because of its small size and because it had not yet joined 
the share market, Atom had a low level of VaR. Moreover, because of the short time 
since its establishment, there was not a clear trend of the VaR. We should give more 
time for Atom to see how will it react to more market risks.  
With regards to the capital and liquidity risks, Atom showed a developing trend with 
these variables. For example, LCR showed an increasing trend which indicates a good 
liquidity coverage level. This suggests that Atom has prepared more liquidity to deal 
with liquidity issues during operations. T1 stayed at a smooth level and passed the 
requirement of the Basel Accords. Moreover, the debt level variables showed a stable 
trend which indicates a controllable debt level for Atom. 
With regards to BVC, as noted in the Atom's development, the brand value of Atom 
increased a lot at this stage, which is confirmed in Figure 5.5. Finally, with regards to 
operational risks, these showed a v-sharp for both variables, which suggests that from 
the beginning of 2017, the costs and operational risks for Atom started to increase. 
However, as Atom had a short history, more time is needed to see its overall operational 
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Figure 5.5 Risk performance of Atom 
Lessons 
Even through Atom has a short history, it developed its risk management system and 
kept increasing its performance during these years. In general, the risk management 
performance of Atom remained in a good state. The risk management report in the Atom 
annual reports suggests a relatively comprehensive approach to its risk management 
system. In summary, as an example of the UK fintechs, even though they faced a higher 
credit risk environment, the performance of Atom reflected a good starting point and 
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the development of these fintechs. 
5.6 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) 
As one of the largest and most influential traditional banks in Australia, ANZ was 
established in 1835 and had over a 180-year history. Its balance sheet was $897.3bn in 
size, its equity was $59.1bn, and it had 44,896 employees at the end of 2017 (ANZ, 
2019). 
Development of ANZ 
As ANZ has a long history, similar to HSBC, there is much to recall with all its 
development. Because of the global operations of the ANZ and the impact of the last 
financial crisis, we focused more on its development after the last financial crisis. The 
last financial crisis showed limited impacts on all Australian banks, including ANZ. 
During the period of the financial crisis, it was still increasing its investments. As the 
Asian economy developed, ANZ invested a lot in Asia. For example, during 2007-2010, 
it provided a 20% investment in China's Tianjin Commercial Bank, opened its tenth 
branch in Vietnam and open sub-branches in Shanghai, China and Nagoya, Japan. After 
a series of investments in Asia, it received licences from several different Asian 
countries. For example, it received a retail RMB license from the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2012 and became the first Australian bank to 
receive this. At the same time, it received many service awards demonstrating its proper 
operations. 
Risk management development 
With the long history of ANZ, similar to other traditional banks, annual reports provide 
a relatively well-established risk management approach. In particular, for ANZ, its risk 
management framework includes two pillars. One is the risk appetite statement, which 
is for the board's members who can then prepare strategic objectives and business plans 
with the risks. The other is the risk management statement which shows the policies 
from the board and strategy that is based on each risk the bank faces. It provides details 
 245 
on how ANZ identifies, evaluates, monitors, reports, controls and mitigates these risks. 
Risk management performance for ANZ is shown in Figure 5.6. In more detail, the 
credit risk management of ANZ provided a relatively higher level of credit risks than 
ICBC and HSBC. The trend of the credit risks shows a smooth, slightly increasing line. 
This confirms the results found in our quantitative analysis that Australian traditional 
banks, including ANZ, need to pay more attention to credit risks. The potential credit 
risk of Australian banks was higher than in the other two countries. With respect to 
market risk, similar to ICBC, the VaR of ANZ showed a low level of impact. 
With regards to the capital and liquidity risks, LCR and T1 passed the Basel 
requirements. This suggests that ANZ had enough liquidity and capital to prevent 
bankruptcy. With regards to debt level variables, on the other hand, D/E showed an 
increasing trend. As ANZ was looking for development opportunities in other countries, 
some of the debt increase could be expected and accepted. However, ANZ still needs 
to pay attention to its debt level because too much debt may cause severe consequences 
to its operations. For the reputational risks, the brand value of ANZ generally increased 
during the investigated time period, but the increasing level decreased. This shows a 
higher risk potential for Australian traditional banks, including ANZ. 
Finally, with regards to the operational risks, ANZ showed a controllable efficiency 
with a medium level of cost in three investigated countries. Moreover, there were signs 
of increasing trends in the operational risk variables for ANZ. Thus, managers need to 













Figure 5.6 Risk performance of ANZ 
Lessons 
In summary, the risk management of ANZ reflects the general performance of 
Australian traditional banks. Compared with the other two countries, Australian banks 
need to concentre more on risk management to prevent future financial crises. 
5.7 Tyro Payments (Tyro) 
Tyro is the largest Electronic Fund Transfers at Point-of-Sale (EFTPOS) provider in 
Australia fintechs. It was founded in 2003 and received its bank licence in 2005. Tyro 
aims is to provide businesses with accessible banking services. At the end of 2017, it 
reached $148m in assets and $93m equity with only 371 employees (Tyro, 2018). 
Development of Tyro 
Tyro is a fintech that aims to build a more technological and smart way of applying 
bank services. In 2005, it became the first fintech to receive a bank licence in Australia. 
In 2011, it became the first one to be certified by new payment regulations regarding 
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the security of payment applications. In 2015, it developed a cloud-based and phone 
core banking platform. In 2018, it became the first bank to launch low-cost routing 
payments, deliver integrated Alipay solutions, and implement payments via Siri. At the 
same time, even though it had a short history, it developed a lot and received many 
awards. For example, it received the Best Banking Innovation Finder award in 2018 
and 2019 and the Best Payment Services Bank in Australia awards in 2018 (Tyro, 2019). 
Risk management development 
As a fintech, Tyro aimed to manage the risks in its operations. However, it did not 
provide a separate risk report in its annual report for analysis. The various risks Tyro 
faced are shown with different variables in the annual reports.  
In Figure 5.7, the credit risk variables show an increasing trend. This indicates an 
increasing default level and a decreasing credit risk management efficiency of Tyro. 
Combined with the results showed in Section 4.5.5, this shows that both traditional 
banks and fintechs in Australia need to reduce their credit risks or at least control them 
to a smooth level. For market risks, the VaR of Tyro showed a higher value than our 
other chosen fintech cases (e.g., YRD and Atom), showing that Tyro is exposed to more 
risk within the market.  
With regards to capital and liquidity risks, with receiving round-up investment, its 
liquidity level stayed relatively high. Thus, we need to give Tyro more time to stabilise 
its liquidity level. Moreover, T1 showed a stable trend over the investigated time period 
and passed the Basel Accords requirement. With regards to debt level variables, both 
D/A and D/E presented a decreasing trend. This suggests that Tyro controlled debt 
levels while developing. Similar to other fintechs, Tyro increased its brand value during 
the investigated time period.  
Finally, with regards to operational risks, C/I showed increasing trends, while ORP 
showed a relatively stable trend. This result indicates a low operational efficiency for 
Tyro. It is suggested that managers should pay more attention to controlling loss and 






   





Figure 5.7 Risk performance of Tyro 
Lessons 
In summary, the risk management of Tyro performed not as well as expected. Thus, 
managers might need to focus more on its risk management, perhaps building a risk 
report into its annual analysis and building management systems for different types of 
risks. With the results found from our quantitative analysis, the same suggestions could 
apply to other Australian fintechs. 
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5.8 Case studies comparisons 
Based on the analysis of each case, in order to have an aggregate view for our case 
studies, Table 5.1 summaries the similarities and differences between these cases. One 
bank of each type in each country was selected. Then, our cases showed that all samples 
of traditional banks had their separate risk report in their annual/interim reports and had 
already joined the share market. However, not all fintechs cases had a separate risk 
report in their annual/interim reports. It might be a good suggestion that these fintechs 
could build a risk report into their annual/interim reports. A risk report could show a 
clearer view of risks faced by the fintechs, and managers could monitor and reduce 
those risks with a higher priority. In addition, only the Atom was not on the share market 
during the investigating time. As noted in Section 5.5, the Atom is in the pre-IPO stage 
and could join the share market in a short time.  
With regards to risk management, similarities and differences can also be found. In 
more detail, for the credit risk variables, the cases of the Chinese and the UK banks 
indicated an increasing efficiency of credit risk management with the decreasing trend 
of these variables. However, cases in Australia showed a slightly increasing trend of 
credit risks. This confirms the results in Section 4.4. Managers in Australian banks 
should pay more attention to credit risk variables than the other two countries. For the 
market risk variables, the cases of the Chinese and Australian banks showed an 
increasing trend, where the UK cases showed a decreasing trend. This suggests that 
managers of Chinese and Australian banks should consider more their VaR values 
during market risk management. Moreover, because of the impacts of the financial 
crisis and a high exchange rate value, the UK banks had relatively high VaR values. 
Even though the trend shows signs of decreasing, this result suggests that managers still 
need to pay attention to the VaR level during risk management. With regards to liquidity 
and capital holding variables, cases in traditional banks showed an increasing trend with 
values higher than 100% in LCR and 6% in T1, which suggests that these cases 
followed legal requirements to hold enough liquidity and capital to prevent bankruptcy. 
Moreover, similar to traditional banks, the cases were chosen for fintechs also showed 
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a relatively stable situation. However, fintechs need to increase their holding levels of 
liquidity and capital and meet the legal requirements. With longer operations and more 
investments, higher values of these variables could be expected. For the debt level 
variables, our chosen cases for fintechs showed an increasing trend which could be 
accepted because these fintechs were in the developing stage. Our cases for traditional 
banks, on the other hand, showed a relatively stable trend. This could be explained by 
the fact that the business costs of these cases were relatively stable based on their long 
history.  
With regards to reputational risk variables, because each bank had its own operational 
strategy and performance, BVC showed differences between cases. In general, the 
brand value was maintained for traditional banks and increased for fintechs. Finally, for 
operational risk variables, cases in traditional banks showed a stable trend with lower 
values than fintechs. This suggests that traditional banks had more efficient control over 
operational risks with a well-established operational risk management system. The 
chosen fintechs, on the other hand, showed a relatively poor performance in operational 
risk management. All of them had the situation of cost more than income during the 
investigated time period. Thus, fintechs should pay more attention to control their 
operational costs to achieve better efficiency. In particular, the operational efficiency of 
Tyro reduced during the investigated time period, so managers in Tyro should take extra 
care of its operational risks. If they failed to control their costs and issues in operations, 








 ICBC YRD HSBC Atom ANZ Tyro 
Location CN CN UK UK AUS AUS 
Bank type T C/F T C/F T C/F 
Have risk report in annual 
report 
√  √ √ √  
In a share market √ √ √  √ √ 
Credit risk variables (NPL, 
NCO and LoanR) trend 
- - - - S/+ + 
Market risk (VaR) trend + + - - + + 
Liquidity holding variables 
(LCR and CR) trend 
S + +/S S/+ + S/- 
Debt level variables (D/A and 
D/E) trend 
S + S/- + S/+ + 
Capital holding variable (T1) 
trend 
+ S + S + + 
Reputational risk variable 
(BVC) trend 
+ - S + - S 
Operational risk variables 
(ORP and C/I) trend 
- - S S/+ S/- + 
C/I >1 exists  √  √  √ 
Table 5.1 Similarities and differences in case studies 
Notes: 'T' represents traditional bank; 'C/F' represents challenger bank/fintech.  
'+' represents positive trends; '-' represents negative trends; 'S' represents stable trends. 
In summary, through the case studies, we saw the different risk management 
performance and strategies of these banks. The results were consistent compared with 
the results obtained from our quantitative analysis. The overall results were more 
comprehensive through adding the qualitative analysis. With regard to types, traditional 
banks had more efficient risk management than fintechs. With regard to countries, 
Chinese banks had a more stable performance than the other two countries. Having 
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recovered from the impacts of the last financial crisis, UK banks developed relatively 
well, and the efficiency of risk management was increased in the investigated time 
period. Australian banks had a relatively good performance during the investigated time 
period. However, because of their higher failure potential in risk management than the 
other two countries, the future performance of Australian banks is more concerning. 
Similar to Brigham and Ehrhardt (2014), the case studies showed the importance of risk 
management. Thus, in order to have better future performance, managers should pay 
more attention to risk management, and should analyse and prioritise risks by types and 
variables. 
5.9 Conclusion 
The case studies in this thesis represent a brief introduction into some illustrations of 
representative cases for our three countries and two types of banks. They highlight some 
of the themes from earlier sections. Viewed in aggregate, they provide reasonable 
explanations of the risks that different banks face and a few strategies as to what should 
be done for better risk management. The fact is that risk exists in all banks, all countries, 
and every institution at all times. Risks cannot be solved through a high liquidity 
position or capital strength. However, these may provide better adaptability for banks 
when facing these risks. By facing the global crisis, proper risk management could set 
the 'survivors' apart from the 'failures'. Fragile risk management system collapses 
spectacularly like some banks that shut down during the financial crisis even though 
they performed quite well before the crisis. This suggests that a bank with weak risk 
management may only operate in stable markets. When the market falters, it cannot 
handle the market movements.  
This section listed one bank of each type in each country to show their risk management 
performance during the investigated time period. Interestingly, they showed different 
performance levels. For example, given the strength of the Chinese economy, banks in 
China developed a lot. At the same time, with the higher involvement of the government, 
the risk management of Chinese traditional banks was in a relatively good state. For 
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Chinese fintechs, their risk management showed a better trend as time developed. With 
the high impact of the last financial crisis in the UK, both types of banks in the UK 
showed similar risk levels, and with their risk management strategies, the risk levels 
seemed to reduce as time developed. For Australian banks, as they were untouched by 
the US subprime loses, the impacts of the financial crisis were limited, and these banks 
remained in a healthy and profitable state. However, they were not without their crises 
and issues. Indeed, both types of banks showed a lower risk efficiency, which might 
cause difficulties for the future risk performance of the Australian banks. 
In summary, risk cannot vanish. Risks have to be taken. For example, shareholders take 
a risk when buying shares in the hopes that they will be compensated sufficiently. Risk 
also has to be managed. There is no magic formula to choose the right risk management 
strategy. Risk management needs more attention from bank managers. They need to 
identify which risks their bank faces and how to prioritise these risks. One possible 




















In the previous chapters, risk variables and their impacts on bank performance in 
different countries and types were listed and analysed. This chapter serves as a follow 
up to the general discussion on the banks' risk management strategies. The emerging 
results of the bank risk management strategy will be discussed in this chapter, and 
strategic suggestions for each type of bank will be applied. The strategic suggestions 
were theorised from the case studies and detailed analysis of panel data regression 
models of each country and type of traditional bank and fintechs. It is hoped that these 
suggestions combined with regression models will provide better perspectives in risk 
management on traditional banks and fintechs and provide an academic basis for 
fintechs as they are a developing area in the banking industry. 
6.2 Triangulation comparisons  
Before providing the suggestions for both types of banks, we summarise the similarities 
and differences between all three countries in both types of banks based on the results 
of random-effects estimates, GMM estimates and case studies. The results are presented 
in three tables based on countries and types. With regards to similarities, there are 
catalogued based on country (Table 6.1) and type (Table 6.2). With regards to 
differences, Table 6.3 shows the different impact levels for each country based on 
significance levels and coefficient values of the risk variables (1 for the lowest, 2 for 





For traditional banks 
All three 
countries 
1) Credit risks have negative impacts on bank performance 
(ROA, ROE & EPS); 
2) Market risk has a negative impact on ROA & EPS; 
3) Higher liquidity holding levels (LCR & CR) suggest a 
better bank performance (ROA, ROE & EPS); 
4) T1 has a positive impact on bank performance (ROA, ROE 
& EPS); 
5) D/A and D/E have a negative impact on the banks' 
performance (ROA, ROE & EPS); 
6) Reputational risk variable (BVC) has a positive influence 
on ROE and EPS; 
7) Operational risks have negative impacts on bank 
performance (ROA, ROE & EPS). 
China & UK (1) Bank size has a negative impact on ROE. 
China & Australia (1) Market risk has a negative impact on ROA, ROE & EPS; 
(2) Reputational risk (BVC) has a positive influence on ROA, 
ROE & EPS. 




a) Credit risks have negative impacts on bank performance 
(ROA, ROE & EPS); 
b) Market risk has a positive impact on ROE, but a negative 
influence on EPS; 
c) Higher liquidity holding levels (LCR & CR) suggest a 
better bank performance (ROA, ROE & EPS); 
d) T1 has a positive impact on bank performance (ROA, ROE 
& EPS); 
e) D/A has a negative impact on bank performance (ROA, 
ROE & EPS); 
f) Reputational risk (BVC) has a positive influence on ROA, 
ROE &EPS; 
g) Bank size has a positive impact on ROA, ROE & EPS; 
h) Operational risks have negative impacts on bank 
performance (ROA, ROE & EPS). 
China & UK No additional similarities. 
China & Australia (a) Market risk has a negative influence on ROA & EPS, but a 
positive impact on ROE; 
(b) D/E has a positive impact on EPS. 
UK & Australia (a) D/E has a negative impact on ROA & ROE. 
Table 6.1 Similarities between countries 
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China 
⬧ Credit risks have negative impacts on bank performance (ROA, ROE & EPS); 
⬧ Market risk has a negative impact on ROA & EPS; 
⬧ Higher liquidity (LCR & CR) and capital holdings (T1) suggest a better bank 
performance (ROA, ROE & EPS); 
⬧ D/A has a negative impact on ROA, ROE & EPS; 
⬧ Operational risks have negative impacts on bank performance (ROA, ROE & 
EPS). 
UK 
⬧ Credit risks have negative impacts on bank performance (ROA, ROE & EPS); 
⬧ Market risk has a negative impact on EPS; 
⬧ Higher liquidity (LCR & CR) and capital holdings (T1) suggest a better bank 
performance (ROA, ROE & EPS); 
⬧ D/A and D/E have a negative impact on ROA, ROE & EPS; 
⬧ Bank size has a positive impact on ROA & EPS; 
⬧ Operational risks have negative impacts on bank performance (ROA, ROE & 
EPS). 
Australia 
⬧ Credit risks have negative impacts on bank performance (ROA, ROE & EPS); 
⬧ Market risk has a negative impact on ROA & EPS; 
⬧ Higher liquidity (LCR & CR) and capital holdings (T1) suggest a better bank 
performance (ROA, ROE & EPS); 
⬧ D/A has a negative impact on ROA, ROE & EPS; 
⬧ D/E has a negative impact on ROA & ROE; 
⬧ Operational risks have negative impacts on bank performance (ROA, ROE & 
EPS) 










 CN UK AUS CN UK AUS CN UK AUS 
ROA ROE EPS 
T Credit risks 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Market risks 1 3 2 2 1 3 1 2 3 
Liquidity risks 2 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 3 
Capital risks 1 2 3 2 1 3 1 2 3 
Debt level risks 1 3 2 2 3 1 1 2 3 
Reputational risks 1 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Bank size 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 3 2 
Operational risks 1 3 2 3 2 1 1 2 3 
C/F Credit risks 2 3 1 3 1 2 3 2 1 
Market risks 2 3 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 
Liquidity risks 1 3 2 2 3 1 1 3 2 
Capital risks 1 2 3 2 1 3 3 2 1 
Debt level risks 2 3 1 3 2 1 2 3 1 
Reputational risks 1 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 1 
Bank size 3 1 2 3 2 1 1 3 2 
Operational risks 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3 1 
Table 6.3 Differences in impact level between countries 
Notes: 'T' represents traditional bank; 'C/F' represents challenger bank/fintech.  
'CN' represents China; 'AUS' represents Australia. 
As shown in the tables above, the first similarity is that all credit risk variables 
negatively impact on both types of banks for every investigated country. However, the 
level of impact is different. For example, as noted in Sections 4.2 to 4.5, they show a 
much higher impact of credit risk in fintechs than in traditional banks except for the 
EPS in Australian banks. In addition, for traditional banks, credit risk shows a bigger 
influence on UK banks than in other countries in ROA and ROE. The possible reason 
for this is that the last financial crisis had more impact in the UK than in the other two 
countries. For fintechs, the overall highest impacts of credit risks were seen in the 
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Chinese fintechs. As they are still in the starting stage of operations, they should be 
given more time to develop and operate, which could show better results. However, 
with an increasing trend and a relatively strong influence, Australian banks need to be 
more concerned about credit risk management than the banks in other countries.  
Next, market risk has a generally negative impact on bank EPS, which suggests that if 
banks face strong influence shown in market movement, their performance will not be 
as good as in a smooth market environment. However, some of the fintechs may find 
opportunities with market movements to increase their returns in assets and equity. Thus, 
they need to balance the VaR values as the high market risk will lead to a weak EPS but 
might increase ROA or ROE. The third overall similarity is that LCR shows a positive 
influence on both types of bank in all three countries. This suggests that with the Basel 
requirements after the last financial crisis, this variable could reflect the liquidity 
situation of the banks. The higher the LCR, the better the performance of the banks will 
be. Moreover, the same situation happens with T1, as to meet the required level of the 
Basel could help banks have enough capital to prevent bankruptcy. The next similarity 
is about D/A and D/E, which reflects the ratio of the banks' debt level to their assets and 
equity. Our findings suggest that traditional banks need to control their debt level to 
achieve better performance. For fintechs, as negative equity exists, they need to develop 
their asset level to be higher than their liabilities, then keep the debt level healthy to 
achieve better performance. 
Furthermore, as fintechs are in their starting and developing stage, an increase in their 
assets can reflect better performance. However, as the large traditional banks have been 
developed for a long time, keep their assets at a stable level and reducing some non-
necessary assets could help their performance. Finally, with regards to the operational 
risks, there also shows a negative impact on performance in each country and type of 
bank. In more detail, for traditional banks, the critical thing to avoid is extreme 
operational risk issues that could disrupt operations. However, fintechs face different 
operational risks. Dongrong Li, the president of China Internet Finance Association, 
said that the most critical operational risk face by fintechs is 'the safety of the business'. 
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For example, fintechs need to identify the customer to avoid fraud during operations, 
where traditional banks could avoid this issue through face-to-face operations 
(ABTnetwork, 2018). As operational risks are hard to monitor, managers in both types 
of banks have to control cost levels to maintain better efficiency. 
6.3 Strategic suggestions for risk management 
With developing of banking industry, the understanding of the risk management of 
banks has improved substantially. Much has been written on the influence of risk 
management to bank performance, both in the academic literature and in the financial 
press. However, with the keeping developing of technology, a new type of banks called 
challenger banks/fintech established and competed with the traditional banks. As both 
traditional banks and fintechs are in the risk business in the process of providing 
financial services. In this thesis, we selected five main types of risks face by banks and 
analysis their influences on traditional banks’ or fintechs’ performance. Based on the 
results in Chapter 4, 5 and Section 6.2, we have found that managers should have 
different focuses when managing risks for different types of banks in different countries. 
In order to highlight the different situation in each country, to prioritise these risks 
become an essential strategy to help managers to control these risks. Thus, this section 
discusses the corresponding strategies for different types of banks in different countries 
and draws together some risk management recommendations for the banking industry. 
For Chinese traditional banks, managers should make sure the bank meets the capital 
and liquidity requirements of the local and global regulations. Next, they need to control 
their debt to a reasonable level. Thirdly, managers should monitor their performance in 
credit operations, which needs to operate smoothly and prepare enough provisions for 
credit risk occurring. At the same time, operational risk issues need to be monitored to 
keep them in the least damaging situation, which could also help the bank stay healthy. 
Together with their stability in the market, this will lead to good performance. The 
suggestions for the UK traditional banks are similar to Chinese traditional banks. With 
the increasingly improved efficiency of risk management, managers should continue 
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this to achieve better future performance.  
However, Australian traditional banks show more potential for risk management failure. 
To prioritise these risks makes more sense to help Australian banks achieve better future 
performance. In more detail, firstly, managers in Australian traditional banks need to 
monitor the credit risk level when they do credit-related business, as in the investigated 
period, their risk levels increased. Next, managers also need to cut unnecessary 
operational costs and reduce the chance of operational risks occurring to achieve a low 
operational risk level, as this also showed an increasing trend during the investigated 
time. Besides that, Australian traditional banks need to take extra care about their 
capital and liquidity holding levels, as their risk levels show an increasing trend. If there 
is not enough capital and liquidity prepared, the banks will be in trouble. 
For Chinese fintechs, managers should firstly keep their credit operations smooth and 
at a lower risk level. Next, they need to be alert to the risks of the market. Also, during 
operations, managers should make sure the fintechs meet or try to meet the regulatory 
requirements for liquidity, capital and debt level. Particularly, they need to control their 
costs in operations, especially for operational risks. Thus, with the development of 
fintechs, their assets and brand values will increase, and they will achieve better 
performance. The suggestions for fintechs in the other two countries are also similar to 
the above for the Chinese fintechs. Moreover, Australian fintechs, similar to Australian 
traditional banks, need to pay more attention to manage these risks. They suffered less 
in the last financial crisis, but their risk levels show a higher potential for future failure. 
Therefore, banks could increase their management efficiency and achieve better future 
performance by prioritising the risks during risk management. Also, based on the 
models this research has built, managers can predict future bank performance through 
their history of risk management performance. By paying more attention to risk 
management, future performance can also be predicted to be better. Moreover, 
managers should follow local and government legalisations and try to meet the 
regulatory requirements, which could increase the chances of good performance in the 
industry. 
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In light of the above, besides considering the types and location of the banks, managers 
in both traditional banks and fintechs could implement risk management strategies in 
the following four ways: 
1. Managers could set standards and build financial reports for risks. Most traditional 
banks have already implemented this strategy, but not fintechs. Thus, fintechs' 
managers should implement this strategy as soon as possible. Moreover, this should go 
beyond public reports. Internal reports could be prepared for managers more frequently, 
which could help them better understand the risks faced by the bank or fintech. 
2. Managers should clearly understand their position limits and rules when they are 
making risk-related decisions. This strategy could restrict the individual and overall risk 
faced by managers and the bank or fintech. For example, senior managers could 
prioritise different types of risks and allocate resources, while line managers might just 
focus on one particular type of risk. 
3. When managers plan for future investment guidelines or management strategies, 
they need to consider their historical and current risk positions. Based on our models, 
managers could predict the future performance of the bank or fintech by filling in their 
current and historical risk data. Thus, following this strategy, managers could make a 
more appropriate decision for the organisation. 
4. Managers could build and enter incentive schemes. This strategy could encourage 
all staff to focus more on risk management, which could help banks and fintechs to 
perform better. 
Besides managers, our analysis can also benefit shareholders and investors. They can 
estimate the future performance of fintechs or traditional banks they are interested in 
based on our models to test whether they are worth investing in. Table 6.4 provide a 
selection process for investors and shareholders. Thus, our analysis allows us to identify 
banks or fintechs that meet regulatory requirements, have improved trends in risk 
management and performance, and are supported by local governments that could have 
better performance and be more worthy of investment.  
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For shareholders and investors who would 
like to test whether a bank/fintech 
developed 
For shareholders and investors, who 
would like to select between two or 
more banks/fintechs 
1. Search from official website to download the historical annual/interim reports; 
2. Find relevant variables in our models; 
3. Calculate the average value and estimated value for the next year; 
4. Put data in the models for the bank or fintech located and get results; 
5. If the performance better than the current 
year or the average value, invest it. 
5. Select the best or better performed 
banks or fintechs, then invest. 
Table 6.4 Investment process for shareholders and investors 
Based on the risk insights gained from Chapter 4, besides managers, investors and 
shareholders, our analysis could also help governments and policymakers to build a 
strategic plan for banks and fintechs. Firstly, similar to investors and shareholders, 
governments and policymakers could use our models to test the performance of 
traditional banks and fintechs. Instead of investing in them, governments and 
policymakers can use our models to identify banks/fintechs appear risk management 
and performance problems. This helps policymakers monitor the 'problems' more 
quickly and support or shut the 'problems' down at the right time. Secondly, 
governments and policymakers need to make more targeted regulatory requirements 
based on bank type. For example, we found that credit risk influences the performance 
of fintechs more than traditional banks, and fintechs had a larger credit risk than 
traditional banks in all three countries. However, there are no particular credit risk 
variables requirements during investigating time period. Fintechs have to follow the 
same requirement as traditional banks, which might be too tight for them. Thus, 
governments and policymakers should make a more targeted requirement for credit risk 
variables for fintechs, giving them more time to survive in the beginning stage. Thirdly, 
through our triangulated comparisons, we found that banks/fintechs perform better in a 
more stable financial environment. Therefore, our analysis can encourage the 
government to provide a better financial environment for the banking industry. In 
summary, Figure 6.1 shows a diagram of the strategic plan for risk management, 
including bank managers, investors and policymakers. 
 263 
 
Figure 6.1 Risk management strategic plan 
Furthermore, combined with the analysis of the literature review, we can say that 
investing in fintechs during and after the financial crisis is a good recommendation. 
This is because, 1. The 2008-09 financial crisis was one of the triggers for the 
establishment and development of fintechs; 2. Governments started to support the 
development of fintechs, while more fintech-related regulations were enacted; 3. More 
traditional banks started to invest in fintechs or set up fintech-related subsidiaries. In 
addition, this is still a good time to invest in fintechs. People in many countries and 
regions have to live and work in lockdown because of Covid-19. As fintechs can offer 
all financial services online, this crisis gives them an opportunity to capture the market. 
As a result, our results can provide investment advice for investors and shareholders. 
For governments and policymakers, our results can give them a better understanding of 
how risk affects the performance of banks/fintechs. Policy makers can have a greater 
focus on risk management when they develop policies for fintechs or update those of 
traditional banks. Also, if local governments want to support any traditional bank or 
fintech, they can use our analysis as one of the basic ideas to support banks or fintechs 
or even the whole industry. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The discussions presented in this chapter highlighted risk management comparisons 
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and their impacts on bank performance between our selected countries. The overall 
discussion showed that each type of bank in each country had different strategies for 
managing risks. Based on the quantitative and qualitative approach analysis, each 
strategy was defined considering not only the bank types but also the risk management 
efficiency and the country where the bank is located. 
In summary, three main conclusions based on investigated countries and four risk 
management strategies can be drawn for this chapter. With regards to investigated 
countries, firstly, with the higher involvement and support of the government, the 
Chinese banks had a relatively good and stable performance. Even for fintechs, the 
performance could be expected to be better in the future. Secondly, with a higher impact 
from the last financial crisis, the starting points of both the UK's traditional banks and 
fintechs were not very good. With a series of improvements in bank management 
systems and regulations, the risk management and performance in the UK were 
trending better. Thirdly, because the impacts of the last financial crisis were limited for 
Australian, a relatively good development was shown in traditional banks and fintechs. 
However, risks trended to increase, so future risk management and performance should 
be concerned by regulators and managers. If better risk management rules and strategies 
could be applied, the crisis might be avoided. However, if risks develop freely when a 
crisis happens, results could not be estimated. With regards to risk management 
strategies, in general, these four strategies are established to measure risk exposure, 
build procedures to manage these risk exposures, limit manager position to an 
acceptable level and encourage all staff to consider risk during operations. 
Thus, a threefold contribution has been built based on this chapter. Firstly, it contributed 
to current research by presenting comparisons based on empirical data. Secondly, it 
provided useful insights for managers and researchers on how risk management 
strategies were deployed. Thirdly, it provided potential strategic plans for managers and 
policymakers. Based on these observations, the final chapter will provide an overall 
conclusion for this study, combined with suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Introduction 
Based on financial technology development and increased global financial connections, 
customers are shifting their preferred way of receiving financial services and products. 
Given this situation, fintechs have become new and popular financial institutions that 
can supply financial services and products through more digital ways than traditional 
banks. However, fintechs did not perform as well as excepted, and there are still limited 
studies investigating this area. Thus, how these fintechs performed and why the 
situation happened was worthy of investigation. In addition, due to the importance of 
risk management, our research has investigated how risk variables impact bank 
performance in traditional banks and fintechs. To achieve a comprehensive view in this 
area, this thesis selected China, the UK and Australia to be the countries for 
investigation. As a result, this study addressed the current situation and the differences 
between bank types and countries which could contribute to knowledge. 
The findings from this research lead to a set of conclusions and implications for future 
researchers, banking sector managers and analysts. These conclusions aim to notice the 
importance of risk management in operating bank performance both in traditional banks 
and challenger banks/fintechs. It is expected that this will help banks 1. Understand 
their current situation and performance of risk management. 2. Find the appropriate 
way to prioritise risks. 3. Provide strategies for managers in risks management to 
achieve sustainable growth in the banking industry. The following section presents 
conclusions for each research question. Section 7.3 outlines the contributions and 
implications of this study to theory and practice. The limitations of this study and 
indicative future research directions are presented in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 provides 
an overall conclusion for this study. 
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7.2 Conclusions for each research question 
This research attempted to identify the impact of risk management on the performance 
of traditional banks and challenger banks/fintechs. It was noted that the importance of 
risk management and its impact on performance was studied quite a lot for traditional 
banks, such as Anggaredho & Rokhim, 2017; Bessis & O'Kelly, 2015; Fu & Heffernan, 
2009; Geng et al., 2016 and Nakashima, 2016. However, the fintechs' relationship 
between risk management and performance had only limited investigations. Given this 
situation, we followed the methodologies of previous studies in traditional banks, 
applied them to both traditional banks and fintechs, and built four research questions to 
reach a more comprehensive investigation of risk management and its impacts on 
performance. 
For research question one: 'What are the critical characteristics of bank risk 
management variables and how can we use them to analyse bank performance through 
bank data?'.  
We summarised five main risk types (credit risk, market risk, liquidity and capital risk, 
reputational risk, and operational risk) in management in 12 risk variables, together 
with the bank size, to represent these banks' risk management. We then used three 
performance variables to show bank performance. As we collected data through the 
banks' annual and interim reports, the variables were showing on a semi-annual basis. 
Thus, to analyse the dataset and show the relationship between variables, panel data 
regression models were suitable. Moreover, with the F, LM and DWH test, the random-
effects approach was more appropriate. As a result, this research applied eighteen 
random-effects panel regression models to analyse risk management and its impacts on 
bank performance for both traditional banks and fintechs in three different countries 
(China, the UK and Australia). In order to have a more robustness results, the GMM 
estimates were applied and consistent results were shown. Moreover, we presented 6 
case studies to show the individual performance in risk management which further 
showed the robustness of our results from random-effects and GMM estimates. 
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For research question two: 'What differences are shown between traditional banks and 
challenger banks/fintechs in their risk management?'. 
Similar to previous studies, we confirmed the importance of risk management in bank 
performance based on the findings from our random-effects panel data regression 
models, GMM estimates together with the case studies. The results showed similarities 
and differences between the two types of banks. For instance, credit risk variables had 
a negative impact on bank performance for both types of banks. We further found that 
fintechs should pay more attention to credit risk as they have higher coefficient 
estimates for the variables. For market risk, fintechs also need to be more alert, as 
movement will have more impact on their performance. Moreover, sometimes, fintechs 
could see such movement as an opportunity to earn some returns.  
For capital and liquidity risk, both types of banks showed similar results. Both of them 
need to keep tier one capital stable, increase liquidity levels and reduce debt to a 
reasonable level, which could help them to achieve better performance. As these 
variables were required to achieve a certain level by the governments and Basel 
Accords, banks need to follow regulatory requirements in their operations. Furthermore, 
as fintechs were in their starting and developing stages, developing their assets can 
result in better performance. However, for the large traditional banks that had been 
developed for a long time, keeping assets at a stable level and reducing some non-
necessary assets would help their performance. Because random-effects and GMM 
estimates showed that negative estimated coefficient values existed for ln(asset) for 
traditional banks.  
With regards to operational risks, these also showed a negative impact on performance 
for both bank types. For fintechs, these variables had relatively high impacts. This 
indicates a different strategy for the different banks with different coefficient estimates. 
For fintechs, the most important thing in operational risk management is to have 'a 
safety business' (e.g., identify the customer to avoid fraud) (ABTnetwork, 2018). For 
traditional banks, the critical thing is to avoid extreme operational risk issues occurring, 
which could help operations continue smoothly. As operational risks are hard to monitor, 
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managers in both types of banks have to control cost levels for better efficiency. 
For research question three 'What differences exist among our three different countries 
in risk management and bank performance, and how well did these countries react to 
the last financial crisis?'. 
Following the previous research question, besides the bank types, similarities and 
differences also existed between the three countries. For example, in traditional banks, 
credit risk showed a stronger influence on UK banks than other countries in the 
investigated time period. One possible reason for this is that the last financial crisis 
impacted the UK more than the other two countries. However, Australian banks had 
more potential for credit failure, as their credit risk variables showed an increasing trend.  
In fintechs, the highest impacts of credit risks were seen in Chinese fintechs. This 
suggests a low efficiency of fintechs' credit risk management. However, as these 
fintechs were established recently, and the Chinese government published a series of 
regulations on fintechs' operations, by following these, the fintechs showed increased 
efficiency in credit risk management. Thus, more time should be given to allow better 
results. In addition, unlike China and the UK, credit risk variables in Australian fintechs 
showed a positive trend, which suggests there may be risky performance in the future. 
Thus, both types of banks in Australia should take extra care with credit risk 
management. 
With regards to market risk, this had a more substantial influence on the UK than the 
other two countries. With its higher level of connections to other countries, the financial 
crisis heavily impacted the UK. Another overall similarity for all countries was LCR 
which showed a positive influence on bank performance. As noted above, this suggests 
that both traditional banks and fintechs should follow the legal requirements, which 
could help them to achieve better performance. In addition, with regards to operational 
risks, we saw that operational risks heavily influenced Australian traditional banks and 
the UK fintechs. As these banks had relatively higher operational risk costs, they should 
keep monitoring their operating activities to reduce risk. If they fail to do so, the 
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performance would be negatively affected. 
For the last research question 'through our analysis, what should these banks/fintechs 
do to improve risk management for future challenges?'. 
In both our quantitative and qualitative results, we showed the necessity of prioritising 
these risks based on the type of banks and the country where the bank is mainly located. 
Through prioritising the relevant risks during risk management, banks could increase 
their management efficiency and achieve better performance in the future. Besides 
prioritising different types of risks based on bank type and locations, we provide four 
more suggestions for managers to both traditional banks and fintechs. Firstly, managers 
should build reports and set standards for risks. For fintechs, they could follow or gain 
experience to build risk reports and standards like traditional banks. For traditional 
banks, they should apply this strategy beyond public reports. They could build more 
frequent internal risk reports (e.g., daily or weekly) to help managers better understand 
risk. Secondly, risk managers in both types of bank need to understand their position 
limits and rules clearly. Thirdly, when managers plan for future investment or 
management strategies, they need to consider their historical and current risk positions. 
For example, they could use our model to estimate future performance and test how 
performance is likely to change if they apply a new strategy. Fourthly, managers could 
build and join incentive schemes, which could make all staff in the bank or fintech 
consider risk management more. 
As noted in Chapter 4, fintechs should pay attention to credit risk first. Even as they try 
to attract more customers, the quality of any credit activities should be controlled. For 
traditional banks, they should make sure that their liquidity, capital and debt are at a 
healthy level because the subprime crisis caused the traditional banks to become short 
of liquidity, which led to severe outcomes. On the other hand, based on the banks' 
locations, as the UK banks suffered a lot during the last financial crisis, the risk 
management performance follows a better trend with a healthier level for each of the 
risk variables. With a high involvement from government and the increasing trend of 
the economy, Chinese traditional banks performed relatively well. However, for the 
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Australian banks, as the last financial crisis had a limited influence on their performance, 
the risk management of Australian banks provided decreased efficiency. This was a 
warning sign for managers to pay more attention to risk management during their 
operating activities. If they do not consider risks carefully and increase risk 
management efficiency, performance could deteriorate in the future.  
The analysis shows that the 2008-09 financial crisis had a different impact on traditional 
banks in different countries. After the last financial crisis, challenger banks/fintechs 
started to be established and became a hot topic in the banking industry. According to 
the literature review in Chapter 2, we note that the last financial crisis was one of the 
triggers for the establishment and development of fintechs. For example, we found that 
after the last financial crisis, governments started to support the development of fintechs. 
Meanwhile, as more fintech-related regulations were enacted, more traditional banks 
started to invest in fintechs or establish fintech-related subsidiaries. Therefore, we can 
say that investing in fintechs during the financial crisis is good advice for shareholders, 
managers and investors related to the banking sector. Furthermore, our results show 
that the performance of most fintechs improved during the investigated time period. 
Although our sample only tested surviving fintechs, the results remain robust through 
both quantitative and qualitative analysis. As noted in Chapter 6, our models could help 
investors to reduce the probability of choosing failed fintech, because if the selected 
fintech perform well in our models, it will not be easily to fail. Therefore, for 
shareholders, managers and investors interested in investing in fintechs, they can 
choose those fintechs that meet regulatory requirements, have developed trends in risk 
management and performance, and are supported by local governments. In addition, it 
is still a good time to invest in fintech. As a result of Covid-19, people in many countries 
and regions have to live and work under lockdown. As fintechs offer all financial 
services online, this crisis gives them an opportunity to capture the market. Therefore, 
people interested in investing in fintechs can search for reports from the official 
websites of fintechs and statistical websites published by governments to see how these 
fintechs have performed in risk management and returns over the years. Also, they can 
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use our models to estimate the future performance of their target fintechs to test whether 
it is worth investing. 
7.3 Contributions and implications for theory and practice 
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to knowledge in theory and practice. 
Through our literature review, some of the research gaps were identified, namely that 
there was an absence of investigation in risk management in fintechs and their 
comparisons with traditional banks. We have critically investigated and evaluated the 
chosen topic. This section shows how the results from this research fill the related gaps 
in knowledge, thereby contributing to theory and practice. Table 7.1 summaries our key 
contributions to knowledge. 
RQ Contributions to knowledge 
1 Theoretical: 
This research contributed to the theory and perceptions of bank risk 
management, fintechs' development and financial performance 
improvement in China, the UK and Australia. It demonstrated risk 
management's impact on banks' performance and how they improve the 
efficiency of risk control, profitability and growth in fintechs as well as 
traditional banks. The results highlighted the focus points when managing 
these risks, the efficiency of risk management and their effects on bank 
performance, in order to assist future studies. The results showed that 
each type of risk shows its impact on bank performance at a different level 
through different variables. Moreover, as three countries and two types of 
banks were investigated, based on the country's situation, it presented the 
similarities and differences between countries and between bank types.  
Further, we followed previous quantitative methods (random-effects 
estimates and GMM estimates). Both of the quantitative analysis showed 
consistent results. Together with the case studies, this research showed 
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more comprehensive results in the area. Thus, this thesis could enhance 
the analysis in risk management for different types of banks. 
Practical: 
We demonstrated the main risks faced by traditional banks and fintechs 
and how the associated variables influenced bank performance. This 
research informed managers about what risks influence bank 
performance. Moreover, we highlighted the development of the fintechs 
where not much research had existed, especially in risk management for 
fintechs. We also built statistical models that could help managers 
improve their understanding of risk management through statistical 
analysis methods.  
2 Theoretical: 
We theoretically applied insight into the different risk variables on bank 
performance via different ratios through random-effects estimates and 
GMM estimates. We applied a bigger model by combining five different 
types of risks, which extends knowledge of bank risk management, 
performance and the relationship between them. This research was 
applied to different types of banks. Moreover, two types of models, 
together with case studies, were applied to show the robustness of the 
results. Thus, this research offered theoretical development regarding risk 
management and banks' performance in different types of banks. 
Practical: 
The demonstrated factors showed how banks could use these panel data 
regression models to understand financial performance better. Moreover, 
as the differences were shown in this research between types of banks, 
they would help banks and fintechs understand the different focus points 
when managing their risks, thereby prioritising risks and creating a better 
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performance to attract customers. We established comparisons between 
bank types which can help them better understand themselves and their 
competitors. For example, we found out fintechs should consider credit 
risks more than traditional banks, because they have higher significance 
levels and coefficient values with credit risk variable. Thus, fintechs need 
to improve their credit risk management, such as build credit risk reports 
and detailed credit risk standards. Further, we also encouraged better risk 
management efficiency and a healthy competitive environment. 
3 Theoretical: 
As noted above, besides the type of bank, we also considered the 
countries where these banks reside. We highlighted the differences and 
similarities shown between the three countries (China, the UK and 
Australia). We extended the knowledge of banks in different countries 
when managing their risks. We showed how these risk variables influence 
bank performance in different countries and made further suggestions for 
managers in the risk management process. It extended knowledge of risk 
management at the country level, which should be helpful for future 
testing in the global banking system. 
Practical: 
We revealed attributes affecting different types of banks based on 
different countries and that their strategies to improve efficiency have 
different focus points. For example, credit risks and operational risk 
trends were increased in Australian banks. Combined with the results of 
our random-effects estimates and GMM estimates, we showed that 
Australian banks should be worried about future performance more than 
the other two countries, which were showing a decreasing trend of risks. 
Thus, managers in Australian banks should pay more attention to risk 
management activities during their operations. 
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4 Theoretical: 
We integrated panel data regression models (e.g., random-effects 
estimates and GMM estimates) and case studies related to risk 
management and its impact on bank performance. We analysed results for 
two types of banks (traditional banks and challenger banks/fintechs) in 
three countries (China, the UK and Australia) which contributed to the 
banking system theory about fintechs. We corroborated different risk 
management strategies which should apply to different types of banks and 
countries. We provided a broad insight into bank performance in 
improving risk management efficiency with different types of banks from 
three countries. This contributed to risk management theory in new types 
of bank fintechs. In addition, We compared the results with those for 
traditional banks, which further extended the theory of risk management 
in banking operations. We also compared the results between three 
selected countries, which further extended risk management theory based 
on bank locations. 
Practical: 
We developed an integrated analysis for improving risk management 
efficiency and bank performance. This could help the banking industry 
develop a better awareness of fintechs. We also provide suggestions based 
on types of banks that could help managers prioritise the risks they face 
and predict banks'/fintechs' future performance based on our models. We 
also applied suggestions and plans in risk management strategies for 
managers in both types of banks and three countries. Moreover, we 
provided suggestions in investing in fintechs for people interested. 
Table 7.1 Contributions to knowledge for each research question 
We contributed to knowledge by helping to fill the gaps in fintechs development, risk 
management, their impacts on bank performance and the current situation shown in 
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traditional banks, especially with respect to how Chinese, the UK's and Australian 
banks performed. We developed a better understanding of the differences and 
similarities between traditional banks and challenger banks and fintechs among these 
countries with respect to risk management. 
In summary, this research could provide different understandings and suggestions for 
different types of people interested in the banking industry. For banks' and fintechs' 
managers, our results showed the necessity of prioritising these risks based on the type 
of bank and the country where the bank is mainly located. Through prioritising risks, 
banks and fintechs could improve their management efficiency. Besides prioritising 
different types of risks based on bank types and locations, we also provide four risk 
management suggestions to both types of banks in all three countries. Firstly, managers 
should build risk reports and set risk standards on a more detailed and frequent basis. 
Secondly, managers need to understand their management limits and rules clearly. 
Thirdly, managers need to consider the bank's/fintech's historical and current risk 
position when planning investment and management strategies. Fourthly, managers 
could build and join incentive schemes, which could increase the enthusiasm for 
participation in risk management. For investors or shareholders, our results can provide 
them with investment advice. They can invest in fintechs or traditional banks that meet 
regulatory requirements, have developed trends in risk management and performance, 
and are supported by local governments. Moreover, our models could help them 
estimate the future performance of the fintech or traditional bank of interest to test 
whether it is worth investing in. For the governments and policymakers, our results 
could provide a better understanding of how risks influence banks'/fintechs' 
performance. This could help them to develop more targeted policies and support 
provisions. 
7.4 Limitations and future work 
There are some limitations in this study that should be viewed as opportunities for 
future work. Firstly, the absence of any established research testing the different types 
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of risks on fintechs in their performance, even though many studies investigated this 
area, limits studies on fintechs. As a new type of bank, our sample with a total of 33 
fintechs was too small to provide generalised results for the whole industry. Thus, a 
larger sample of fintechs would have been better for statistical analysis. However, as 
the fintechs are newly established companies in the banking industry, there were only 
limited sample variables to be used in this research. Thus, as time passes, there should 
be more for future researchers to analyse. Nevertheless, the shortfall was overcome by 
analysing case studies, the qualitative results that enriched the research and the 
quantitative results gathered from the panel data regression models. 
As we stated in Chapter 5, we were unable to obtain data on failure cases for analysis. 
The main reason for this is that all fintechs operate online. When a fintech company 
closes its operations, its data will disappear from the internet. Therefore, we do not have 
access to data on any closed fintechs. In addition, poorly run fintechs may delay 
publishing or may not publish financial and risk performance reports. Therefore, we 
could only select those 'successful' fintechs and collect data from their published annual 
or interim reports. Although only 'successful' fintechs are used, the cases we have 
selected can still help us understand how fintechs operate in risk management. Based 
on our analysis, we find some fintechs performed better than others during the 
investigated period and are considered worthy of investment that have the following 
conditions: 1. have released their annual or interim reports regularly; 2. meet regulatory 
requirements; 3. have developed trends in risk management and performance; 4. are 
supported by local governments. 
Secondly, we could not capture all of the variables in risk management. As indicated in 
Chapter 3, this research used typical risk variables to test bank performance. However, 
as shown in previous studies, it can only focus on one or more of the risk variables to 
test their impacts, which still contributes to the literature. In addition, there were limited 
studies focused on fintechs. In this regard, future research could include more risk 
management variables.  
Finally, we built several regression models to reach our results. Future researchers could 
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summarise a whole regression model with dummy variables, such as using dummy 
variables for bank types and countries when they have enough large sample size to 
represent the industry. Also, this research was collected only from banks and fintechs 
in China, the UK and Australia. In order to achieve more generalised results, other 
countries could be added. While the limitations of this research are acknowledged, the 
achieved results are not reduced in their significance and contributions.  
7.5 Overall conclusion 
We have shown the importance of risk management in banks' performance in both 
traditional banks and the newly established fintechs. With the behaviour change of 
consumers in receiving financial products and services, fintechs have taken on a more 
important role in the banking industry. Thus, managers in traditional banks and fintechs 
need to pay attention to risk management to achieve better performance. We aimed to 
analyse the differences and similarities existing between the two types of banks. 
Moreover, in order to achieve more comprehensive results, we analysed this topic in 
three countries (China, the UK and Australia). After reviewing the previous literature, 
we built a methodology with quantitative and qualitative approaches to obtain our 
results. Based on analysing these results, we provided discussions and suggestions. 
Thus, we showed new insight into bank risk management which could be the foundation 
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Appendix 1 Dummy variable analysis (Random-effects estimates) 
Through our literature review in the traditional banking industry, we noted that when 
investigating banks in China, researchers often add a dummy variable to determine the 
effects of bank ownership regarding whether the bank is a state-owned bank or a joint-
stock commercial banks or an other types of commercial bank on bank performance. 
For example, Fu & Heffernan (2009) and Tan (2016) both use dummy variables to 
represent the ownership of the Chinese traditional banks and test its influence on bank 
performance. Thus, in order to have a comprehensive result for Chinese traditional 
banks, we also add a dummy variable to indicate bank ownership to compare their 
performance to other traditional banks. The dummy variable is equal to one for state-
owned banks (SOB) and zero for other traditional banks. 
As noted in our methodology, the standard form of the panel data regression model is 
  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 , where 𝑦  represent the dependent variables; 𝑥 
represents the independent variables; 𝛽0  represents the constant term;  𝛽𝑗 (𝑗 =
1, … , 𝑘) are coefficients to be estimated; 𝑖 and 𝑡 are indices for the sections and time, 
respectively; 𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 , where 𝛼𝑖 is the individual-specific unobserved effect. 
For the random-effects approach, the individual-specific unobserved effect includes 
unobserved time-invariant and group-specific effect. 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Following a 
similar approach, we also run random-effects models with the addition of a dummy 
variable. The form of the model becomes   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 + γ𝑆𝑂𝐵𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝑦 represent the dependent variables; 𝑥 represents the independent variables; 
𝛽0  represents the constant term;  𝛽𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑘)  and γ  are coefficients to be 
estimated for the dummy variable; 𝑖 and 𝑡 are indices for the sections and time, 
respectively; 𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 , where 𝛼𝑖 is the individual-specific unobserved effect 
and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
With the dummy variable in the dataset, the F test, LM test and DWH test results were 
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not changed. Random-effects models were still suitable and were applied in all panel 
data regression models for Chinese traditional banks. The estimates of the panel data 
regression models are constructed in Table A1.1 and include three models based on 
three dependent variables. 
 ROA ROE EPS 
 Estimates R.S.E  Estimates R.S.E Estimates R.S.E 
Intercept 0.0378 0.0634 0.1903 0.6057 0.0357 0.5720 
NPL -0.1426** 0.0680 -2.2775** 1.1412 -0.8983* 0.6145 
NCO -0.0104 0.0255 -0.0043* 0.4288 -0.1632* 0.2260 
LoanR -0.0199* 0.0323 -0.0785 0.5365 -0.0252 0.2902 
VaR -0.0001** 0.000022 -0.0006* 0.00037 -0.0006*** 0.0002 
LCR 0.0005* 0.0017 0.0032* 0.0286 0.0094* 0.0150 
CR 0.0335 0.0601 0.3338** 0.5562 0.7064* 0.5396 
T1 0.0025** 0.0321 0.2331*** 0.5368 0.3351 0.2887 
D/A -0.0040 0.0112 -0.1796** 0.1823 -0.0171* 0.1034 
D/E -0.0004** 0.0007 -0.0076*** 0.0116 -0.0006 0.0063 
BVC % 0.0029*** 0.0035 0.0444 0.0590 0.011** 0.0304 
ORP % -0.0003* 0.0137 -0.0459* 0.2152 -0.1006* 0.1303 
Ln(Asset) -0.0022*** 0.0007 -0.0243** 0.0107 -0.0085*** 0.0075 
C/I -0.0110** 0.0068 -0.2128** 0.1162 -0.0366*** 0.0608 
SOB 0.0072** 0.0020 0.0737** 0.0294 0.0191 0.0219 
R2within 0.5062  0.3918  0.3346  
R2between 0.5769  0.4537  0.4062  
R2overall 0.3053  0.2688  0.2384  
No. 110  110  110  
Table A1.1 Random-effects estimation results for China (with the SOB dummy variable) 
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
     R.S.E represent robust standard error. 
For all dependent variables (ROA, ROE and EPS), the results are consistent with the 
results found in Section 4.2. For example, all credit risk variables have a negative 
influence. This suggests that higher credit risks would lead to worse performance. In 
more detail, NPL is significant for all three variables (ROA, ROE and EPS) at 5%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. This suggests that NPL is significantly important in credit risk 
management for Chinese traditional banks. Moreover, LoanR estimates shows 10% 
significance for ROA and NCO estimation shows 10% for ROE and EPS. This suggests 
that besides NPL, managers should also pay attention to these variables when managing 
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credit risks. Moreover, NPL shows the highest coefficient value in three credit risk 
variables for all three dependent variables. This further shows the importance of NPL 
in credit risk management. The market risk variable, VaR, also has a significant 
negative effect on all three dependent variables. With its significance, VaR should be 
considered during risk management. However, as estimate values are relatively small, 
combined with a relatively stable financial situation in China, traditional banks can 
worry less about the impact of market risk.  
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, LCR, CR and T1 have positive 
impacts on bank performance. This suggests that increased tier one capital and liquidity 
holding percentages in the traditional banks would improve their asset performance. In 
more detail, LCR shows its positive influence for all three variables at the 10% 
significance level and T1 shows the 5% and 1% significance level for ROA and ROE, 
respectively. This indicates that Chinese traditional banks should follow legal 
requirements and increase liquidity and capital levels while managing liquidity and 
capital risks. Moreover, CR shows its significance at the 5% and 10% level for ROE 
and EPS, respectively. CR also shows highest coefficient values in three variables. This 
suggests that besides achieving the legal requirements, managers should consider CR 
when managing liquidity and capital risks. With respects to debt level variables, both 
D/A and D/E have negative impacts on bank performance. In more detail, D/A is 
significant for ROE and EPS at the 5% and 10% significance level respectively, and 
D/E is significant for ROA and ROE at the 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
Moreover, D/A shows higher coefficient value than D/E for all three dependent 
vairbales. Thus, managers should control and reduce the debt level and focus more on 
D/A, which could increase bank performance during risk management.  
For the selected operational risk variables, both ORP and C/I show significant negative 
influences on bank performance. This result proves the importance of operational risks 
and managers should take extra care when managing operational risks. Reducing 
operational issues and their costs could help Chinese traditional banks developing their 
bank performance. With regards to reputational risks, BVC shows positive impacts on 
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all three dependent variables and shows its significance at the 1% and 5% for ROA and 
EPS, respectively. This suggests that managers should increasing traditional banks' 
reputation during operations which could help banks to receive better performance. 
Moreover, ln(asset) has a significant negative impact at bank performance with the 1% 
level for ROA and EPS and at the 5% level for ROE. This means that a higher asset 
level will reduce bank performance. The highly significant level indicates the strong 
influence of ln(asset) on bank performance. Thus, the result suggests that maintaining 
or decreasing the acceptable amount of assets could help traditional banks perform 
better. This result confirms findings from previous studies (e.g., Geng, 2016, Tan, 2016 
and Zhang, 2010) that also showed a negative relationship between ln(asset) and bank 
performance.  
In addition, the dummy variable (state-owned banks) also shows a consistent result for 
three dependent variables. SOB presents a positive impact on bank performance, which 
suggests that state-owned banks enjoyed more scale efficiency than other banks. 
Moreover, SOB is only significant in the models of ROA and ROE, which indicates 
that the ownership of bank influences its performance in assets and equity but does not 
significantly affect bank performance in the share market. This result is in line with Tan 
(2016) for Chinese traditional banks. He/She showed a positive relationship between 
SOBs and bank performance. However, the result is the opposite of that found by Fu & 
Heffernan (2009), who argued that SOBs have lower bank performance. Our finding 
could be explained as, with the advantages of larger business scale and variety, SOBs 
could reduce their costs and thereby increase bank performance.  
Similarly, besides interpreting variables, we looked at the R2 for our random-effects 
models. R2(within) shows a 51% variation for ROA, 39% for ROE and 33% foe EPS 
within one traditional banks over time. R2(between) shows 58% variation for ROA, 45% 
for ROE and 41% foe EPS between traditional banks. R2(overall) shows 31% for ROA, 
27% for ROE and 24% foe EPS for traditional banks. This shows that Chinese 
traditional banks have higher variation with regards to ROA. 
In summary, in order to have a comprehensive result for Chinese traditional banks, we 
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added a dummy variable to test if the ownership of banks influences bank performance. 
Our overall conclusion is consistent with obtained showed in Chapter 4.2. With adding 
the dummy variable, the results further show that if the bank is a state-owned bank, the 
performance will be better than other banks in China. In addition, as noted in Chapter 
3, the reason for not adding the dummy variable to traditional banks in the UK and 
Australia is that there are no state-owned banks in these countries. Thus, this research 
only adds the dummy variable for Chinese traditional banks as shown here in Appendix 


















Appendix 2 Dummy variable analysis (GMM estimates) 
As noted in Chapter 3 and Appendix 1, this section applies GMM for Chinese 
traditional banks by adding the dummy variable, state-owned banks (SOB). For all 
dependent variables (ROA, ROE and EPS), the estimates are consistent with the results 
obtained in GMM for Chinses traditional banks in Chapter 4. Therefore, reducing credit 
risks, market risks, debt level and operational risks could help banks to improve their 
performance. At the same time, improving liquidity and capital holding level and 
reputation could also help banks improve their bank performance. In addition, Chinese 
traditional banks should keep their size stable and reduce unnecessary assets to achieve 
better performance.  
Concerning the SOB in our GMM estimations, instead of all significant positive impact 
on the performance shown in random-effects panel data regression models, the GMM 
estimates show different results. The SOB only has a significant positive influence on 
the ROA, and has a negative impact on the ROE. These results show that state-owned 
banks enjoyed more scale efficiency than other banks in ROA and EPS. This suggests 
that the SOB has a better ROA performance with a significant positive influence on 
ROA than other traditional banks in China. Moreover, based on the DWH tests, we 
confirmed there is no endogeneity problem in our dataset. The difference here suggests 
that SOBs should keep their operations smooth. Although they could not enjoy the scale 
efficiency for ROE, SOBs could enjoy the scale efficiency for ROA and EPS. 
Additionally, as the coefficient value is not significant on ROE and EPS, based on the 
significant result for ROA, this finding is consistent with Tan (2016) and inconsistent 
with Fu & Heffernan (2009). The possible reason could be that with the advantages of 
larger business scale and variety, SOBs can reduce their costs and increase ROA 
performance.  
As noted in Chapter 3, in order to have a comprehensive result for Chinese traditional 
banks, we add a dummy variable to test if the ownership of a bank influences bank 
performance. Our overall conclusion is consistent with the findings shown in Chapter 
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4.2 and Appendix 1. In summary, besides the dummy variable, the result stays 
consistent for risk variables. Reducing credit risks, market risks, debt level risks and 
operational risks could increase bank performance. While increasing liquidity and 
capital holing levels and brand value could increase bank performance. Moreover, 
cutting unnecessary assets could also help Chinese traditional bank increase their 
performance. The estimate of the dummy variable suggests that if the bank is state-
owned, then ROA performance will be better than other banks in China. Moreover, as 
said before, not adding the dummy variable to traditional banks in the UK and Australia 
is that there are no state-owned banks in these countries. Thus, this research only adds 

















 Estimations  
 ROA ROE EPS 
Intercept 0.1300 0.3673 -0.4587 
One period lag of 
dependent variable 
0.3465* 0.4889*** 0.0481 
Non-performing loan ratio -0.0538* -0.1490*** -0.7114* 
Net Charge-off rate -0.0084 -0.3215* -0.2716* 
Total loan loss ratio -0.0009* -0.1521 -0.3391* 
Value at risk -0.0001 -0.0004** -0.0010*** 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0010* 0.0282* 0.0030 
Current ratio 0.0597 0.2685 0.4926* 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.0069** 0.7651* 0.0515* 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.0199 -0.4006* -0.0931* 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0013* -0.0271 -0.0037 
Brand value change % 0.0008*** 0.0025 0.0177* 
Operational risk % -0.0031* -0.1036* -0.0870* 
Ln(Asset) -0.0048* -0.0544** -0.0034* 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.0117 -0.1497 -0.0955* 
State-owned banks 0.0016** -0.0152 0.0030 
F-test 169.3*** 184.8*** 201.0*** 
Sargan Test (p-value > 𝜒2) 49.7(0.565) 60.5(0.196) 42.6(0.821) 
AR(1) z = -5.84 
p-value = 0.00 
z = - 3.71 
p-value = 0.00 
z = -2.04 
p-value = 0.00 
AR(2) z = -0.39  
p-value = 0.70 
z = -0.99 
p-value = 0.32 
z = -0.08 
p-value = 0.94 
Obs. 110 110 110 
Table A2.1 GMM estimation results for China (with the SOB dummy variable) 
Notes: *, **, *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model 
estimation. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of 






Appendix 3 Random-effects estimates without outliers for Australian 
fintechs 
As we observed in Chapter 4, some outliers exist in fintechs for all three countries. 
However, there are not enough observations to test Chinese and UK fintech's EPS with 
deleting the outliers. Thus, we should give fintechs a longer time to have more fintechs 
join the share market, and then we will have enough data to analyse. Thus, in order to 
check the influence of these outliers to get more comprehensive results, we rerun the 
random-effects estimates for Australian fintechs without outliers.  
Firstly, we rerun White’s test to see if heteroscedasticity still exists. Results of White’s 
test in Table A3.1 shows that heteroscedasticity was still present in data without outliers. 
Since heteroscedasticity causes standard errors to be biased, after finding the proper 
static panel model, we used robust standard errors. 
Fintechs ROA model ROE model EPS model 
White’s test (𝑝-values) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Table A3.1 Tests for heteroscedasticity 
Next, we rerun the F, LM and DWH tests after deleting the outliers of the Australian 
fintechs' dataset. The results are consistent with the results showed in Chapter 4. 
Random-effects models were still suitable and were applied in all panel data regression 
models for Australian fintechs. Table A3.2 shows tests for determining the most 
appropriate approach for Australian fintechs without outliers. The estimates of random-
effects are constructed in Table A3.3 and include three models based on three dependent 
variables. 
Test 𝑝-values (ROA) 𝑝-values (ROE) 𝑝-values (EPS) 
F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LM 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DWH 0.3804 0.4660 0.5908 
Table A3.2 Tests for determination the most appropriate approach for Australian 
fintechs without outliers 
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 ROA ROE EPS 
 Estimates R.S.E  Estimates R.S.E Estimates R.S.E 
Intercept -0.7333*** 0.2121 -0.7515** 0.4583 0.0237 0.0763 
NPL -1.1843* 0.6338 -0.9681* 1.2075 -2.6271* 1.9913 
NCO -2.1031 0.6829 -3.6701* 1.4634 -2.0469 2.0003 
LoanR -1.0431* 0.6184 -2.2432* 1.1366 -0.9832* 1.9333 
VaR -0.0061* 0.0113 0.0159 0.0321 -0.0054* 0.0042 
LCR 0.0279* 0.0670 0.0359* 0.2041 0.0157** 0.0212 
CR 0.0212* 0.0215 0.0306 0.0748 0.2076 0.0084 
T1 0.2246*** 0.7462 0.4668*** 1.6627 0.1215* 0.2313 
D/A -0.4501* 0.2167 -1.6009* 0.4604 -0.0284 0.0561 
D/E -0.0054  0.0033 -0.0237* 0.0074 -0.0041 0.0009 
BVC % 0.0220* 0.0274 0.1093** 0.0972 0.0038* 0.0081 
ORP % -0.0078 0.0790 -0.2696** 0.1776 -0.2297** 0.1850 
Ln(Asset) 0.0685** 0.0334 0.0118* 0.0742 0.0152** 0.0125 
C/I -0.0058** 0.0565 -0.0215** 0.0550 -0.0038 0.0199 
R2within 0.6147  0.5489  0.5763  
R2between 0.6572  0.6026  0.6276  
R2overall 0.3403  0.3223  0.3712  
No. 74  74  65  
Table A3.3Random-effects estimation results for Australian fintechs (without outliers) 
Note: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
     R.S.E represent robust standard error. 
1. Outliers included in the following fintechs at the time period: ‘ChangeFinance’ in 
30/06/2015, 31/12/2015 and 31/12/2016; ‘NovatiiGroup’ in 31/12/2015 and 31/12/2016; 
‘Ondeck’ in 31/12/2015 and ‘WISR’ in 31/12/2017. 
For all dependent variables (ROA, ROE and EPS), the results are consistent with those 
in Section 4.5, except for the effect of D/E on EPS. For example, all credit risk variables 
have a negative influence. This suggests that higher credit risks would lead to worse 
performance. In more detail, NPL and LoanR are significant for all three variables 
(ROA, ROE and EPS) at the 10% significance level. NCO estimate shows its 
significance at the 10% level for ROE and the highest coefficient value in three credit 
risk variables for all three dependent variables. As credit variables showed similar 
significance level in above three regression models, it suggests that managers should 
consider credit variables with coefficient values more. All coefficient values of credit 
risk variables are smaller than were seen in the estimates from the model performed 
from the dataset containing outliers. This suggests that outliers increase the impact of 
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credit risk variables on predicted bank performance but do not affect the overall 
findings. 
Similar to results with the outliers, the market risk variable, VaR, has a significant 
negative impact on ROA and EPS at the 10% significance level but has a positive 
impact on the ROE. This further illustrates the complexity of market risk, and 
Australian fintechs should pay extra attention to market risk management. Managers 
should balance VaR values to achieve better overall performance. 
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, LCR, CR and T1 have positive 
impacts on bank performance. This suggests that increased tier one capital and liquidity 
holding percentages in the traditional banks would improve their asset performance. In 
more detail, LCR shows its significance positive influence for all three variables at the 
10%, 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. CR shows its significance at the 10% 
level for ROE, while T1 shows its significance at the 1%, 1% and 10% significance 
level for ROA,ROE and EPS, respectively. Moreover, T1 also shows highest coefficient 
values in three regression models. This indicates that Australian fintechs should follow 
legal requirements and increase liquidity and capital levels while managing liquidity 
and capital risks. Managers should consider T1 more based on its higher significance 
level and coefficient values. 
With respects to debt level variables, different results are shown. Both D/A and D/E 
have a negative impact on bank performance. This suggests that the outliers influence 
the D/E's impact on the EPS. However, the change of influence of D/E does not impact 
our suggestions as we found the negative impact of D/E on the EPS in our GMM 
estimates with outliers. Our results provide further evidence of the importance of 
running random-effects and GMM estimates simultaneously to test the dataset. In more 
detail, D/A is significant for ROA and ROE at the 10% significance level, and D/E is 
significant for ROE at the 10% significance level. D/A shows higher coefficient values 
than D/E for all three dependent variables. Thus, our suggestions are the same. 
Managers should control and reduce the debt level and focus more on D/A, which will 
improve the fintechs' performance in the risk management process. 
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For the selected operational risk variables, both ORP and C/I show negative influences 
on bank performance. The importance of ORP in operational risk management 
increased when outliers were removed. In the random-effects estimates for Australian 
fintechs without outliers, ORP increased the coefficient values for all three variables 
and showed higher significance levels and coefficient values than C/I. This suggests 
that reducing operational issues and their costs could help Australian fintechs to their 
performance.  
Similar to the results with outliers, the reputational risk variable BVC shows a positive 
impacts on all three dependent variables. Moreover, BVC shows its significance at the 
10%, 5% and 10% level for ROA, ROE and EPS, respectively. This suggests that 
managers should increase fintechs' reputation during operations which could help banks 
to attain better performance. With regards to the bank size, ln(asset) has a significant 
positive impact on bank performance at the 10% level for ROE and at the 5% level for 
ROA and EPS. This means that a higher asset level will increase bank performance. 
This is also consistent with results with outliers included and confirms our findings that 
increasing their size could help fintechs improve their performance. 
Similarly, besides interpreting variables, we looked at the R2 for our random-effects 
models. R2(within) shows a 61% variation for ROA, 55% for ROE and 58% for EPS 
within fintechs over time. R2(between) shows 66% variation for ROA, 60% for ROE 
and 63% foe EPS between fintechs. R2(overall) shows 34% for ROA, 32% for ROE 
and 37% foe EPS for fintechs. This shows that Australian fintechs have higher variation 
with regards to ROA. 
In summary, we found random-effects estimates without outliers for Australian fintechs. 
The overall findings are consistent compared with the analysis in Section 4.5, except 
for the D/E in EPS. Even without outliers, fintechs still need to improve bank risk 
management to help them achieve successful performance. Furthermore, as outliers are 
part of the performance of these fintechs, we cannot simply remove them and then 
analyse the rest of the data. Therefore, the analysis without outliers is presented here in 
Appendix 3 rather than in Chapter 4. 
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Appendix 4 GMM estimates without outliers for Australian fintechs 
Similar to Chapter 4, we also rerun the GMM estimates for Australian fintechs without 
outliers. The estimates from the GMM are constructed in Table A4.1 and include three 
models based on three dependent variables.  
 Estimations  
 ROA ROE EPS 
Intercept -01.491*** -3.2195*** 0.2254 
One period lag of dependent 
variable 
0.0505 0.2458* 0.0518** 
Non-performing loan ratio -3.7734* -1.3353* -1.1664*** 
Net Charge-off rate -6.6597* -9.9603* -1.2782*** 
Total loan loss ratio -4.6012* -5.7208** -1.5498*** 
Value at risk -0.0054 -0.0224* -0.0061** 
Liquidity coverage ratio 0.0283* 0.0936* 0.0053* 
Current ratio 0.0099 0.0044 0.0027 
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.9913*** 0.1830* 0.0726* 
Debt-to Asset ratio -0.8122*** -0.0854 -0.0815*** 
Debt-to-Equity ratio -0.0311*** -0.0170* -0.0017* 
Brand value change % 0.0927*** 0.0391* 0.0052* 
Operational risk % -0.2469 -0.1784** -0.2934*** 
Ln(Asset) 0.0301* 0.0122** 0.0002* 
Cost-to-Income ratio -0.0228** -0.0943* -0.0209*** 
F-test 292.7*** 201.2*** 279.1*** 
Sargan Test (p-value > 𝜒2) 33.04(0.511) 31.2(0.583) 23.0(0.993)  
AR(1) z = -3.01 
p-value = 0.00 
z = -3.45 
p-value = 0.00 
z =-3.34 
p-value = 0.00 
AR(2) z = -0.84 
p-value = 0.41 
z = -0.40 
p-value = 0.68 
z = -0.29 
p-value = 0.78 
Obs.1 74 74 65 
Table A4.1 GMM estimation results for Australian fintechs (without outliers) 
Notes: *, **, *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sargan test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model 
estimation. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of 
order 1 and 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
1. Outliers included in the following fintechs at the time period: ‘ChangeFinance’ in 
30/06/2015, 31/12/2015 and 31/12/2016; ‘NovatiiGroup’ in 31/12/2015 and 31/12/2016; 
‘Ondeck’ in 31/12/2015 and ‘WISR’ in 31/12/2017. 
Firstly, the F-statistics confirm the significance of the variables. The Sargan test shows 
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the there is no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. The AR tests show that the 
estimates of the parameters of the independent variables are consistent for our GMM. 
Moreover, the significant coefficients of the lagged performance variables (ROE and 
EPS) confirm the dynamic character of the model specification. For Australian fintechs, 
the significant coefficients of the lagged performance variables confirm the dynamic 
character of the model specification. These results suggest that the performance of 
Australian fintechs seems to persist and implies that the Australian fintechs are in a 
competitive market structure.  
For all the dependent variables (ROA, ROE and EPS), the results are consistent with 
the results found in Section 4.5. For example, all credit risk variables have a significant 
negative influence on bank performance. This suggests that higher credit risk would 
lead to worse performance. Similar to the random-effects model in Appendix 3, the 
NCO estimate shows the highest coefficient value of the three credit risk variables for 
all three dependent variables. This suggests that managers should consider credit 
variables with significance levels along with coefficient values. Moreover, all 
coefficient values for credit risk variables are smaller than they were for the estimates 
with the outliers. This suggests that outliers increase the impact of credit risk variables 
on bank performance but do not affect the overall findings. 
Similar to results with the outliers, the market risk variable, VaR, has a significant 
negative impact on all dependent variables. Similar to the results with outliers, there is 
no endogeneity problem in our dataset as we tested. Moreover, the VaR is significant in 
the GMM model but not in the random-effects model. The results shown here suggests 
that Australian fintechs should be concerned more with market risks. Furthermore, as 
the results for the other two dependent variables are consistent, Australian fintechs 
should keep VaR at a reasonable level and reduce the risk, if possible, to achieve better 
performance. 
With regards to the capital and liquidity risk variables, LCR, CR and T1 have positive 
impacts on bank performance. This suggests that increased tier one capital and liquidity 
holding percentages in the traditional banks would improve their asset performance. In 
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more detail, LCR shows its significant positive influence for all three variables at the 
10% significance level, while T1 has its significance at the 1%, 10% and 10% 
significance level for ROA, ROE and EPS, respectively. Moreover, T1 also shows the 
highest coefficient value of the three variables. This indicates that Australian fintechs 
should follow legal requirements and increase their liquidity and capital levels while 
managing liquidity and capital risks. Managers should consider T1 more based on its 
high significance level and coefficient values. With respect to debt level variables, 
consistent results are shown. Both D/A and D/E have a negative impact on bank 
performance. In more detail, D/A is significant for ROA and EPS at the 1% significance 
level, and D/E is significant for ROA at the 1% significance level and ROE and EPS at 
the 10% significance level. D/A shows a higher coefficient value than D/E for all three 
dependent variables. Thus, in order to achieve better performance, managers should 
control and reduce debt levels. 
For the selected operational risk variables, both ORP and C/I show negative influences 
on bank performance. Similar to Appendix 3, the importance of ORP in operational risk 
management increased when outliers were removed. ORP increased its coefficient 
values for all three variables and showed higher significance levels and coefficient 
values than C/I. This suggests that reducing operational issues and their costs could 
help Australian fintechs to develop their performance.  
Similar to the results with outliers, the reputational risk variable BVC shows a 
significant positive impact on all three dependent variables. This suggests that 
managers should increase fintechs' reputation during operations which could help banks 
to achieve better performance. With regards to bank size, ln(asset) also shows a 
significant positive impact on all three dependent variables. This means that a higher 
asset level will increase fintechs' performance. This is also consistent with our results 
with outliers and comfirms our findings that increasing size could help fintechs to 
improve their performance.  
In summary, we applied random-effects estimates without outliers to Australian 
fintechs. The overall findings are consistent with our analysis in Section 4.5. Even 
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without outliers, fintechs still need to improve bank risk management to help them 
achieve successful performance. Furthermore, as outliers are part of the performance 
of these fintechs, we cannot simply remove them and then analyse the rest of the data. 
Therefore, the analysis without outliers is presented here in Appendix 3 rather than in 
Chapter 4. 
 
 
